THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH

VOLUME XVIII APRIL, 1932 NUMBER 2

ADAPTING COURSES IN INTERPRETATION TO THE ACADEMIC MIND

LEE EMERSON BASSETT
Stanford University

BEFORE we can proceed with this discussion, we must come to some understanding of the meaning of the term "academic mind." To some it may represent a more or less vague notion associated with a university community, while others may be led to think of a particular individual, a faculty member perhaps of pleasant or unhappy memory. The image that came into my mind when first I gave attention to the word was that of a thin, sad-faced, dyspeptic individual, critical and caustic, yet not devoid of kindness and humor, whose trousers and coat hang loosely upon him and rarely match in material and color, and who avows that students are a nuisance and that the human race is hopeless. One might apply to him the remark made about Bernard Shaw: "Though he has few enemies, he is cordially hated by his friends." But the kingdom of the university is not entirely made up of such as these. No profession or class should be judged by its queer ones. The negative aspects of the term "academic mind," which appear when one first attempts to define it, suggest the reply made by an alienist when asked for a definition of insanity. "Define everything else in the universe," he said. "What is left is insanity." No invidious comparison is here intended, of course.

Does academic refer to a particular type of mind, that, in and of itself, sets an individual or group apart from others? Are all men of high intelligence academic minded? Would Abou Ben Ad-

hem, who headed the list of those whom love of God had blessed, be classed as a man of academic mind? The term applies, I am prone to think, to a certain attitude, if you will, and to habits of thought rather than to inherent peculiarities. We all know men of superior intelligence and men of generous and loving natures, like Ben Adhem—"may his tribe increase"—to whom, without discredit to them, we would not apply the term academic. Not all intelligent men have the academic attitude—a fortunate thing perhaps—yet it can be acquired. It is the business of the university, if I understand the meaning of university, to bring students to that attitude and to train them to certain methods and habits of thought that mark the man who has been profoundly influenced by the experience and discipline.

Perhaps we can arrive at the most satisfactory working definition, and at the same time gain a clearer idea of what is demanded of us who offer interpretation courses, by considering those things which the university holds of greatest worth and for which it stands in the higher education of the individual.

First, the university exalts knowledge. Knowledge is power. The university sets high value on that kind of power. Tests are based largely on the mastery of facts in various fields of knowledge. It is assumed that the university man is an informed man—a man who knows much about something and something about everything. The university seeks to impart knowledge and to instill the love of learning.

In the second place, to quote Woodrow Wilson, "the object of the university is intellect." This implies the training of the mind in acquiring information not only, but in coherent, straight, discriminating thinking.

Thirdly, something more is derived than the ability to think in an orderly way. Any student who can pay attention can learn to think coherently. He can organize his notes, write clear abstracts of assigned readings, work out problems, make a brief. But if he rises to the expectations and responds to the stimulus of the university, his thinking activity will not stop there. He will take account of his own reactions, and he will be called on, and will endeavor, to interpret the meaning of what he observes, reads, and hears. He will experiment, ponder, compare, seek to discover relationships, and to base conclusions on adequate ground of knowledge, observa-

tion and thought. History will mean to him something more than a mass of events and dates and names to be remembered; chemistry more than lists of elements and of formulae; literature more than names of authors, titles, words, syntax and style. All these, and the rest, he will discover, have bearing on life and are to be interpreted in terms of human need and human experience and human worth.

Fourth, the university stands for truth. Its high function is to seek truth in nature and in human life, to encourage the search and love of it and to apply what is learned to the welfare and happiness of men. It should train men to distinguish truth from *"seeming truth"* that they may not be deceived and entrapped. And, what is of greater significance, it should inculcate such respect for truth that the man himself will not resort to deception nor take advantage of others who have not had his opportunities.

Fifth, the university represents not intellect alone but spirit as well. It recognizes the ennobling and refining influence of beauty, the power of faith, hope and love—things not made with hands nor measurable with instruments, but essential to the complete and the good life.

Sixth, and last, the university values straight-forward, accurate, unpretentious expression, in conduct and in word, written and spoken. Such expression alone serves the sincere desire to make ideas clear to others and to communicate truth with least possibility of misunderstanding and with greatest force.

Knowledge, straight thinking, interpretative thinking, truth, things of the spirit as well as of the mind, simple, accurate and adequate expressions—for these the university stands and these are of chief concern to the earnest man of academic training, whether that training be gained in the university or acquired through years of independent labor and self discipline. That these ideals are not realized to the full, or, in some instances, not at all, is no reflection on the principles and ideals for which the university is supposed to stand.

Bearing in mind these principles represented by the university, let us ask ourselves whether courses in interpretation are compatible with them. If they are, how may they be made to serve in a general way the purposes of university education? Furthermore, because of the peculiar character of such work, is it not possible that it may

be so organized and conducted as to meet a need not now met in other courses and departments?

When we face these questions squarely and deal with them frankly we shall have made a beginning in preparing the way for meeting and, let us hope, overcoming eventually the indifference and often the prejudice which exist and which are at once a handicap and a challenge to us. It must be admitted that courses in interpretation are not accepted everywhere without question.

They are still viewed by some faculty members as unworthy of the serious consideration of scholarly men. During my early years at Stanford the able and learned head of a department there protested to a student who wished to take my course in oral interpretation. "Why take that course? Anybody with intelligence can read!" Sad commentary, by the way, on a good many faculty men who are reputed to be intelligent! We may as well confess, though, that there has been, and still is, reason for this hesitancy and doubt and suspicion on the part of faculty and administration. In many instances they have been considerate, tolerant, and charitable.

If our interpretation courses are included in the curriculum, it must be under the assumption that they conform to academic standards and contribute in some way to the academic mindedness of those whom we teach. We must test our courses then by the ideals and purposes of the university briefly stated, in part, at least, previously in this paper.

First, as the university stands for sound knowledge and seeks to build up an eager attitude toward learning, the material of our courses must be substantial in thought and content. That is one of the first tests to be applied. Do our courses represent a substantial body of material with which students are expected to become familiar? We shall agree, I hope, that only literature of recognized merit and of universal appeal on a high level should be included. There is no place in the curriculum for writings of inferior grade, unless as examples that by contrast emphasize excellencies of the best. We should have nothing to do with literary fakirs, sentimentalists and sensationalists. Let us leave clap-trap, catchy, cheap exhibition "pieces" and "stunts" to entertainers ambitious for vaudeville applause. Our function is not to train people for purposes of exhibition nor, as I conceive it, are we primarily concerned about making public readers. Our inspiring task is to help them to under-

stand and appreciate "the best thought of the best minds in their best moments" that their own minds may be opened, their imaginations led out, and their spirits enriched by experience gained through vital contact with good literature.

Our courses in interpretation, then, should be made up of the best that literature has to offer, together with collateral reading of the best prose and poetry. A good background of knowledge of the work of a particular poet or prose writer helps to substantiate and illumine the interpretation of portions of his work assigned for more intensive study. Students in interpretation classes might well be required to read the major portions of Keats, Tennyson, Dickens, Kipling or of any other author whose writings they undertake to interpret orally. If a book of selections is used, they should be required to read the whole text of stories or plays from which scenes are given and find out as much as possible about the author and his work. Knowledge of the period in which the author lived, the influence that shaped his thought and motivated his writings is highly important. A scene from Nicholas Nickleby, for example, cannot be adequately presented until the student has read the whole story and knows the circumstances that prompted the writing of it.

Study of a few pieces that recite well will not suffice. Reliable interpretation springs from knowledge, thought, and experience. The student must be made to realize this. He should be led to orient himself by broader reading than that entailed in the study of the one piece of literature to be interpreted. Courses in literature offered by departments of English can help here. They are a valuable supplement to the oral interpretation courses, as are sound oral courses to those in literature. The reading of Malory's book of Arthurian romances is an illuminating experience for the student who undertakes the oral interpretation of the "Idylls of the King." When oral interpretation courses have a content comparable to courses in English literature they will merit equal recognition with them in the university curriculum.

In the second place, a course in interpretation should be a course in clear thinking, in concentration, analysis and synthesis. In preparing a piece of literature for oral interpretation every word, phrase, sentence, the whole composition, in fact, should be subjected to deliberate scrutiny. The student who pretends to understand the

meaning of words or of sentences, prepares his own betrayal, even if he did not prepare the assignment. When he reads:

> "There is a divinity that shapes our ends
> rough—hew them as we may"

he betrays his laziness and stupidity, though he may inadvertently have stated a truth about himself and his immediate predicament!

The study of the vocabulary of a piece of literature, the analysis of it for its ideas and figurative meanings, and the relation of its parts to each other requires as exacting attention and thought as does the solution of a problem in mathematics or physics. "Words, words, words," are easily said. Their meaning is elusive and we are easily misled by appearances, or are led into error by taking meanings for granted, as did the student who, after he had read the sentences from Stevenson's "Lantern Bearers," "They may be meat salesmen to the outer eye but to themselves are Miltons, Shakespeares or Beethovens" explained that Beethoven was "some sort of a religious sect."

A familiar example will suffice to make this point clear. A junior student read Keat's sonnet "On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer" after this manner:

> Much have I travell'd in the realms of gold,
> And many goodly states and kingdoms seen;
> Round many western islands have I been
> Which bards in fealty to *A*pollo hold.
> Oft of one wide expanse had I been told
> That deep-brow'd Homer ruled as his de-*mes*-ne;
> Yet did I never breathe its pure serene
> Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold:
> Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
> When a new planet swims into his ken;
> Or like stout Cor*tez* when with eagle eyes
> He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
> Look'd at each other with a wild *sur*mise—
> Silent, upon a peak in Dar*i*en.

When asked to explain "realms of gold," "goodly states and kingdoms," "western islands," "fealty," "Apollo," "demesne" and the other figurative references, he couldn't do it. After being assigned the sonnet three successive times he was able to read it with a fair degree of accuracy. When he sought knowledge that would

give him the right to read the poem, he strengthened himself in intellectual honesty and did something toward acquiring the academic mind.

Third, and closely related to clear thinking, is interpretative thinking. Through interpretative thinking, through recognition of the meaning and possibilities of facts discovered and things known, the university makes its greatest contribution to society and to the individual student who is induced to do that kind of thinking. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are interpreted in the light of modern conditions. The grammatical system of a language is discovered through an interpretative study of the various forms and usages that have appeared in the development of the language. The use of serums in preventive medicine came about through a long process of observation, experimentation and interpretative thinking. In like manner, the voicing that brings to life the words that stand for a poem and that makes that poem a reality to the one who voices it and those who hear it, is the result of interpretative thinking. In the process the imagination and feeling of the reader take over what at first were but mental images. They are the reader's now, not as a matter of knowledge merely but his by right of experience. He may know what "kindness" means as an abstraction, but the pleasure of doing a kind deed or of imagining a kind deed done adds significance to the word and to the utterance of it. So one who reads and reacts to the images suggested by words recreates the author's thought and at the same time adds something from his own experience. His thinking is at once interpretative and creative. The thought must first come to life in the mind and soul of the reader. The reader discovers something within that he may not have been aware of before. No fact or idea ever becomes potent until it is incarnated and lived and interpreted in terms of life.

Every phrase, every sentence, every image, when once understood and taken to heart, becomes an experience, an experience more significant than the mere intellectual comprehension of the meaning of the words. We may read the following lines merely as a series of intelligible words or as the revelation of an experience as deep, as mysterious, as beautiful and as awe-inspiring as can be expressed in sound.

> "The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,

Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep."

When the full significance of these lines is revealed through the voice, they tell us not facts only but a solemn truth; they "feelingly persuade us what we are." "Happy is he who can translate the stubbornness of fortune into so quiet and so sweet a style."

Fourth, as the university stands for the discovery and accurate statement of truth, interpretations must be true to the thought and spirit of the author. The earnest effort to get the meaning of a passage, determine the spirit and catch the emotional experience of it is wholesome exercise in intellectual and spiritual honesty. We all know how difficult this is, and we all know the thrill and the glow of achievement and self discovery when we arrive at what seems to us the exact meaning, the true experience and the adequate expression. One of the most satisfying and inspiring experiences a teacher has is that of leading a student to find the deeper meaning in words and the truth they are meant to convey but do not reveal to the casual glance or the superficial thought.

The opening lines of "The Merchant of Venice" will serve well enough to illustrate the difference between hasty perusal and an earnest effort to find the author's meaning and to speak it faithfully.

"In sooth, I know not why I am so sad.
It wearies me, you say it wearies you.
But how I found it, caught it, or came by it,
What stuff 'tis made of, where of it is born,
I am to learn;
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me
That I have much ado to know myself."

Nine students out of ten in reading this will throw the emphasis on *"sad."* But questioning will eventually reveal the real meaning of the lines and Antonio's intention in speaking as he does. Why does Antonio say this? To tell his friends that he is sad? Do they not already know it? Have they not told him that his mood makes them weary? How do we know that? We have not heard them say it, but Antonio has. "It wearies me," he says. "You say it wearies you." No, Antonio is not declaring to the world that he is sad nor

bidding everybody to observe the fact. But he is trying to account for the mood. He says that he doesn't know the cause of it and he deplores the dulling effect it has on his wits. It has been said that Antonio poses as a man of sadness and exploits the mood. The criticism is not well taken when it is made to apply to Shakespeare's Antonio. It is applicable, though, to the Antonio of the reader who advertises the mood by a perverted rendering of the lines. Antonio does not say

"In sooth, I know not why I am so *sad*."

but

"In sooth, I know not *why* I am so sad."

This carries the implication, clearly indicated by Antonio later on, that his friends have been concerned about his sadness and have asked him about it—have said, in fact, that it makes them weary.

This is but an illustration of the close scrutiny the reader must give to every line of literature if he prepares himself to speak with the authority of one who knows what he is saying. Does not this sort of training afford discipline in observation and discriminating thought comparable to that required in laboratory experiment and scientific investigation? As discipline in accuracy of thought-getting and thought-statement alone, does it not merit academic recognition along with any other study, the educational value of which is measured largely by the training it offers in accurate observation and precise knowledge and statement?

Fifth, literature is something more than a formal representation of ideas. It reveals the spiritual experiences of men, their emotional reactions to their environment, to themselves and to other men. In a broad sense all men are spiritually minded and live largely in the spirit. Whether the level of life of the individual be high or low depends upon his spiritual attitude and the kind of emotions that dominate his thought and conduct. A man's active spirit, that part of his nature which reveals itself to other men, may be low, sordid, mean, selfish, revengeful, yet as a human being he has capacity for high and noble aspirations and achievements. Shylock has a strong spirit, but the motions of that spirit were "dark as Erebus." I cannot think that a man's nature is changed, in and of itself, when he turns from sordidness, selfishness and hate, as did Scrooge, to generous, joyous service. He was still Scrooge to those who knew him, but a Scrooge to be loved, not feared. Submerged emotions

and spiritual energies were suddenly released and Scrooge's better self stood revealed. Life for him thereafter, and for all who came in contact with him, was lifted to a higher level and took on new meaning because of a changed attitude toward men, because his better emotions took command.

Now, in literature we find the expression of all the moods and emotions of men. To experience literature, to live it, as one must who interprets it orally to others, means the discovery within oneself of emotions common to humanity. In literature that is true to life as a whole the best in man emerges somewhere and attracts us by its beauty and truth. Men are not "Hairy Apes" clear through. Even Caliban, that gross and bestial creature, had glimmering visions of beauty and of something better around and above him than he had found in the mire of his cave. Shakespeare dealt justly with human nature in his portrayal of life. Listen. The brutish Caliban speaks, reflecting the brute still, but revealing dreams of "sounds and sweet airs" and voices and opening clouds ready to drop riches upon him, dreams that so delighted his spirit that when he waked he "cried to dream again."

> "Be not afeared; the isle is full of noises,
> Sounds and sweet airs, that give delight and hurt not.
> Sometimes a thousand twanging instruments
> Will hum about mine ears; and sometimes voices,
> That, if I then had wak'd after long sleep,
> Will make me sleep again; and then, in dreaming,
> The clouds methought would open, and show riches
> Ready to drop upon me; that, when I wak'd,
> I cried to dream again."

Our literature, built as it is out of the stuff of human life, reaches into the realm of fancy and imagination and of dreams where the spirit is free to claim its own.

The liberalizing, regenerative influence of enduring literature is like the influence of a strong and much loved friend. We are free to select what we shall read and make ours as we are free to choose our friends; freer, indeed, for the choice rests wholly with us and is not limited to our environment. Will anyone venture to assert that the depth and breadth of spiritual experience to be derived from the intimate contact with good literature which full oral rendering demands is not a vital part of university education? Indeed, is it

not greatly needed to round out academic life and give it heart as well as head?

Lastly, if we are to adapt our courses to academic standards, the work done in them must be unassuming, simple, clear. One reason for discrediting courses in elocution in former days was the emphasis put on emotionalism. The first thing thought of was the importance of emotional reaction and expression. Students recited Wolsey's farewell to Cromwell without knowing who Wosley was or why he was brought low or said what he did to Cromwell by way of advice. And, if perchance they had heard of Oliver Cromwell, they thought the Cromwell who shed tears when Wolsey spoke was the great Oliver himself. But the piece offered fine chances for emotional wallowing and pretense for vocality and gesture. Such recitations were to be witnessed, not experienced. They were exhibitions, not interpretations. But there is no justification in educational work for mere emotionalism and gesticulation in and for themselves.

Strength of expression and interpretation should be sought by simple methods. That art is truest which calls least attention to the manner of execution. The student should be made to feel that when he gives sincere, honest expression to what he clearly thinks and strongly feels, he is not expected to do something extraordinary. The reading we should encourage is the unpretentious reading of honest, unassuming minds, reading that cultured ladies and gentlemen would approve. Exaggeration, over-emphasis for effect, vulgar display of any sort, have no place in courses in interpretation or on the platform of a university. The academic mind is impatient of over-emphasis, exaggeration and distortion of the truth. On the other hand, nothing is more attractive and impressive than unassuming simplicity and straight dealing.

In the degree that our courses in oral interpretation are substantial in content, offer exacting discipline in clear thinking, interpretative thinking, truthful thinking, open the way to understanding and appreciation of spiritual things, and stand for honest, unaffected and unpretentious utterance, they are adapted, so it seems to me, to the expectation and the exactions of the academic mind and are potent factors in building up in our student the attitude of mind which we may call academic.

Never was the opportunity nor the need of the teacher of oral

interpretation greater in our universities than at the present time. The liberalizing, humanizing influence of our finest poetry and prose is understood and acknowledged. The need of such influence is great in the university. Dealing, as literature does, with the experiences of men, expressing as it does their intuitions, emotions and deepest thoughts on the meanings of life, it supplements the limited activity of the investigating intellect and rounds out and enriches the life of the individual. The man who lives, as many university men are compelled to live, largely in the laboratory and in the realm of detached investigation and thought, suffers atrophy of creative imagination and of spirit unless he has opportunity and incentive to give play to these faculties. The familiar experience of Darwin is a case in point. He deplored in his later years his inability to enjoy music or art. He admitted that his studies had deadened his capacity for such things.

It is a lamentable fact that departments of English have failed in many instances to treat literature as an art to be enjoyed. The influence of the scientific attitude has had, doubtless, much to do with this. Tennyson once expressed the fear that his poetry would be studied in the schools. It has been and still is! But how? Do our students come into the university or go out of it with any real love for Tennyson, or any other poet, for that matter? There are exceptions, exceptions rare enough to prove the practice implied in what has just been said. Hiram Corson's reading and his methods of imparting the informing spirit of Tennyson, Milton, and Shakespeare are still remembered by students of Cornell University who had the privilege of coming under his influence. Dr. David Starr Jordan once told me that his first contact with poetry came when he sat in Dr. Corson's classes and listened to his readings. Dr. John Branner, the second President of Stanford, often expressed his appreciation of Dr. Corson's readings, which he described as "real interpretations of real literature." The generous acceptance of oral interpretation courses at Stanford can be attributed in large measure, I believe, to the experiences several of our faculty had in Corson's courses at Cornell. Professor Copeland at Harvard exerted a similar influence in his classes and by his public readings at that institution. Literally scores of people have expressed to me their appreciation of what his readings brought to them of insight and joy in literature. But where now is the cultivated voice and the

trained reader to be found in English departments of our universities? There may be some. I hope there are. I personally know of none, though I know a few who think they can read. Perish the thought!

The whole field of the oral interpretation, the real interpretation, of literature is open to us. The richest field of all lies fallow now. Do we measure up to the opportunity and the need? Have we the scholarship, trained judgment, disciplined taste, culture, and motives that conform to the highest conception of the university and the academic mind? Let us, then, move up and possess the land, not for the sake of possession but that we may do our full part in our appointed way.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STAMMERING*

C. S. BLUEMEL
University of Denver

ONE of the assuring things about stammering is the fact that there are many earnest workers striving to learn the nature and cause of this speech defect. On the other hand, it is disquieting to see the great diversity of opinions that these workers entertain. One investigator finds an emotional disturbance, another observes a respiratory disorder, a third sees a social mal-adjustment, a fourth discerns oral inactivity, a fifth believes there is latent left-handedness, a sixth holds that there is an impediment of thought, and so on with theories accumulating.

This diversity of opinion is due partly to the fact that the problem of stammering is not yet solved. It is also very largely due to our confusion of the primary speech disorder with the various complications and emotional reactions that associate themselves with the later stage of the disturbance.

Yet it is imperative that we keep the two stages of stammering distinctly separate in our minds, just as we keep the two stages of infantile paralysis apart when we discuss symptoms, treatment, and other aspects of the disease. The primary stage of infantile paralysis

*Read before the annual meeting of the American Society for the Study of Disorders of Speech, Detroit, Dec. 31, 1931.

is an inflammation of the spinal cord which is accompanied by headache, backache, fever, vomiting, restlessness, delirium, etc. The secondary stage is marked by muscular paralysis, so that we deal eventually with shrunken muscles, canes, crutches, braces, and other things so far removed from the original fever that we seem to be considering a different disease.

With stammering, the primary disorder is a simple disturbance of speech in which a delay ensues between the commencement and completion of a word. In secondary stammering the child has become conscious of his defect, and attempts to control it and conceal it. There is now physical effort in speech, with various respiratory disturbances, the use of starters and wedges, the employment of synonyms and circumlocutions, the appearance of confusion in the thought processes, and the association of emotional disturbances with speech and with the various situations in which stammering is anticipated.

In primary stammering the disturbance is most frequently seen at the beginning of the sentence, and it commonly assumes the form of repetition of the first word of the sentence. The child says, for instance, "I-I-I want that. Can-can-can I have it?" Often we hear repetition of initial consonants or initial syllables of words, and especially of the introductory words to sentences. The child says, "L-l-l-look at this. M-m-m-mother, what is it?"

It is characteristic of this primary or basic stammering that it may disappear and return, often repeatedly, over a period of several months or years. But eventually the secondary stage of stammering is reached.

The stammerer has now become conscious of his defect, and he tries to force the articulation of his words. He squeezes the lips together or presses the tongue into the roof of the mouth in order to accomplish by physical exertion what he cannot achieve by natural fluency. In many instances he is unable to confine his muscular effort to the speech organs, and he jerks his head, wrings his hands, or even stamps his feet. These struggles have nothing to do with primary stammering; they represent merely his futile endeavor to contend with a disability which is beyond his understanding and control.

The same may be said of respiratory disturbances. The stammerer tries to talk after exhausting his breath, or he attempts to

speak while inhaling instead of exhaling, he gasps in the middle of sentences, and in various other ways disturbs the normal rhythm of respiration. Then, too, there are respiratory disturbances due to emotion. These often precede speech, making their appearance as soon as the stammerer knows that he will be required to talk. Usually they become intensified with the act of speech.

Far removed from basic stammering is the use of starters and wedges. The stammerer intersperses his speech with such phrases as, "Well," and "Say," and "Listen." One little girl begins her conversation with "Oh, Oh, Oh."

An evasion of stammering is seen in the use of synonyms and circumlocutions. The speaker says "Empire State" instead of "New York State" because he finds the latter phrase more difficult. In this same manner he may avoid difficult words and difficult situations a hundred times a day. These evasions have nothing to do with primary stammering: they represent merely the stammerer's attempt to escape from an impediment that is already established.

The search for synonyms often leads to confusion of thought. This is especially likely to be the case when the stammerer is confronted with a direct question, for the situation gives him but a moment to formulate a reply. Confusion also arises from indecision; the stammerer is fearful of words for which no synonyms are available, and he delays the act of speech because he knows that stammering is inevitable. Meanwhile he may stare helplessly at a mental picture of the printed word he wishes to say, or he may visualize the object he wants to name. While this indecision continues, he stands mentally transfixed. This confusion in the thinking processes may be of such severity as to make speech temporarily impossible.

The dominant symptom in secondary stammering is fear. This may be fear of letters, fear of words, fear of speech, fear of people, or fear of speech situations. A quarter of a century ago it was pretty well accepted that fear resulted from stammering, but the last twenty-five years have seen in psychology a remarkable emphasis on the emotions, and many observers of stammering have again revived the fallacy that fear is the cause of stammering. A rather typical point of view is expressed by an English medical writer who says: "It is nearly always found that a deep seated sense of fear is present as the underlying causal factor."

This point of view, however, is in no way borne out by careful observation. We see young university debaters pale and gasping with fear, and although they may show hurried speech and confusion, they do not display the impediment of speech which we know as stammering. It is evident then that fear as a mere emotion does not cause stammering.

Neither does the fear of speech cause stammering. The neurologist sees patients who are troubled with self-consciousness which becomes severe and disabling when they are required to talk. But when these patients are non-stammerers their embarrassment does not produce stammering. Elizabeth K. became painfully self-conscious and speech conscious when she was a junior in college. Her fear began when she first addressed her sorority sisters at luncheon. In accordance with their custom she tapped her glass and rose to bring something informally to their attention. Her heart beat fast and she became confused. After this experience she became self-conscious in class. Sometimes she is "scared to death" throughout an entire period and she feels exhausted when the class is over. When she recites, her voice seems strained and her words sound funny to hear. Occasionally she gets a little confused; once she said "Blaker" instead of "Baker." However, her fear of speech never leads to stammering.

Numerous cases of this kind could be cited, but this case is sufficient to illustrate the point that the fear of speech does not result in stammering when the speaker is not a stammerer.

Finally there is the theory that stammering results from the fear of stammering, the argument being that the impediment arises from auto-suggestion. Actually, however, one does not find fear of stammering in people who are not already stammerers. Then, too, it is seen that young children often stammer without self-consciousness toward speech. When their stammering is intensified by emotion it is usually because of pleasurable excitement.

When fear affects the young child—and it does sometimes develop quite early in stammering—one finds that the child usually becomes negativistic toward speech. He points, or says, "I can't say it," or he refuses to talk, but he does not display the emotional breakdown in speech which is so evident in the adult.

Having all these points in mind one must conclude that the primary cause of stammering is not to be found in fear—whether

it be fear as an emotion, or fear of speech, or fear of stammering. Fear is a result of stammering, and when it adds to the stammerer's difficulties it does so as a secondary factor.

When stammering begins in early childhood there is often a lapse of several years between the onset of primary stammering and the development of secondary stammering. Meanwhile in many instances the stammering comes and goes. But if the young child is scolded or punished for his impediment, or is made conscious of his stammering as a social defect, he may develop secondary symptoms quite early, in fact within two or three weeks of the onset of the primary speech disturbance. None the less one may recognize the transition from the primary to the secondary stage.

I said at the beginning of my paper that much of our difficulty with stammering as a research problem resulted from the fact that we confuse the primary speech disorder with the various complications and emotional reactions that characterize the secondary stage of the disturbance. Thus far I have devoted my paper to an explanation of my conception of the two stages of stammering. I have tried to show that primary stammering is a speech disturbance pure and simple, while secondary stammering includes not only the speech disturbance but also the struggle with the impediment and the emotional reaction toward it.

I propose now to examine several theories of the cause of stammering, and to test them against this classification in order to see whether they relate to basic stammering or whether they have to do with secondary symptoms.

I will take first the interesting theory that stammering often results when a left-handed child is made to use the right hand. This change in handedness is presumed to disturb the balance between the right and left hemispheres of the brain, with the result that the controlling half of the brain is deprived of its natural leadership.

This theory of reversal was applied in a fascinating manner to the problem of word-blindness, a disability that manifests itself in reading and writing. It was noticed that children sometimes read or wrote "d" instead of "b," and "q" instead of "p". Here there was a confusion between the letters and their mirror images, and the conclusion was accepted that the child was using the wrong half of the brain. The theory, however, is far from being adequate, for

children sometimes write "m" instead of "w," and "n" instead of "u". Here we need another theory, that the child is using the bottom of his brain instead of the top. We also need the second theory to explain errors in shorthand, in which beginners frequently reverse their horizontal word-forms.

The theory, then, is far from sufficient in its relation to word-blindness; therefore when it is applied to the problem of stammering, it should not be accepted as something already accredited.

If the theory is valid in stammering, it must apply to basic stammering, and not to the secondary manifestations of the disorder. It can hardly apply to the use of excessive effort in speech or to the use of synonyms, or to confusion in thought, or to fear. The theory has been employed to explain respiratory disturbance on the assumption that one hemisphere controls the chest muscles, while the opposite hemisphere acquires a sort of antagonistic control of the abdominal muscles. This is an ingenious explanation, though it seems to be little more than a hypothesis. But the theory is intended not merely to explain the respiratory disturbances of stammering. It is deemed to be related to the problem in a more fundamental manner, manual reversal being accepted as the cause of stammering itself. It would be one of the miracles of medicine if the problem of stammering could be so completely simplified, and the remedy found so readily at hand. But unfortunately this scarcely seems to be the case.

In the first place the conception of cerebral dominance is somewhat confused. It is inferred that a child is right-brained because he throws a ball with his left hand; but often the fact is overlooked that he kicks a ball with his right foot. Then the inference is drawn that a child is right-brained if he happens to sight with his left eye. But the matter of eye dominance is by no means so simple, for there enter into the problem such considerations, as unequal vision in the two eyes, unequal accommodation, unequal muscular control, and other physiological and anatomical factors. The conclusion that eye dominance points to brain dominance may therefore be unwarranted.

Turning to the clinical facts of stammering, one usually fails to find a history of manual reversal in examining a child within a few weeks of the onset of stammering. Often the patient is a child of two or three years who has not yet entered school, and has not

been required to use his right hand in violation of a preference for his left.

But even if the child is in school and is being taught to use the right hand in spite of natural left-handedness, it still does not follow that the enforced manual reversal is accountable for his stammering. Children often stammer when they enter nursery school, and since they are not required to write or draw, there is no question of manual reversal, but probably one of over-stimulation. Stimulation may therefore be the potent factor in the grade school. It is conceivable, of course, that a strongly left-handed child might be made nervous when required to use his right hand for co-ordinated movements. But I can conceive of this nervousness existing quite apart from a disturbance in cerebral dominance. I believe that he might be made nervous if he were required to reverse his shoes, wearing the left shoe on the right foot, and vice versa. It is even conceivable that extreme nervousness from this cause might manifest itself in speech disturbance, but I fail to see the justification for invoking theories of cerebral dominance.

Finally, if manual reversal, per se, causes stammering, then one would expect to find stammering in the right-handed English child when he commences to use a fork, for he is taught to hold the fork in his left hand, and not to pass it from one hand to the other across his plate as the child does in America. Here is an example of manual reversal of quite extensive scope, and it is a reversal that favors the left-handed child while it handicaps the right-handed. But there is no wholesale stammering among English children when they reach the fork age.

In view of these various facts one may well doubt the validity of the theory of manual reversal with consequent disturbance of cerebral dominance, though one cannot fail to be fascinated with the theory and impressed by the brilliant researches of the workers who have sponsored it.

Another interesting theory of stammering is that of visual lack. Stammering is supposed to result when the speaker finds his mental pictures either slightly or temporarily diminished or lacking altogether. The theory was published in 1915, and has since gained considerable vogue in the United States, though its acceptance has been in the sphere of education rather than the sphere of medicine.

In testing the theory one does not find that it is applicable to

secondary stammering; that is, one could not consider visual lack as accounting for effort in speech, for fear, the use of synonyms, etc. Possibly it might be inferred that visual lack could cause confusion, though it would seem more logical to argue that confusion causes visual lack, since a bewildered state of mind impairs the stammerer's thinking.

The theory fails in many important points when it is tested against primary or basic stammering. If visual lack causes stammering, then one would expect a young child to stammer when he loses his sight and consequently suffers a gradual fading of his visual memories. This, however, proves not to be the case, for the loss of sight has no effect on speech. Likewise one sees that congenital blindness has no effect on speech development; the child learns to talk normally in spite of total lack of visual imagery.

Then, too, in observing young stammerers one often finds that their fluency is destroyed by strong visual impressions, which must be regarded as the opposite of visual lack. The child is talking fluently in the doctor's office, and almost at will the physician can induce stammering by taking a toy airplane or a doll from his desk. The child responds immediately with "I-I-I want to see it," "Let-let-let me have it." Certainly the little patient shows no lack of visualizing power. The same is true of the confirmed adult stammerer. Probably his hardest task is to introduce two people, whom he sees clearly before him. There is too much visualizing, so to speak, and his stammering is likely to occur in its severest form.

We will now examine the theory that stammering is caused by some kind of subconscious emotional conflict. It is difficult to say what kind of conflict, for most writers on the subject allude vaguely to repressions, but do not arrive at the point where they clarify the matter. There are references to subconscious memories, forgotten emotions, psychic mal-assimilation, etc. The allusion seems to be to something illicit, which the stammerer is endeavoring, as it were, to keep from himself.

When the writers are specific, they are not in accord. One believes that the stammering boy has developed a street corner vocabulary, and that in the presence of his parents he starts to use an obscene word, but interrupts himself and thus causes stammering. By this procedure, fear becomes attached to the syllable, and the fear interferes with its use.

Another writer believes that the stammerer is using his impediment as a defence, and that he excuses his failures by the existence of his infirmity.

Another investigator considers stammering as a code language which affords a means of expression to wishes that have been repressed into the patient's subconscious mind.

Still other investigators believe that through his impediment the stammerer is secretly gratifying in his maturer years the suckling instinct which belongs to childhood.

When one comes to examine these arguments he finds it difficult to test the general theory in its relation to primary and secondary stammering. The suckling theory is undoubtedly primary, but the repressed emotion theory is secondary, for stammering is thought to arise from fear. But there is no explanation of the manner in which fear may cause stammering except on the part of the writer who believes that the stammerer is afraid of obscene words. In reality there is too much confusion in this group of theories to permit of clear analysis.

It is evident that these theories were not evolved from a clinical study of stammering. There was first the Freudian explanation of nervous symptoms, and then its application to stammering together with its application to countless other nervous illnesses. Consequently if one accepts this general line of reasoning, he does so not because of his insight into stammering but because of his conviction regarding psycho-analysis and kindred psychology.

Clinical observation of stammering does not strengthen one's confidence in these theories. In examining young children one finds nothing of unconscious conflicts that is not already in one's mind. And if one deals with adult stammerers, he is of course in danger of suggesting his own conclusions. Denhardt found that he could influence a stammerer's speech by suggesting a relationship with the phases of the moon, and it is certain that suggestion will be a potent factor when one asks a stammerer to fathom the emotional memories of his childhood. One is therefore entitled to reasonable doubt about these theories unless it can be shown that repressions and conflicts are unquestioned realities and that their appearance precedes the onset of primary stammering.

There are numerous other theories that one might test for relationship to primary and secondary stammering. I will discuss,

however, only one further theory—the theory that I propounded in 1912 and later modified in some degree. The fundamental conception in this theory is that stammering is an impediment of thought, and not primarily a speech defect. In its original form the theory assumed that the stammerer's mental impediment was a form of transient auditory amnesia, in which the stammerer was unable to recall the sound of words to his mind because his auditory memory for words was weak or dim. Being for the moment unable to think the words, he was for the moment unable to say them.

Further observation of stammerers[1] led to the conclusion that this failure of mental speech occurred not because the stammerer's memory for sounds was dim, but because the speech imagery actually recoiled for the moment from his mind. So far as mental speech is concerned, the speaker's mind is momentarily blank, and if he attempts to proceed, he must inevitably stammer. This mental condition was deemed to constitute basic stammering.

I shall endeavor now to examine this theory more critically, and in doing so, I shall disregard the psychological concepts of speech, and shall confine the discussion to cerebral physiology, in which speech takes the value of a conditioned reflex. For the moment, speech can be disregarded as well as psychology, for I wish to refer to some of Pavlov's physiological experiments.[2]

Pavlov's work is principally with the dog. He performs first the simple experiment of putting food or a little weak acid in the animal's mouth. By certain ingenious methods he then measures the amount of saliva the animal secretes. The secretion of saliva in response to the stimulus of food or acid is regarded as a natural or un-conditioned reflex. A conditioned reflex is established as follows:

A weak solution of acid is made black. The dog is permitted to see it, and a little of the acid is then put in his mouth. Thereupon the glands secrete saliva. Later the dog is shown a bottle of black water at a distance, and again he secretes saliva. This is a conditioned reflex.

In another experiment the stimulus is a flash of light. First

[1] *Mental Aspects of Stammering*, Baltimore, 1930.

[2] Pavlov, I. P.: *Lectures on the Conditioned Reflexes;* International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1928.

the light, then the weak acid in the mouth, then the secretion of saliva. After several repetitions of the procedure, it is found that the light by itself will produce saliva, while acid or food is no longer necessary. Again there is a conditioned reflex.

And now the experiment is repeated with a slight variation in the conditions. The light is flashed as before, but the acid is not applied till an interval of three minutes has elapsed. The acid produces saliva as before. After several repetitions of the procedure, the acid is omitted, whereupon there appears a remarkable phenomenon. The light without the acid produces saliva, but the saliva is not immediately forthcoming; instead there ensues an interval of approximately three minutes. Something meanwhile holds back the salivary flow. Pavlov calls this phenomenon retardation or internal inhibition.

There are other experiments with inhibition. The experimenter sounds a tone on a tuning-fork, then gives the animal food. This stimulus is a positive tone, since it is always followed by feeding. The experimenter also uses a negative tone, of a different pitch, which is not followed by feeding. When the conditioned reflex is established and food is no longer employed, it is found that the positive tone produces saliva while the negative tone does not.

But the negative tone is found to have sufficiently strong inhibiting powers to stop the conditioned reflex if it is sounded shortly before the positive. That is to say, the positive tone will produce saliva so long as the negative tone is kept silent, but if the negative tone is sounded, it may be fifteen minutes before the positive tone can again produce salivary flow. Other experiments also show that there is remarkable potency to inhibition.

Most potent of all in its inhibitive qualities is the powerful stimulus which one would interpret psychologically as being of the emotional kind. This type of inhibition was discovered accidentally. A number of dogs were caught in a flood, and were rescued with considerable difficulty. When later they were returned to the laboratory it was found in some cases that their positive conditioned reflexed had been completely annihilated. Gradually these reflexes were built up again, then the flood stimulus was reproduced in miniature by allowing water to flow under the door into the laboratory. Again the conditioned reflexes were inhibited.

We can now leave Pavlov's experiments and revert to the

subject of speech. To the behaviorist, speech is simply a conditioned reflex. The child sees a flash, and he learns to say "light." With other stimuli he says "milk," "hot," or "walk," as the case may be. In this manner his speech is eventually built up.

But what if the child says "M-m-m-milk"? Evidently there is inhibition. Recognition of this inhibition may suffice with the physiologist and behaviorist, but the psychologist assumes that there is a mental process of speech combined with the cerebral process and he looks for the interruption of thought that corresponds to the physiological inhibition. It is at this point that one may recognize temporary auditory amnesia or recoil—that is, recoil of verbal thought from the stream of consciousness. One could state the matter by saying that in stammering there is internal inhibition in which the flow of verbal thought is retarded or inhibited, just as the flow of saliva is inhibited in Pavlov's physiological experiments.

One can assume that inhibition occurs in two phases. First there is unusual and excessive stimulation—a flood, a fire, a fall—and the conditioned reflex which we know as speech is partly or wholly obliterated. If partly obliterated, we have immediate stammering; if wholly obliterated we have temporary mutism, and usually stammering when speech returns. In this initial process stammering has resulted from external inhibition. In the second phase, stammering becomes permanently established by internal inhibition. The child attempts to say "ball," but several seconds elapse between the commencement and the completion of the word. The setting is similar to that in Pavlov's experiment in which a delay occurs between the flash of light and the taste of food. In both cases there is a delayed conditioned reflex. In the experiment there is a delay in the flow of saliva; in stammering there is a delay in the flow of mental speech.

Probably the initial stammering from external inhibition would prove temporary if it were not for internal inhibition. This inhibition etches into the brain the delay that occurs between commencement and completion of the word, and thereby the mental impediment is perpetuated.

One can suppose that internal inhibition ensues when stammering results from imitating a stammerer. Here there is an artificial delay between the commencement and completion of a word. In the

light of Pavlov's work it is natural that delay should lead to inhibition.

Similarly when one stammers because of association with a stammerer: one hears the stammerer attempting to say familiar words, and as he listens, the process of retardation is established in his mind.

If speech is viewed as a conditioned reflex, it is easy to understand why stammering has its inception in childhood and never in adult life. The reflex becomes inhibited only when it is insecurely established, that is, in early life. But when the reflex has been repeated countless times over a period of two or three decades it is no longer vulnerable to external or internal inhibition.

One can see, too, why stammering is practically incurable in adolescent and adult life. The normal conditioned reflex of speech has never been securely established, while internal inhibition has been elaborated as a permanent part of the cerebral physiology.

Confronted with these theories of inhibition one may well inquire: Why is it that inhibition occurs in some individuals and not in all? To this question there is no present answer. In his animal experiments Pavlov recognizes an inhibitive type. Possibly there is also an inhibitive type in the human family. But here we enter upon conjecture and speculation, and it would be well to recognize the limitations of our present knowledge.

The foregoing interpretation of stammering in physiological terms is offered as a correlative explanation of the theory of stammering that I have advanced in purely psychological terms. The theory of auditory amnesia or recoil is based on psychological consideration and on observation of stammering, but it seems to find support in the physiological researches which I have just described.

If the theory of temporary amnesia, or internal inhibition, is correct, then it is evident that the explanation applies to primary or basic stammering. This basic stammering is the disability that the patient has always with him. Superadded to it are the complications that result from the stammerer's struggle with speech and from his emotional reaction to his impediment. These complications constitute secondary stammering. They comprise such manifestations as respiratory disturbances, physical effort and contortion, the use of starters and synonyms, and the appearance of confusion and fear in association with speech.

It is not my desire to urge the acceptability of my own particular theory of the cause of stammering. The purpose of this paper is to draw a distinction between primary and secondary stammering, and to emphasize the fact that the speech disturbances and emotional reactions of the confirmed stammerer are symptoms far removed from the basic speech disorder with which the impediment begins. I believe that all investigation of stammering should be made with this distinction between primary and secondary stammering in mind; otherwise our researches may merely add to the confusion that already confronts us.

THOMAS HOBBES' PHILOSOPHY OF SPEECH

LESTER W. THONSSEN
College of the City of New York

THE field of Speech numbers among its important contributors men who are established institutions in philosophy, psychology, physics, education, politics, and the classics. Some of these contributors have dealt specifically with the problems of rhetoric and public speaking; others have made contact with the field only in an indirect way—chiefly, perhaps, through inquiries into the nature and function of those peculiar social phenomena known as language and speech. From the latter contributors—as well as from many of the former, of course—have come the individual philosophies of speech which proposed to interpret the vital forces governing articulate utterance. Perhaps such interpretation is in many cases of academic rather than of practical value. However, that should not make it any the less interesting—nor any the less significant. Furthermore, even the most functional treatments of rhetoric and public speaking are heavily charged with the philosophical and with what might be called the academic. Few would feel disposed to condemn the philosophical settings and accompaniments of our rhetorical supports. To do so would be to strike at the fundamentals of our subject-matter. It would be an attempt to dethrone Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and a host of others through whom the profession may lay claim to a tradition which from the point of view of elevation and profundity stands, like Webster's verbal picture of Massachusetts, in need of no defense.

The purpose of this paper is to present the name of a great thinker who, though infrequently referred to in our professional circle, made a philosophical discursion the character of which it may be worthwhile to investigate. Thomas Hobbes, the British empiricist who, according to Theodore Buckley,[1] formed the summary *par excellence* of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, was vitally interested in the philosophical intricacies of the spoken word. An examination of Hobbes' speech theory—and this, of necessity, draws us into the vortex of his philosophy—may aid in determining what place his work should receive in the history of our subject.

In order to understand speech it is first necessary to understand the speaker, the human being. Hobbes' approach to the psychological analysis of man is fundamentally empirical. All conceptions of the things from without are due to *sense;* and

> The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continueth inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-resistance, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because *outward*, seemeth to be some matter without. And this *seeming*, or *fancy*, is that which men call *sense*.[2]

Light, sound, heat, and the like are merely motions in the objects which are pressing against the sense organs of the human being; by the same token, motions of different kinds are engendered in the perceiving individual since "motion produceth nothing but motion."[3] The object which produces the sense conception is real, for Hobbes speaks of the *object of sense* as being the thing by whose action the conception is produced.[4] The sensation is due to the interacting operation of outer and inner motion; the incoming motion is always encountered by an outwardly directed motion. The seeming, or fancy, which results is the sense conception.

[1] *Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetic*, edited by Theodore Buckley; London, 1883, p. iii.

[2] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, edited by Sir William Molesworth; London, 1839, vol. III, (*Of Man*), p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Human Nature*, Vol. IV, p. 3.

It is not my desire to urge the acceptability of my own particular theory of the cause of stammering. The purpose of this paper is to draw a distinction between primary and secondary stammering, and to emphasize the fact that the speech disturbances and emotional reactions of the confirmed stammerer are symptoms far removed from the basic speech disorder with which the impediment begins. I believe that all investigation of stammering should be made with this distinction between primary and secondary stammering in mind; otherwise our researches may merely add to the confusion that already confronts us.

THOMAS HOBBES' PHILOSOPHY OF SPEECH

LESTER W. THONSSEN
College of the City of New York

THE field of Speech numbers among its important contributors men who are established institutions in philosophy, psychology, physics, education, politics, and the classics. Some of these contributors have dealt specifically with the problems of rhetoric and public speaking; others have made contact with the field only in an indirect way—chiefly, perhaps, through inquiries into the nature and function of those peculiar social phenomena known as language and speech. From the latter contributors—as well as from many of the former, of course—have come the individual philosophies of speech which proposed to interpret the vital forces governing articulate utterance. Perhaps such interpretation is in many cases of academic rather than of practical value. However, that should not make it any the less interesting—nor any the less significant. Furthermore, even the most functional treatments of rhetoric and public speaking are heavily charged with the philosophical and with what might be called the academic. Few would feel disposed to condemn the philosophical settings and accompaniments of our rhetorical supports. To do so would be to strike at the fundamentals of our subject-matter. It would be an attempt to dethrone Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and a host of others through whom the profession may lay claim to a tradition which from the point of view of elevation and profundity stands, like Webster's verbal picture of Massachusetts, in need of no defense.

The purpose of this paper is to present the name of a great thinker who, though infrequently referred to in our professional circle, made a philosophical discursion the character of which it may be worthwhile to investigate. Thomas Hobbes, the British empiricist who, according to Theodore Buckley,[1] formed the summary *par excellence* of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, was vitally interested in the philosophical intricacies of the spoken word. An examination of Hobbes' speech theory—and this, of necessity, draws us into the vortex of his philosophy—may aid in determining what place his work should receive in the history of our subject.

In order to understand speech it is first necessary to understand the speaker, the human being. Hobbes' approach to the psychological analysis of man is fundamentally empirical. All conceptions of the things from without are due to *sense;* and

> The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continueth inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-resistance, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because *outward*, seemeth to be some matter without. And this *seeming*, or *fancy*, is that which men call *sense*.[2]

Light, sound, heat, and the like are merely motions in the objects which are pressing against the sense organs of the human being; by the same token, motions of different kinds are engendered in the perceiving individual since "motion produceth nothing but motion."[3] The object which produces the sense conception is real, for Hobbes speaks of the *object of sense* as being the thing by whose action the conception is produced.[4] The sensation is due to the interacting operation of outer and inner motion; the incoming motion is always encountered by an outwardly directed motion. The seeming, or fancy, which results is the sense conception.

[1] *Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetic*, edited by Theodore Buckley; London, 1883, p. iii.

[2] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, edited by Sir William Molesworth; London, 1839, vol. III, (*Of Man*), p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Human Nature*, Vol. IV, p. 3.

The human being, according to Hobbes, is composed of two principal parts, body and mind, and these parts have specific functional activities: the powers of the mind are cognitive and imaginative while the powers of the body are nutritive, motive, and generative.[5]

In Hobbes' thought world imagination plays a significant role. He speaks of two kinds of motion peculiar to all animals: the one is called vital motion and the other, voluntary motion.[6] Speaking is a voluntary motion. Furthermore, imagination is fundamental to it.

> And because *going, speaking,* and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of *whither, which way, and what;* it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion.[7]

Thus speech becomes an active principle. It is a voluntary motion which has its roots deep in imagination.

Hobbes declares that "imagination and memory are but one thing."[8] The imagination is the *"conception remaining, and by little and little decaying, from and after the act* of sense."[9] The fundamental idea is that an image remains of the thing observed long after the actual object has been removed; the temporal factor is the one which obscures the image since "the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of an object, the weaker is the imagination."[10] From this reasoning Hobbes concludes that imagination is "decaying sense."

Imagination is an active phenomenon. It is the beginning of internal motion, and before it assumes definite form in speaking or other types of overt action it is called endeavor.[11] This is a significant point since it introduces the subject of the passions concerning which more will be said in succeeding paragraphs. The internal beginnings of "voluntary motion" constitute the entrance to the

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[6] *Of Man*, p. 38.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[9] *Human Nature*, p. 9.
[10] *Of Man*, p. 5.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

study of the passions together with the modes of speech which express those passions in their natural forms.

Discourse has its beginnings in the imagination. And in man the imagination may be "indued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs," and this is what is known as understanding.[12] Out of the train of imagination comes what Hobbes calls mental discourse—which may eventually lead to verbal discourse.[13] The succession of mental discourse in waking life is quite orderly, for

> . . . . as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense; and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.[14]

Hobbes, the logician, enters strongly at this point, for in the treatment of the train of regulated thoughts he indicates that the discursion centers about a quest for causes and effects.

> In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but *seeking*, or the faculty of invention . . . . a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.[15]

Speaking, as previously indicated, is one of the voluntary motions peculiar to the human being. A voluntary motion—for which imagination is basic—may not appear in overt form in its early stages. Instead, it may be an endeavor. When the endeavor is "towards something which causes it, it is called APPETITE OR DESIRE;" and when it is "fromward something, it is generally called AVER-

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[13] *Ibid;* in *Human Nature*, p. 14, he refers to verbal discourse as *discursion.*

[14] *Of Man*, p. 11 f.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

SION."[16] When the motion is neither toward nor fromward a condition of immobility known as *contempt* is set up. Such passions or feelings are subject to examination on the basis of the voluntary motions which their natures require. But the passions have a vital connection with speech, according to Hobbes, since they represent the internal promptings which eventually provoke overt speaking.

> It is the nature almost of every corporal thing, being *often moved* in one and the same manner, to receive continually a *greater* and *greater uneasiness* and aptitude to the *same* motion, insomuch as in time the same becometh so *habitual*, that, to beget it, there needs no more than to *begin it*. The passions of man, as they are the beginning of *voluntary* motions; so are they the beginning of *speech*, which is the motion of the tongue. And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions, and passions which are in themselves, and to that end having invented *language*, have by that means transferred all that *discursion* of their *mind* . . . . by the *motion* of their *tongues*, into *discourse* of *words*. . . . .[17]

Hobbes draws a distinction between speech which expresses emotional content and speech which expresses thought content. He observes that the "forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts."[18] It is to be recognized that there is a "feeling" attached to mere thought content inasmuch as thought involves motion. Nevertheless the division of speech forms for passion and speech forms for thought is highly suggestive of the dichotomous treatment of persuasion and conviction so prevalent in modern speech theory.

Hobbes attempts to delineate the speech forms which are characterized by passion. He observes that all passions are subject to expression *indicatively*, but a few of them have particular forms: deliberation may be expressed *subjunctively;* desire and aversion are usually expressed *imperatively;* indignation, pity, and revengefulness are expressed *optatively;* and desire to know is expressed *interrogatively*.[19] Immediately after setting forth these forms, however, Hobbes declares that

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[17] *Human Nature*, p. 25.
[18] *Of Man*, p. 49.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 49 f.

> certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.[20]

"The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words. . . ."[21] Hobbes does not make speech and thought synonymous, it is to be observed, but instead, he makes speech the agency for the transference of thought into verbal form. Mental discourse there could be without speech, but there could be no definite communication of thought sequences and so the social world would suffer.

The special uses of speech which grow out of the transfer of mental into verbal discourse are: first, to register causal relationships; second, to reveal knowledge to others; third, to effect co-operative activities; and fourth, to give individual, aesthetic pleasure.[22] The philosophical implications point to speech as a social phenomenon which developed from the desire for individual expression and the need for group solidarity.

Fundamentally good instruments may be used for wrong-doing —and speech presents no exception to this general rule. Although Hobbes observes that speech was man's most noble and profitable invention, he adds that it has brought about abuses as well as advantages. Speech enables men to register their thoughts wrongly, to use words metaphorically with consequent deception, to declare "that to be their will, which is not," and to cause grief to others.[23] Furthermore, speech makes truth and falsehood definite realities, since

> . . . *true* and *false* are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither *truth* nor *falsehood; error* there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.[24]

In order to make truth prevail the person must make sure that

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

he remembers "what every name he uses stands for. . . ."[25] There must be no ambiguity. Understanding must result from speech and to that end Hobbes declares that

> Forasmuch as whosoever *speaketh to another,* intendeth thereby to *make* him *understand* what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth, he *intendeth also not* to make him understand what he saith; which is a *contradiction* of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.[26]

The foregoing considerations return us to the question which was suggested in the early part of the paper. What place does Hobbes deserve in the chronicle of speech contributions? He was primarily a political philosopher, then a psychologist, and last of all, perhaps, a rhetorician.[27] However, his interest in rhetoric, his philosophical inquiry into the nature of speech and language, and his excellent brief of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* suggest the advisability of acknowledging him as a contributor of no mean distinction to a long and significant line of speech theory. Thomas Hobbes was another great thinker who sustained and developed an abiding tradition—a tradition which gives beauty, dignity, and permanence to the rhetorical continuum.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[27] For texts of Thomas Hobbes' *Whole Art of Rhetorick,* see Molesworth's edition, *op. cit.*, vol. VI, pp. 423-536; or *The Art of Rhetoric,* London, 1681; or "A Brief of the Art of Rhetorick" by Hobbes, in *Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetic,* edited by T. Buckley; London, 1883.

THE SPEECH CURRICULUM IN TEACHERS COLLEGES*

VIRGINIA SANDERSON
San Jose State Teachers' College

TWO important curricular problems confront those of us especially concerned with speech education in teacher-training institutions. These two problems are not new; the first has been the subject of discussion for some years;[1] but both are vital and worthy of special consideration at this period in educational history. Many normal schools are now becoming teachers' colleges and are revising requirements; curricula are being reorganized and in some instances expanded; administrative officials, course of study committees and boards of education are more critical than ever of what is to be retained in or added to the courses of study, and have never been more eager than now to see that the graduates of teachers' colleges, the teachers of tomorrow, bring to the profession the wisest of knowledge and the most practical of training.

It is high time we took action, as a group of speech specialists, also interested in seeing that the prospective teachers in our teachers' colleges and normal schools[2] receive the best training possible for the profession of teaching, and decide what should be the requirements in speech education of those prospective teachers.

1. What shall we offer and require, as adequate preparation, of those students who wish to specialize in speech, either for the purpose of teaching the subject in a secondary school or because they wish to continue special work in speech in some graduate school?
2. What practical instruction in speech education shall we recommend and ask to have required of every general ele-

*Presented at the Teachers College Section, convention of the National Association of Teachers of Speech, Detroit, Michigan, December 28, 1931.

[1] Reports of speech training in teachers' colleges and normal schools: *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, June, 1922; February, 1923; February, 1928; February, 1930.

[2] Because of limited space, the problem of the speech curriculum in the two year normal school could not, in this paper, be treated adequately, so far as the recommendation of courses possible of inclusion in an already burdened curriculum was concerned. The same general needs and ideals hold true, however, for all teacher-training institutions.

mentary and kindergarten-primary teacher whose daily work demands that she be, in a way, a teacher of speech, possessed of speech knowledges and skills?

In spite of the fact that the Committee on Speech Education in Teachers' Colleges and Normal Schools, in their recent report,[3] found an increase of required offerings in speech education and an improvement in the standardization of approach, they did not find us in agreement as to what should constitute the training of the teachers' college student who wishes to become a speech specialist. And we must admit that, as a group, we have done little or nothing toward offering a carefully organized and flexible course of study in speech designed especially to add to the professional equipment of the prospective kindergarten and general elementary school teacher.

Let us consider first the case of the prospective speech specialist. You know the charges brought against us: that we have set ourselves apart from other subject-matter fields, and have felt that we were sufficient unto ourselves; that, as a group, we do not require of our students the same academic training and educational background required of other students; that we have allowed our graduates to specialize too narrowly in the under-graduate field; that many of our courses contain little subject-matter content, and that we cannot agree, among ourselves, as to what that content should be.

These criticisms are, in the main, just. But even while we admit them, we should take steps to invalidate them. I should like to present four resolutions[4] which should not go the way of most resolutions, but should be put into practical use by all teachers of speech until they are no longer resolutions but facts.

I. Resolved, that we will make speech more of an integrating subject in the college curriculum, and, at the same time, include, among our requirements of our special students:

a. Adequate knowledge of English composition and literature,

[3] Quarterly Journal of Speech, February, 1930.

[4] So strongly did the Teachers' College section at the recent Detroit convention of the National Association feel that these four resolutions represented not just the idea of one individual but the thought and belief of all members of the section meeting that they voted unanimously to go on record as endorsing and recommending the resolutions as given.

out of the firm conviction that good English background is essential for the teacher of Speech.

b. Practical knowledge of physiology and physics, as basic to an understanding of the speech mechanism and function.

c. Appreciative knowledge of music and art, not only for the cultural values involved, but because such knowledge is needed as part of the background of the speech teacher.

d. Training in special phases of physical education, notably Dalcroze eurythmics, fencing, natural or folk dancing, with the thought in mind that the whole body must speak, must, indeed, "be saturated with intelligence," and that the body cannot serve with the voice if it is bound or inhibited.

e. Knowledge of psychology, especially the psychology of childhood, social psychology and the psychology of speech.

f. Study of foreign languages so that both knowledge and skill are developed, for any teacher of speech is better equipped if she has a knowledge of comparative phonetics, a reading knowledge of other languages and skill in the use of them.

II. Resolved, that we will require of our students the same general professional requirements and the same educational background required of all prospective teachers.

III. Resolved, that we will organize, or reorganize, the curriculum[5] in speech with the very definite aim of furnishing the prospective specialist and teacher an opportunity of securing a firm foundation for future study and a broad knowledge of every phase of speech—interpretation, public speaking, debate, dramatic art and speech correction.

This means that the prospective teacher and specialist will see the speech problem in its relationship to every phase of the subject. And is this not right? Should we not remember that the undergraduate college is the place for the unfolding of general speech knowledge and for the development of speech skills, and that we should leave specialization to the graduate schools? The fact that we have been inadequate and narrow in our requirements for undergraduates is, I believe, largely the reason why some graduate schools

[5] The curriculum is the whole body of experiences the teacher uses in and out of the classroom, the courses as well as what are often called extra-curricular activities.

of speech are having such difficulty in maintaining graduate standards. We send them students so poorly equipped, so unsatisfactorily prepared, that the graduate schools feel forced to offer courses which are undergraduate in method and scope. After all, what right have we to allow a student to be graduated from a four year teachers' college, with a major in speech, if he has, let us say, fine training in debate, but little or no knowledge of interpretation and less than no knowledge of speech correction? Why can we not insist that every prospective speech specialist before graduation have a year course or the equivalent in each of the following: Interpretation, Public Speaking, Debate, Play Production, and Speech Correction, as well as quarter or semester courses in voice analysis, comparative phonetics, stagecraft, the teaching of speech and other helpful courses? This ideal is not an impossible one. In one or two colleges it is in effect.

The fourth resolution, if put into effect, would, I believe, do much to bring about not only general agreement as to the speech curriculum, among ourselves, but would result in an improvement of our offerings beyond measure, both from the point of view of the total curricular pattern and the individual course.

IV. Resolved: that the time has come to put into practise, in the speech curriculum, the principles of curriculum construction.

It is impossible in this paper to explain all that is meant by the principles of curriculum construction, but if all departments and teachers of speech should ask themselves the following three questions before determining the content of a course of study or individual courses, they would be following, to an extent, the principles of curriculum construction.

1. For what am I preparing these students, for further study in a graduate school, for teaching in a secondary school or for service in an elementary school; and as teachers of speech or teachers interested in the general use of speech as part of their daily work?
2. Having made an inventory of my class, what kinds of experiences do these students need, to be the best type of teacher needed for the type of school desired, and how shall I determine what learning will most effectively take place in order to give the experiences needed?[6]

[6] It is important to remember that the way in which learning takes place

What are the problems they will be called upon to attack later, and what are the big controls they should be able to use?

3. Having decided on the necessary experiences and the most effective way of handling the learning process, what sorts of materials or tools, (references, equipment, etc.) do I need to gather and list in order to make possible the learning and experiences necessary?

One sees at once that the serious consideration of such questions would condition certain types or areas of courses if applied to a course of study in speech. There would be the need for foundation, survey or orientation courses; professional courses for the acquiring of technical knowledge; laboratory courses, such as are already found in stagecraft, play production and speech correction clinics; and integrating courses, such as The Teaching of Speech, which summarize or synthesize the courses which have preceded, in an endeavor to bring all parts together and give the senior student a picture of the whole. A careful study of the principles of curriculum and their application would, I believe, make courses in speech more purposeful, more meaningful and more in agreement.

Interested as I am, however, in the training of speech specialists, I am even more interested at the present time in the need for a course of study in speech education, especially designed to be part of the required training of every general elementary and kindergarten-primary school teacher. Why is it, I wonder, that we have paid so little attention to their needs?

When one studies the elementary school courses of study, especially those rated highest in language and grammar, literature and reading,[7] he sees definitely that every grade teacher needs to possess certain speech skills in order to be an efficient teacher. He finds all courses of study unanimous in stressing the reading aloud by the teacher, in all grades from the kindergarten through the

is fundamentally the same on all levels; that learning must be an active process; that it takes place most effectively and economically in situations that are real and meaningful, and of recognized value; and that it should exemplify the organization, instruction and use it expects to have in the school.

[7] Stratemeyer, F. B. and Bruner, H. B.: *Rating Elementary School Courses of Study*, Bureau of Publications, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1926, pp. 193.

sixth. He notes that story telling is no longer considered solely in the light of its place in the kindergarten but is being sought for all the grades. He observes the emphasis on dramatization and oral composition; the tenacious hold of phonics; the increasing interest in phonetics. When no definite mention of speech correction is made, the following statement is implied: the kindergarten-primary and general elementary school teacher should be able to diagnose and correct the simpler speech disorders.

Even though one scorn to accept the elementary school courses of study as standards, our ideals of human knowledge, our principles of education lead us to the same conclusion: every teacher must not only possess speech skills and knowledges; she must be able to help her students to an adequate command and appreciation of our most characteristic and essential human activity, speech.

Yet when one considers the present offerings in speech, designed primarily for the prospective general elementary school teacher, he is astounded. The emphasis in teacher-training institution, so far as speech education is concerned, seems to be almost entirely on the training of the speech specialist or secondary school teacher of the subject; although many departments stress the cultural non-professional point of view and so again are of no service to the average grade teacher who wishes more than personal skill developed, who wishes indeed to learn how she may help others.

In many instances, the training of the kindergarten and general elementary school teachers is left to other departments and to instructors who have had little if any speech training. Story telling and oral composition are taught in many Education departments, the first usually in conjunction with "Children's Literature," the second as a part of the course in "Intermediate Curriculum," or "Language in the Primary Grades." Just how much real speech skill and knowledge it is possible to give in such crowded courses, taught by teachers who are not equipped or are not capable, in the time given, of developing such skills, it is difficult to say. The listed courses for studying the correction of speech disorders and designed to meet the needs of prospective teachers of several grade levels are so few as to be almost negligible, yet we know that the earlier speech faults are taken care of, the better; and it is an indisputable fact that speech habits are formed in early years. Interpretation, as described in catalogues, apparently makes little use of the ma-

terials the grade teacher will use; courses in Play Production are concerned with the Little Theatre movement and Broadway successes or, at best, with one-act plays for use in the secondary school.

I should like to propose then the following course of study designed to meet the needs of the kindergarten and general elementary school teachers and to be required of all these teachers before graduation from a teachers' college. This course of study is, I believe, possible of inclusion in the four year curriculum, since it does not demand too drastic revision of general requirements; it is practical and based on sound educational objectives.

The proposed plan consists of five courses, arranged as nearly as possible in order of learning difficulty and relationship. Each course has both a cultural and a professional aim, and has been planned with the idea of giving the students a rich background of knowledge, practical skill, and an understanding of how to use both knowledge and skill to the best advantage in the elementary school classrooms.

Course I, *Interpretative Reading,* has as its major objective the development of the ability of the student to read aloud, recreating the thought and mood of the author. A broad knowledge of literature which lends itself best to oral interpretation and including literature of special value for grade teachers is one essential. Good reading, however, also requires that the voice be a controlled and effective instrument for expression, so the course must consider the problem of voice training and phonetics. The teacher in the kindergarten and elementary school must not only read well; she must have a sensitive ear, quick to detect sound changes and to recognize her own variations and provincialisms and those of her students. Voice and ear training may, however, be developed through a study of oral interpretation of literature, rather than acquired by direct instruction: phonetics may be taught as a tool rather than as a subject.[8]

[8] One recognizes, naturally, that in different sections of the country emphasis in teaching will differ. In New York City where the foreign pupil element presents a real problem in speech education, this course will very likely be, to a great extent, a course in phonetic training; in California and in other sections where dialect is not a problem there will need be less direct phonetic instruction for the elementary school teacher. The specialist in every case, however, needs thorough training in the field of phonetics.

Since this course offers an excellent opportunity for the beginning of voice and ear training, and because it makes use of material already prepared, requiring no original composition or organization, of the student, it is believed to be a good introductory course.

Course II, *Story-Telling,* has as its major objective the development of skill in the art of story-telling and involves a wide knowledge of all kinds of comparative literature suitable for story-telling purposes, from early beginnings to modern times, and including traditional and modern fairly tales, fables and symbolic stories, myths, legends, biography and hero stories, nature and animal tales.

This course represents more learning difficulty than the first. A good story-teller must not only be able to choose his story wisely and appeal to the interests and imaginations of his hearers; he must know how to cut it for use and when to use it verbatim, when and how to amplify it and how to tell it most effectively. Such a course will further the development of the speaking voice as an effective instrument and will continue phonetic training.

Course III, *Dramatization,* may at first glance seem to be so closely connected with story-telling as to warrant both being given in a single course, but if a study of all the dramatic activities of use in the elementary school is made, a separate course in surely justified. For again, both knowledge and skill are necessary. The teacher must know how to make economical and good use of informal and formal dramatization (spontaneous and prepared), pageants and festivals, operettas, simple one-act plays and pantomimes. She must know how to select and arrange assembly programs, and how to use dramatization in the classroom as a means of correlating different subjects. She should learn the possibilities of educational puppetry and be able to stage, light, costume, and direct a school play from the point of view of educational dramatics. Such a course as I am describing should combine lecture, discussion and laboratory methods of instruction and give all students some opportunity for practical experience.

Course IV, *Oral Composition,* represents an added difficulty over courses I, II, and III, in that it requires the student to select and organize his material in addition to presenting it. It aims to develop in the student the power of selective and reflective thinking and the ability to say simply, clearly, and vividly before any kind of audience what he wishes to say. It necessitates thinking while

on one's feet before an audience, but goes a step further than most courses in public speaking in that the elementary school teacher must be able to suggest and develop topics within the interest and imagination of pupils in the grades and must have ability to offer constructive criticism, and so help her pupils to improve their own thought and speech. While personal skill in oral composition is an important skill for the teacher to possess, it is equally essential that she possess the ability to criticize constructively speech composition and delivery.

Course V, *Speech Correction,* has as its major objective the development of ability, on the part of prospective kindergarten and general elementary school teachers, to recognize defects of phonation and articulation, to apply remedial treatment for those disorders of speech which do not necessitate a specialist's attention and to recommend the proper authorities when the case is due to organic disorder or too difficult to be treated by a comparatively inexperienced person. Since any peculiarity of speech so noticeable as to interfere with one's adjustment to a social environment is a speech defect, the course would deal analytically with such major disorders as stuttering (stammering), but more specifically with mispronunciations, lisping, infantile perseveration and other substitutions, and voice inadequacies, and would require of all students practical experience in a speech clinic under the direction of a specialist in speech correction. In this course phonetic training would again receive emphasis, and a voice record of each member of the class should be made and compared with the record made at the beginning of the first course in speech education, *Interpretative Reading,* so that in addition to training the student to recognize defects in others he might be helped to see how he has improved in the course of his study of speech, and what persistent speech difficulties he still needs to conquer.

This course has been placed last because it is believed that, before taking it, a student should be decidedly voice-conscious, and should have acquired a certain amount of vocal proficiency. The course is more technical than the others, and demands a maturity more likely to be found in the older student. It is best given, too, at a point in the curriculum not too removed from graduation, so that a discussion and study of the speech defects often found in ordinary classrooms will gain in significance.

It is evident, of course, that such a plan of speech education as I have outlined is far from giving complete satisfaction. It represents a practical ideal, but will undoubtedly be criticized by many who can suggest definite ways of improving both organization and method. Such criticism is most desirable; and since the individual syllabi are still in the process of construction, it is hoped that those who are vitally interested in the problem of teacher training will send in their suggestions, references and recommendations to the author of this paper.[9] Only as we work together as a group, pooling our ideas and interests, subordinating our prejudices and considering other points of view, and always striving to secure more objective norms for guidance of our thinking, can we hope to be of real service to our fellow-teachers and to our students.

A FOOTNOTE ON THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES

EARL W. WILEY
Ohio State University

THE race of Adam might be divided into two fundamental types of men, like the members of our debating teams: the one affirmative, the other negative. The former, under typical conditions, is robust physically, subtle, often emotional of character, always impetuous and sometimes belligerent of spirit, and in his concepts liberal. The latter is calm and thoughtful, cautious in word and deed, intellectually honest, and by nature conservative.

Machiavelli recognized some such division among men and cited Pope Julius II and Fabius, respectively, as representatives of the two types. We need not go to Italy of the Renaissance for our illustrations. Thomas Carlyle and George Bernard Shaw represent the militant type at the ink pot. Mencken and Broun stand with them. Stevenson and Lamb and Barrie are their natural opposites. Modern politics has its Mussolinis and Lenins no less than it has its Hoovers and Coolidges. A Roosevelt balances a McKinley. Mili-

[9] Address: Teachers' College, Columbia, until June 1st; The University of Wisconsin, June to August; San Jose State Teachers' College, San Jose, California after August 1st.

tary has its dashing Sheridans no less than its overcautious McClellans. Patrick Henry and Madison are counter-parts in the field of debate.

Distinctively of the affirmative type was Stephen A. Douglas. He was physically vigorous, powerful of voice and action, mentally enthusiastic, cock-sure and opinionated. He could order a cup of coffee in the grand flourish of a debutante or in the dynamic tones of an army sergeant. But by nature he preferred to give orders rather than to make requests. The political opponent who stood in his way courted danger. Sometimes he assaulted him with ridicule, sometimes with the brimstone of invective. Like most men of the impetuous type he always took the most convenient means to accomplish his ends. He certainly wasted no time in deciding on the ethics of any course of action he desired to pursue. Essentially he was a debater of the *killer* type.

Abraham Lincoln stood as his temperamental opposite. A dash of the scholar surged through his blood stream and directed his movements along lines of caution and discretion. "I know very little about this subject. Let us think it over before acting on it." Such was his attitude on political issues. Consequently he established himself naturally on the *status quo* and sought sincerely to maintain it. This conservative trait cultivated in his debating art a defensive attitude which influenced him to parry the thrusts of his rivals rather than to launch attacks on them. It was this cautious, judicious attitude that characterized him in the rôle of debater.

The discussion between him and Douglas, in 1858, was quite as much a clash between two personalities of diametrically opposed natures, as it was a clash between the Hamiltonian and the Jeffersonian schools of political philosophy. Douglas conducted himself throughout the series of debates in strictest harmony with his own inherent nature: only once in the series did he hesitate to throw himself recklessly at his opponent. Not so with Lincoln. Twice in the series he assumed the rôle of the aggressive, affirmative type of man. These episodes deserve a word of attention.

A thousand-odd delegates and visitors packed the Hall of Representatives in Springfield on the night of June 16, and experienced the first of these occasions when Lincoln stepped out of character. Candles flickered and dark shadows crept lazily over the floor and ceiling of the gloomy structure. Voices buzzed in discordant con-

versation and blended with the strains of lively music played by a brass band stationed on the steps outside the building. It was stuffy inside, and men had stripped off their coats for comfort. Except to hear a few last-minute announcements and a speech by Lincoln, they were ready to adjourn. That day they had transacted the business of a Republican State Convention: appointed committees, drafted a platform, and designated Abraham Lincoln as "their first and only choice" for a seat in the Senate of the United States.

A cheer echoed through the Hall as Lincoln forced his way down a crowded aisle, and all eyes followed him as he mounted the platform and seated himself in a chair. They wondered what he would say to them, what it was he had written down in the manuscript which he held in his hand: it was unusual for Lincoln to read his speeches to them. But whatever his theme, it was conceded by the majority present that he would say nothing that would endanger the success of the party in the campaign. For Lincoln was a conservative at heart: he would not "rock the boat."

This was no hasty generalization that they made. They had listened to his calmly reasoned arguments in the Fremont campaign of 1856 and found them sufficient for the occasion. They had admired the dispassionate character of his speeches of 1854, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise had driven men of strong anti-slavery leanings close to the gates of bedlam. The older men present remembered him as a capable speaker in the days of the Harrison and Tyler campaign, and recalled how well poised and balanced he was for a young man set in a sea of enthusiasm and hilarity. Yes, it was conceded that Lincoln would analyze the political situation calmly and honestly. His strength as a candidate lay in his sterling character and conservative outlook. Furthermore he was honest, too honest, perhaps, for partisan purposes. Yet, he was shrewd and could take care of himself on the platform in case of emergency.

Abolitionists present on that night of course, and perhaps some of the sturdy German folk, whose fathers had deserted the Fatherland for a land of freedom, hesitated to think that a man of such conservatism was the exact representative of their views on slavery. How could the "battle of freedom" be fought by a man who hedged an inch on any phase of slavery? There were Abolitionists present who recalled how Lincoln had departed from Springfield, on a night in 1854, rather than to attend a meeting of theirs. There were those

present who recalled how long it took Lincoln to make up his mind to join up with the Republican party. Some present must have recalled that Lincoln had never promulgated a liberal political idea, publicly, since he attacked the constitutionality of the Mexican War in 1848 and that radical fling had driven him out of politics for years. He had learned his lesson: it paid to be conservative if a man would win political office.

Introduced to the audience by the chairman, Gustave Koerner, he began speaking in the slow, measured tones so familiar to many of those present. But what he said had a queer sound, coming from Lincoln:

"'A house divided against itself cannot stand.'

"I believe this government cannot endure; permanently half *slave* and half *free*. . . . .

"It will become *all* one thing, or all the other."

He had spoken less than three minutes when men who knew him realized that he was not the Lincoln of former years. He was now the aggressive and daring Lincoln. He was carrying the fighting to his opponents: he was stealing the thunder of the great Douglas himself. Then he made the most astounding accusation that he had ever made in his life: he charged the ranking Democrats with *conspiring* to make the Union all *slave*.

Deliberately he set about the task of supporting the accusation with evidence that made his accusation plausible. But he did not prove the correctness of his proposition: he could not. The accusation was entirely based on circumstantial evidence. Lincoln realized that fact. He was dealing with a hypothesis. But the time had come for aggressive action on his part. He must assume a positive and affirmative position in the controversy. Out of character, he stepped, of course. But many present, not appreciating the rhetorical objective of the argument, wondered if the speaker had gone stark mad. It was now time for the conservative men present to rub their eyes in wonder and for the Abolitionists to slap their thighs in joy. Another Daniel had come to their assistance.

The question now needs be asked, How would Douglas meet that sort of attack? He was in Washington when reports of the speech reached his ears and in response to the startling charges he said absolutely nothing. But he packed his bags and was soon back in Illinois to take the stump in his defense. The word *defense* seems

quite odd when applied to Douglas. He simply was not accustomed to being forced into a position of defense: it was his opponents who usually sought such security as that offered by defense.

Chicago greeted him lustily on the evening of July 9. Stupendous crowds wedged themselves in downtown streets. Firecrackers fizzed and snapped and dogs howled. Roman candles and rockets flashed in the sky. It was a welcome fitting the dynamic man for whom it was accorded. That night he stood on the balcony of the Tremont House and addressed the people packed together in the streets below him. Behind him on the balcony sat no other than Abraham Lincoln, intent on learning how Douglas would reply to his accusation made in Springfield, pronounced twenty-three days earlier.

His curiosity was hardly satisfied: Douglas deliberately ignored all mention of the charge that he and Roger and James and Franklin had *conspired* to make the Union all *slave*. The Little Giant was too shrewd in the nuances of rhetoric to be trapped thus easily by a small town lawyer. He believed that a debater standing in defense of his position was a beaten debater; and believing this, he refused to say a single word on the historic accusation. But consistently following out the philosophy of the man he was, he coupled his evasion on the accusation with a double-edge sword of attack.

He exploited the principle of popular sovereignty as basic to the welfare of the Republic. On that rock the nation had stood for decades: on that rock it would continue to stand, Lincoln to the contrary. His Republican opponent, in fact, advocated a revolutionary change from the traditions of the fathers of the Republic. More than that, he would war on the Supreme Court of the United States for pronouncing the Dred Scott decision. Was this the type of man to send to Washington to weigh the delicate problems confronting the nation? What is more, he urged the North to rise up against the South, to arm itself, and by trial of battle to eradicate the institution of slavery. Such was the vigor of his attack.

Rhetorically viewed, it is all simple enough: Douglas had driven Lincoln back onto the defensive. The offensive attempt the latter had made in Springfield, June 16, to force Douglas into considering slavery as the paramount issue of the campaign had proved to be entirely inadequate for the steel of the Little Giant. By compounding the art of evasion with the art of attack—that the best defense

is a strong offense—Douglas had jumped into the saddle and seized the driver's reins. It was for him to direct the argument of the campaign!

Yet, there was Lincoln to reckon with. The latter took the stand at the Tremont House on the following night, July 10, and with all the resources at his command struggled to refute the myriad of charges that Douglas had foisted on him. He *denied* that Republicans had supplied money or sacrificed principle in joining with the Danites against Douglas. He *denied* that Republicans had voted down Lecompton on grounds of popular sovereignty. He *denied* that Douglas was Republican in principle because he had stood with the Republicans on Lecompton. He *denied* that he rejected the Dred Scott decision in the sense that he resisted it. He *denied* the deductions that Douglas made on the 16th of June speech, which now lay shattered at his feet like a broken bowl. He denied. . . .

But there is no need of extending this explanation. Lincoln had been forced back onto the defensive. He was mired in the mud. Before he could go forward he must dig himself out of the mud. The negative debater who essayed the rôle of the affirmative debater, as a rhetorical attack, was soundly threshed, at least for the moment, by a natural affirmative debater.

The political forum shifted from Chicago to central Illinois. Encouraged by his coup in Chicago, Douglas continued to wage a relentless war against Lincoln, personally. He called him names. At Beardstown he called him "a liar, a coward, a wretch, and a sneak." He dragged Senator Trumbull, his colleague, into the controversy and also called him hard names. Combining the art of invective with a vigorous exploitation of popular sovereignty as a cure-all for national ills, he continued to ride the offensive waves. He carried his tactics so far, in fact, that in one town he threatened to take Lincoln into the alley and thresh him. And to prove that his method was popular, a partisan in the crowd, somewhat in his cups, agreed to take the task off Douglas' hands. At Ottawa, in the first joint debate, he continued his savage attack by propounding seven interrogatories to Lincoln, so framed that the answers he expected from Lincoln were stated in the questions.

What tactics should a cautious, deliberate type of debater utilize in the face of a debater like Douglas? Lincoln seemed uncertain of his course. His friends felt the force of the smashing attack that

Douglas was making on him and urged him to fight back in a more personal way. But even the questions that Douglas submitted at Ottawa failed to rouse Lincoln to any high degree of initiative. It is true that at Freeport he propounded four questions to Douglas, in retaliation, and in Jonesboro added a fifth. But he lacked the driving power of the natural affirmative. This is well indicated when we note how Douglas disposed of the famous second question which Lincoln submitted, including the idea of the contradiction between popular sovereignty and the Dred Scott decision. In the long run the question practically destroyed Douglas, politically, but how did Lincoln handle the matter in Freeport?

After the question had been submitted and Douglas had replied to it in his cleverly evasive way, Lincoln came up for rejoinder. The stage was set. The most vital spot in Douglas' armour had been pierced. Lincoln's friends in Freeport waited for him patiently to emphasize the strange contradiction in Douglas' argument. But what did Lincoln say about that contradiction? Nothing.

Lincoln lacked the driving power of the debater built in the mould of a Douglas or a Demosthenes or a Patrick Henry. Historically we view these lapses indifferently. But his political friends —at least of the affirmative species—had ample cause for questioning his methods.

It was at Charleston, in the fourth joint debate of the series, when for a second time Lincoln stepped out of character. Being the opening speaker there, he could govern, largely, the direction of the argument for the day. Logically he should have followed up the thread of the discussion as developed in Jonesboro, in the third joint debate. The argument in Jonesboro raised the question of whether Lincoln or Douglas best represented the slavery intentions and political philosophy of the early men of the Republic: both sought the authority of the past for their statesmanship on slavery. Lincoln certainly would have been justified in pursuing that theme in Charleston and it is probable that had he possessed the documentary evidence in support of his position, such as he afterward collected and presented at Cooper Union, he would have pursued that theme. But in Charleston he essayed the rôle of the dashing affirmative speaker. Again he was the rhetorician.

The debate in Charleston is the least discussed of all the debates of the series. It is hardly mentioned, in fact, by Lincoln biographers.

Yet it has a rhetorical significance that should not escape the eye of men practiced in the strategy of debate. It vies in rhetorical interest with Lincoln's speech of June 16, when he sought to drive Douglas onto the defensive and to establish slavery as the *sine qua non* of the campaign.

It is clear that Douglas was waging his campaign on the single issue of popular sovereignty. Vulnerable as that issue proved to be constitutionally, it was an effective issue for a politician of the impetuous type in a stirring campaign. Lincoln had failed entirely to break down its persuasive force. All he could do was to deny its efficacy and its principle. But that availed little in the stress of discussion before partisans.

At Charleston he decided to question the sincerity of Douglas in advocating the principle. That was a clear case of *ad hominem* attack which had no merit in debate where the truth was sought. This brought him to the charge that Senator Lyman Trumbull had introduced into the campaign. Trumbull had made the blunt charge that Douglas had himself repudiated the principle of popular sovereignty in dealing with the Toombs Bill legislation, which sought to fix the conditions under which Kansas might enter the Union as a state. The original bill, virtually an Enabling Act, provided that the people of Kansas would have an election at which they might approve or reject the constitution framed for them by their Legislature. But when the Bill came from the Committee on Territories, of which Douglas was the Chairman, the provision calling for a popular vote on the proposed constitution had been deleted.

It was a dreary record of documentary facts that Lincoln reviewed in Charleston. Piece by piece he compared Trumbull's evidence with Douglas' retorts. He decided that Trumbull had all the better of the argument. Douglas, *ipso facto*, was no honest disciple of popular sovereignty!

In sum, Lincoln stepped out of character twice in the joint debates of 1858 to meet Douglas on his own ground as a positive, impetuous type of man. But each time the attempt seemed abortive. He lacked the stomach for such a method: with him it was a device of rhetoric. His speaking genius better fitted a select audience of intellectuals, such as the Supreme Court of the United States. He lack the demagoguery of the partisan speaker. Machiavelli, in *The*

Prince, sums up the comparative merits of the two types of debaters here discussed, in favor of the impetuous type. He wrote:

"Of this, however, I am well persuaded, that it is better to be impetuous than cautious. For Fortune is a woman who to be kept under must be beaten and roughly handled; and we see that she suffers herself to be more readily mastered by those who so treat her than by those who are more timid in their approaches."

PROLEGOMENA TO ARGUMENTATION

EDWARD Z. ROWELL
University of California

*Part II. The Historical Roots of the Problem.**

THE problem of fundamental theory in argumentation is in its broad aspects a very old problem. It existed long before modern psychology turned monistic, and long also before argumentation became a separate discipline. It troubled the minds of the ancient Greeks when rhetoric, the mother of argumentation, was in her infancy.

In an inquiry of this character we cannot ignore these old roots of our problem. This is a field in which the genetic approach is an almost indispensable guide to sound insight. It is to the past, therefore, that we must now turn. We have not the space, however, to attempt the tracing of the whole history of the subject, howsoever desirable that might be. The most that we can try to do is to select and examine a few of the most important works in the fields of rhetoric and argumentation and let these reveal to us the elements of our problem as they manifested themselves in periods gone by.

ARISTOTLE AGAINST THE SOPHISTIC TENDENCY

The natural starting-point for this historical retrospect is, of course, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. This work was the pioneer systematic treatment of the art of the orator and became an essential precedent for all subsequent traditions in rhetoric and argumentation. On account of its careful elaboration of the principles and processes of

*This is the second of a series of articles on the general topic presented above. The first appeared in Vol. XVIII, No. 1, of this *Journal*.

oratory it lends itself excellently to our purpose of laying bare the points in rhetorical theory at which problems tend to arise.

This treatise is marked by five important characteristics. The first is a particular selectiveness of scope, the second is the sociality of its outlook, the third is its concern with the psychology of persuasion, the fourth is its emphasis on logical proofs, and the fifth is the analytical rather than pedagogical character of its method. These characteristics deserve to be examined more closely.

The *Rhetoric* is selective in its scope. Evidently the author's broad intent was to make it a scientific treatise on the art of the orator in general. This is apparent from his definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering in any given case the available means of persuasion," and from his subdivision of oratory into the three existing types. This purpose undergoes modification, however, as the author expounds the province of rhetoric and as he sets forth his conception of the essence of the orator's process. In the first instance he criticises and rejects the popular oratory of his day in which appeals to the emotions ruled. And in the second instance he asks that speech content be mainly what amounts to logical demonstration. He thus maintains a standard and a bias which restrict the natural scope of a freely empirical approach to the study of rhetorical phenomena.

The *Rhetoric* discusses oratory with reference to its actual manifestations in the affairs of men in the author's time. It keeps the reader aware of the types of situations in which oratory occurred in Greek society, of the practices appropriate to each, and of the important aspects of the public life of the nation which the orator needed to know. It thus avoids being merely academic by maintaining a measure of the social outlook which most teachers of speech in our own time regard as necessary to any sound study of the subject of public speaking. This social outlook becomes, however, more than just an outlook. In the final analysis we see Aristotle resting his whole theory on a broadly social basis.

In addition to maintaining this social outlook, the *Rhetoric* takes account of the important adaptations and appeals which the speaker must make in dealing with various kinds of hearers. It offers us, in other words, a psychological study of the important human impulses and attitudes which determine the ways in which hearers respond to public speakers. The content of this study is

not, of course, the sort of psychology with which we are most familiar. Much of it is not even psychology at all in the present-day sense of the term. Some of the material is found today in works on ethics, sociology, education, and even religion. It is, however, a thoroughly vital psychology which rests on so organic a view of the human personality that it has much in common with the functionalism which has prevailed in modern psychology in the last quarter of a century. Fully a fifth of the *Rhetoric* deals with this subject.[1]

A very important characteristic of the *Rhetoric* is found in the emphasis Aristotle places on logic. He classes rhetoric with logic. He urges upon us the view that appeals to the passions should be regarded as merely accessory to the logical demonstration. He even appears to suggest that rhetoric is needed in the world only because people are not all adequately rational beings. And he takes pains to clarify the essential relationship between the proofs of the orator and the proofs of the philosopher. He thus remains the devotee of logic in spite of his extended study of the psychological elements in persuasion.

The last characteristic of the *Rhetoric* arises from the nature of the work as a text-book. The *Rhetoric* is not a text-book which satisfies the demand for prescribed guidance as to details of procedure in speech making. It analyzes all the means of persuasion, tells the reader what knowledge he must have of society, of public affairs, of sound argument, and of the principles of style; but it does not undertake to tell how the speaker should proceed in preparing for and carrying out his task. It leaves much to the genius and experience of the particular orator. It thus gives us, not a system of discipline, but a classification and analysis of the elements of a discipline.

What, now, is the theoretical foundation on which this system of rhetoric rests? What is the nature of Aristotle's conception of the basic principles in terms of which the process of persuasion should be understood?

The main concept from which Aristotle proceeds is the idea of persuasion. This term "persuasion" defines for him the general aim

[1] It needs to be emphasized that our present interest in psychology in relation to public speaking is by no means peculiar to our own age.

of oratory. He uses it in the inclusive sense which makes it embrace all the elements involved in the speaker's effort to influence his audience. According to this usage oratory is the action in which the various appeals are the means, and of which persuasion is the aim.

Looked at superficially this use of the concept of persuasion appears to be identical with that proposed by the critics of the standard tradition in argumentation. It is identical with it in the respect of its inclusiveness. In other respects the identity appears to break down. This fact will be brought to fuller light in the discussion of other aspects of the theoretical foundation of the *Rhetoric*.

The means used in persuasion, according to Aristotle, are of two kinds, namely, the truths established (or apparently established) by logical processes, and appeals to feelings. This is Aristotle's version of the duality we know as the "appeal to reason" and the "appeal to feelings." The two versions are not, however, wholly identical. The modern version of the duality is stated in psychological language wholly, and is usually understood to be a psychologically-arrived-at distinction. This is not the case with Aristotle's conception of the matter. He approaches rhetoric from the point of view of the speaker and his tasks and duties as a member of a human society to which many different kinds of values may be at stake. His distinctions are primarily social and philosophical. He does not say "appeal to reason" or "appeal to understanding." What he speaks of rather consistently is *dealing with the truth aspects of a subject* as against *endeavoring to secure the favor of the listener through appeals to his feelings*. True, his term "appeal to the passions" has for us a distinctly psychological character. It had for him, too. But in the duality it was a socially-arrived-at, rather than psychologically-arrived-at concept. We shall find occasion later to refer again to this distinction between the two versions of the duality.

Of the two elements in this duality the logical is treated by Aristotle as basic. The primary concern of the speaker, according to the Rhetoric, is to deal with the truth aspects of the issues before him. All other elements that enter in must be regarded as merely accessory to that first concern. But why must or should this be so? To this question the *Rhetoric* appears to embody two replies. The

first is that the chief business of oratory is allied with the chief business of inquiry. The speaker deals with audiences, that is certain. But he deals with them in reference to an issue which is in process of solution. In that respect he is a public problem-solver in whose function the moving of the audience is in a sense not much more than a means. The second reply is hidden in Aristotle's conviction that an orator's hearer should judge matters according to the truth relating to them rather than according to the feeling he may experience about them. This position springs directly from the Stagirite's standards in ethics.

Clearly, this theory is essentially at variance with the psychology-dominated thought in our field today. This becomes most strikingly true if we take into consideration the extreme Woolbertian thesis that the principles of rhetoric must rest on psychology as the fundamental science.[2] According to this thesis, all such matters as the choice of "persuasion" as the basic concept, the acceptance of the dichotomy of the logical and the non-logical, and the adoption of the principle of the primacy of the logical in this discipline, can properly spring and derive their whole justification only from a psychological analysis of the hearer's response to speaking. But, according to Aristotle's view, these can and should properly be arrived at through the less immediate social consideration of logical and ethical values. In all this, psychology may be present as an aid but never as the controlling factor.

One other important element is discoverable in this theoretical foundation of the *Rhetoric*. It is the observation by Aristotle that the logical process involved in public discourse bears only partial resemblance to the logical process which is involved in inquiry. Aristotle says that the logical process present in discourse is in essense or nature true logic, but he observes that there are differences between the two which may go beyond mere form. Some of these differences he himself points out, as when he calls the enthymeme the orator's syllogism, and the example the orator's induction. He thus establishes a distinction between reasoning in inquiry and the logical element in public discourse with respect to which we seem still in need of further light.

Now, this view of rhetoric was not the only theory of the

[2] See the first paper in this series.

subject accepted by the Greeks. The doctrine of the art which prevailed most generally before Aristotle came upon the scene, and which continued to be practiced regardless of the force of Aristotle's influence, was the teaching of the sophists which in its extreme form made of rhetoric the art of personal display and power. This doctrine was at the basis of the popular appeals to the passions and prejudices of men which characterized the speaking of the day and which had brought rhetoric into disrepute with many of the intellectual leaders of Greece. Aristotle earnestly condemned this kind of rhetoric and ruled it summarily out of his system. His rhetoric and that of the sophists were fundamentally antagonistic toward each other.

Here, then, was a very early and very important conflict between basic theories in rhetoric. It was a conflict between a school which stressed psychological values and a school which stressed logical and ethical values. It would be quite unfair to suggest that this ancient conflict is fully analogous to the conflict which is now going on in the field of argumentation, but it can hardly be denied that the latter is in essence a continuation of the former. Certainly the conclusion is inescapable that had we never had another work on rhetoric since the Stagirite wrote his treatise, we should in all probability be confronted today with the same fundamental problems which we are now facing. Some of us should be insisting, even as we are now insisting, that the traditional logical approach to the process is wrong and that Aristotle's psychology has been outgrown; while others of us should be inclined, even as we are now inclined, to maintain an essential loyalty to the logically conditioned *Rhetoric*.

So much for the present concerning the *Rhetoric*. We shall not undertake to weigh its theory critically in this chapter. All we have wished to do here has been to bring into the open all the points which have significance for us in view of our larger task of discovering a sound basis for the discipline of argumentation as it should be written today. We must not drop the subject of Aristotle, however, without observing the anomaly which exists in the relation of Aristotle to the situation in the field of argumentation which obtains at present. We blame Aristotle for saddling argumentation with the logical approach to the problem, but we are obliged at the same time to credit him with being the father of the first systematic psychology of persuasion. That cannot but appear to many people as anomalous.

To care much about the psychology of persuasion seems to them to preclude emphasizing logic. That did not trouble the father of systematic rhetoric. He did not feel bound to give logic a lower place in his system just because he recognized the importance to the orator of the psychology of persuasion. But, of course, it may be that Aristotle took the position he did because he had to work with an undevelped and unsound psychology. We shall see later how pertinent this suggestion may be.

QUINTILIAN AND ECLECTICISM

Even in ancient times rhetoricians did not remain divided into only two camps. Besides the sophists and the Aristotelians there were men with more or less different points of view. In this third class we may group those whose views were hospitable to both the sophists and Aristotle. Most of these men leaned more toward the sophistic influence than they did toward the other, but they borrowed quite heavily from either source.

The most brilliant figure in this group was, of course, Cicero. But we shall pass him by and examine next the large work, the *Institutes of Oratory*, by Quintilian. Broadly speaking, Quintilian belongs to the school represented by Cicero, but he gives slightly more recognition than does the latter to the attitudes of Aristotle. His work is more systematic than are the works of Cicero and lends itself better to our purpose.

The main drive of Aristotle's spirit was that of investigation. He was in all respects the thinker. The main drive of Quintilian's mind was that of creation. While also a thinker, he was more the artist, the teacher, and the public leader. Aristotle was a philosopher: Quintilian was an orator. Aristotle lived in an age when the profession of the rhetorician was frequently united with the profession of the philosopher. Quintilian lived in an era when rhetoric was cultivated by men whose chief associations were with public affairs. Aristotle knew oratory as it had developed through a period of less than two centuries in Greece: Quintilian saw oratory in the perspective of four additional centuries of Greek and Latin public speaking. Aristotle's conception of rhetoric we have reviewed. Let us see how differently the subject is treated by Quintilian.

Quintilian's rhetoric is characterized by a larger inclusiveness of scope than has been found true of Aristotle's system. Quintilian

defines oratory as the "art of speaking well," and he is more sympathetic with oratory as he finds it. All he wishes is that it be good oratory. If he has any anxiety at all, it is rather that speaking should not be too much like a philosophical disquisition than that it should not appeal too much to feeling.

Like Aristotle, Quintilian gives his rhetoric a social outlook. But this is a social outlook without the philosophical insight present in the thought of the Greek. There is one sense, however, in which he carries the matter farther than does Aristotle. Aristotle appears to keep in mind the discussions of philosophers as somehow an important part of the image of oratory, while at the same time he rejects the popular oratory of his day. Quintilian, on the other hand, contrasts oratory with the discussions of philosophers and takes into consideration rather freely the common practice of appealing to the feelings. In other words, Quintilian seems to treat oratory more completely in terms of its actual common occurrence in human affairs.

Like Aristotle, also, Quintilian devotes much time to the psychology of the audience. But Aristotle makes of his discussion a systematic analysis worthy of a place in a general treatise on psychology, while Quintilian is content to remain a rhetorician. Aristotle pauses to carry out an investigation while Quintilian seeks only what he requires for practice. Aristotle produces a scholarly survey of the emotional life of various social groups, while Quintilian seeks in psychology only the strategy of platform influence.

As regards the logical element in rhetoric, Quintilian takes again the position of the rhetorician. We are orators, he would say. As orators we have to deal with propositions and with people. In so far as our propositions involve issues that call for proof we must, of course, employ those principles and techniques which have to do with sound demonstration. But even in such cases we do not turn logicians, for logicians are investigators, and we are pleaders who have to influence our hearers. We need logic. Inevitably it enters into the business of speaking. But so do we need grammar and other guides. Rhetoric does not share the nature of logic; it merely involves logic.

As regards the character of the Quintilian book as a whole, we may say that as contrasted with the work of Aristotle it is more nearly a text-book (although for the teacher rather than for the

student) with an interest in showing not just what is to be done, but also how it should be done. In some respects it prescribes regarding methods and procedures even more fully than do many present-day texts with their appeal to the weaker student. The *Institutes* is in a truer sense a manual, whereas the *Rhetoric* may be most properly spoken of as a treatise.

The theoretical foundation on which Quintilian's system rests is more difficult to get at than is the theoretical foundation of the rhetoric of Aristotle. Aristotle wrote on logic, ethics, and psychology as well as on rhetoric, hence we are able to trace his thinking nearer to its fundamentals. Quintilian, on the other hand, cared chiefly about the applications of the two sciences and hence failed to leave us an exposition of his basic views. His approach to the subject of rhetoric may be best characterized as that of informed common sense.

The general concept from which Quintilian proceeds is that of oratory in its broad sense of good public speaking of every kind.

From the content of the *Institutes* it appears that he did not think of reason as a primary force in human reactions. If he actually maintained such a view, it is evident that he held the belief so lightly that it did not influence his rhetoric in any vital way. Indeed, there are grounds for inferring that he simply took for granted the practical view that reason and feeling exist side by side, that they influence each other, that feeling reaches the will more easily than does reason, and that it even overcomes reason if it only becomes sufficiently intense.

Quintilian's view of the place of the logical element in rhetoric is consistent with this psychological account of the relation of reason to feeling, but it springs rather from his disposition as a rhetorician. He maintains the opinion that while the logical element is an important factor in rhetoric, it does not furnish the primary concept in terms of which rhetoric should be viewed. Oratory, he believes, has for its general function the winning of audiences. In the process of winning them it will usually employ more or less of logical proof. But this fact has only empirical significance. It suggests nothing concerning the question of primacy.

This analysis makes it evident that Quintilian's rhetoric is in many ways unlike the rhetoric of Aristotle. In general it is more thoroughly empirical. In particular, it partakes less of the nature

of argumentation, exhibits less interest in logic, and comes definitely short of the high ethical standard maintained in the work of the Stagirite. But we find here no decided turning to the opposite extreme. There is enough of Aristotle in Quintilian to check that tendency.

Here we have, then, a third point of view regarding rhetorical fundamentals. In the first the logical element was given primacy in the rhetorical process. In the second this primacy was yielded to what we would call psychology. In the last primacy was withheld from either factor. The conclusion, therefore, that in its broad aspects the problem of fundamental theory in argumentation is a very old problem is inescapable.

THE EARLY MODERNS

The next work which we shall consider is the *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, by Dr. George Campbell of Aberdeen, a book published in 1776. Between the years of Quintilian and the years of Campbell there elapsed a stretch of seventeen centuries—a period not unimportant for rhetoric. The limits imposed upon this historical survey oblige us, however, to leave this period untouched.

Dr. Campbell was a theologian and the principal of Marischal College. He was neither a philosopher nor a teacher of rhetoric. His work originated as a group of essays on the main aspects of the subject which held his interest as a hobby. Back of him was a long era when rhetoric was a formal study in the universities of Europe, and when it depended almost wholly on the creative work of the Greeks and Romans. Ahead of him was an era when interest in those formal studies was to wane, but when some attempts would be made to re-write the discipline in terms of the imagery of another age.

Campbell's approach to the subject of rhetoric is in sympathy with the position of Quintilian in that it views the process of oratory in terms of the speaker's practical task. Yet his system differs quite importantly from that found in the *Institutes*. The reason for this difference arises mainly from Campbell's knowledge of early modern psychology.

According to Campbell discourse may have four kinds of ends. These are to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will. In any one speech we

properly maintain only one of these ends as the dominant aim of our effort, but it is usual for all the other ends to be present also in subsidiary roles. Each of these ends dictates to us the selection of the materials and techniques which we shall employ. If we aim either to enlighten the understanding or to influence the will, for example, we find ourselves impelled to use argument. If we follow the other aims we select devices appropriate to those. It thus is apparent that the chief concern of rhetoric is with showing how we may adapt our speech to its particular ends.

In its final outcome the rhetoric of the *Philosophy* tends in the matter of scope to lean toward Quintilian. It views the work of the speaker from the point of view of speaking, and concerns itself with good speaking in general.

This work carries almost no trace of the social outlook found in the works of the ancients. It is a product of the arm-chair. In the mind of the preacher-educator there apparently did not vibrate any strong sense of the vital operation of oratory in public life. This may have been due to the influence of printing in the modern era, or to the temperament of the writer. The true cause cannot easily be established.

The psychology of the hearer the *Philosophy* does not, on the other hand, neglect. Campbell, it is known, interested himself in the psychological writings of his contemporaries. He knew how such categories as "the understanding," "the imagination," "the passions," and "the will" were currently used, and he applied that usage in his system. He was not a better psychologist than Aristotle, but his psychological discussion is more strictly psychological when viewed through modern eyes. His point of view would readily be called that of the faculty school of psychologists, but that label should be used with restraint. The *Philosophy* shows that he thought of the actions of the human faculties as being able to merge into one another and to reinforce each other.

As for logic, it is a very important tool in the speaker's hands, Campbell would say. In seeking to convince a hearer, for example, we are doing nothing else than making a particular application of the logician's art. It is clear, then, that no system of rhetoric can ignore the realm of logic. It must also be clear, however, that logic is only a means in rhetoric and not its foundation.

Looking, now, at the theoretical fundamentals of this system

of rhetoric, we discover, first, that Campbell uses the concept of eloquence as the general category. He views the character of the rhetorical process rather consistently as having very flexible variability. That is to say, he recognizes that speaking may at one extreme be almost synonymous with logical reasoning and at the other extreme almost synonymous with mere appeal to the emotions. According to this view, the only reason why a speech cannot be wholly identical with reasoning is because in speaking we deal not only with subjects but with minds as well. Otherwise there is no ground for refusing to include in rhetoric the discussions of philosophers or even of mathematicians. And there is equally no ground for disdaining appeals made to the passions exclusively. As a matter of observed fact we must admit that our speeches classify themselves by their individual emphases along the whole line between the two extremes.[3] What we are talking about, therefore, is eloquence, and not some select trait or element of good speaking. Eloquence, in other words, denotes the whole of the speaker's art taken empirically.

Within this broad scope of eloquence the author finds room for the familiar distinction between appeal to the understanding and appeal to the passions. Following his interest in psychological analysis, however, he superimposes upon this dichotomy the more modern one of conviction and persuasion. By "conviction" he means the process of changing a hearer's beliefs through an appeal to the understanding. By "persuasion" he means the process of moving the hearer's will through concurrent appeals to his understanding and his passions. He thus assigns to the concept of persuasion an exclusive meaning, and fills out the view of rhetorical processes by employing the additional concept of conviction.

This use of the terms "conviction" and "persuasion" represents a definite shift from the old to modern traditions in that it involves the assumption of a distinctly psychological point of view in the choice and use of concepts and terms. When we considered the work of Aristotle we observed that when he was applying the term "persuasion" to the whole process of oratorical appeal, he was not psychologizing. He was accepting a term already in use and derived from social experience rather than from any psychological classifi-

[3] This, unfortunately, is a point overlooked by most rhetoricians throughout the centuries of rhetorical history.

cation. Theoretically he might have been able to make room for the term "conviction," even after having employed the term "persuasion" as he did, but he used neither it nor any of its possible psychological equivalents. Our own tradition, on the other hand, has been tied to real and would-be psychological distinctions. We have applied the term "conviction" to appeals to reason (or the understanding) and the term "persuasion" to appeals to feeling—feeling being usually thought of as a bridge to the will or to action. Campbell is manifestly nearer to Aristotle in that he makes "persuasion" an inclusive term; but he is nearer to us in that he takes a psychological point of view and uses "conviction" as a separate concept.

The work which seems at once to follow old traditions in rhetoric and to anticipate the era of text-books devoted exclusively to argumentation is Archbishop Whately's highly esteemed *Elements of Rhetoric*. Whately was primarily a logician—not just as a student, but in spirit. He engaged in refuting the attacks of eighteenth century rationalists on Christianity and did it very much in the manner of the rationalists themselves. He was at home intellectually in the fields of logic, theology, and political economy.

The *Elements* is a small thoughtful volume consisting of four parts. The first deals with the discovery and organization of arguments. The second covers the subject of persuasion, and the last two with style and elocution. The whole work leans very largely on Aristotle and on Campbell, but carries the impress also of Whately's own originality.

When we survey the characteristics of this rhetoric we are struck most of all by the author's choice of its scope. The most widely accepted definition of rhetoric in Whately's time represented the discipline as the art of prose composition. Whately, prompted probably by his interest in logic and controversy, chose to narrow the field to argumentative composition. As a consequence of this choice he introduced into his work many of the special features which belong particularly to controversial technique and so took an important step in the creation of the separate discipline of argumentation.

The outlook of this work is social in a restricted sense. Whately was for many years an active controversialist and knew what the experience of dealing with opponents and audiences meant. But he

lived in an age when men communicated their ideas to the world chiefly in writing and he concerned himself in his disputations less with public affairs than with beliefs. The *Elements* conveys to us, therefore, not so much a sense of the public character of argumentation as a sense of its genuinely vital character.

Concerning the subject of rational as distinguished from affective appeals, Whately presents a very clear exposition. He distinguishes between conviction and persuasion in the manner employed by Campbell. That is, he regards conviction as purely an address to the understanding and the emotions. But he takes an additional step at this point. He gives the appeal to the emotions the label of "exhortation," a term used in this manner by Thomas Wilson in 1553,[4] and then re-defines persuasion as a combination of exhortation and argument. The relation of the two elements of the combination to each other Whately tends to explain rather mechanically, assigning to argument and to exhortation distinctly differentiated functions.

The position of the logical element in this system is the same as that in Aristotle. Whately even adopts at the outset Aristotle's view that "rhetoric is an offshoot from logic." His argument favoring this adoption is that logic and rhetoric have both to do with reasoning and that reasoning belongs fundamentally to the same genus whether we come upon it in inquiry or in communication.

The theoretical foundation of the Whately system is, in simple summary, as follows: rhetoric has to do with argumentation. Argumentation, in turn, has primarily to do with logical proof. But it has to do with more than proof. Proving can secure only conviction. That is, it can teach people opinions they have not been interested in before or cause them to accept opinions which they would otherwise doubt or oppose. And this in a particular instance may be all that we aim to accomplish. But often we wish also to move the wills of people to action, to cause our hearers to behave in line with a particular belief. And this effect cannot be produced without at least some appeal to the feelings. There are times, in other words, when we wish to persuade, and persuasion without appeal to feeling is impossible. Human nature does not function that way. While primary, therefore, logical proof is not the sole element in argu-

[4] In his *The Arte of Rhetorique.*

mentation. Argumentation consists also of that mixture of reasoning and emotional appeal which we call persuasion.

In the presence of this rhetoric we have the impression of being not far from home. There is in the *Elements* a definite approach to the treatment of argumentation as embodied in our standard tradition. Whately confines his treatise to the subject of argumentation, distinguishes in nearly the modern manner between conviction and persuasion, follows Aristotle in making logical proof the primary element in the arguer's work, and gives instruction concerning many phases of controversial technique. His work bears the date of 1828, which is half a century before the development of argumentation into the specialized discipline set forth in Baker's *Principles of Argumentation* and other texts.

THE RHETORICS OF THE MODERN CLASSROOM

Many text-books of rhetoric were written between the publication of the *Elements* and the first edition of Baker's *Principles*. Most of them were written for the modern classroom as we know it. They were written by authors who were neither philosophers nor orators but instructors in composition—men who had to concern themselves as much with the pedagogy as with the theory of the subject.

Individually these works reveal relatively little that is significant for our present inquiry. Collectively, however, they indicate several trends in treatment and doctrine which are worthy of our notice.

An examination of these texts shows that by 1850 writers on rhetoric had accepted fully Whately's separation of argumentation from other kinds of composition, and had begun to distinguish prose writing as falling within the classes of narration, description, exposition, and argumentation. This, now standard, classification does not appear in all the works of the period, but it appears often enough to indicate a trend. The advantage of the classification can be easily appreciated. It enabled students of rhetoric to make specialties of argumentation and the other kinds of composition and so to develop a more detailed understanding of the processes of each.

These works show also that the tendency toward the development of argumentation into the specialized discipline which has become our tradition was at first very gradual. Aside from the technical treatment of analysis and briefing, the body of principles

and methods presented in our standard tradition represents growing interest in the technique of argumentation rather than the sudden discovery of something new in the field. The period in question is certainly one of evolution rather than of revolution.

With reference to the basic theory in argumentation, this period exhibits a variety of views. The dichotomy of conviction and persuasion is maintained rather consistently, but the interpretation of the concept varies. In some a dualistic view such as appears in Aristotle is set forth, treating the appeals to feeling as an adjunct to the appeal to reason. In others the extreme view is taken that argumentation has to do purely with the logical proof of truth. In many of the works a parallelism appears which assigns to the intellect the function of understanding the means, and to the feelings the function of appreciating the ends involved in a proposition. And in the rest a more vague parallelism is assumed which in some cases approaches identity with the organic doctrine of Quintilian.

A similar difference of attitude is manifested in these rhetorics regarding the difference between the logical elements as it appears in inquiry and the same element as it functions in communication. Some of the authors treat the matter as if this logical element were just real logic in both situations. Others join Aristotle in pointing out that in discourse the logical element is truly of the nature of logic, but that it takes on an altered form. Still others assign to logic the task of evaluating the work of thought, and to rhetoric or argumentation the task of discovering proofs for particular propositions—which is a way of saying that strictly speaking the logical element in rhetoric is in truth just a relative of logic rather than logic itself. And there are some who consider the logical element after the analogy of figures of speech, that is, as forms of thought and expression which may be treated without reference to the subject of logic as such.

That this lack of agreement should extend also to the use of terms is perhaps natural. Some of the authors use the term "persuasion" to cover the whole process of speaking or writing wherever the aim is to influence people with respect to a proposition. Some use in the same way the term "argumentation." Others restrict the meanings of these terms, applying the first to the process of moving the will through appeal to feeling, and the second to the process of

shaping people's beliefs. And several vary the usage in still other ways, or employ wholly different designations.

The impression this summary makes upon us is that the rhetoricians of this period disagreed in their theories more than had their ancient and modern predecessors. This impression is only superficially sound. It is true that these writers produced a new diversity of points of view, but these points of view represented the re-combinations of older ideas rather than the creation of new ones. Most of the really new elements which we find in the writings examined arose from the study of composition in terms of its general types and from the adaptation of rhetorical studies to modern classroom practice.

ARGUMENTATION ACCORDING TO OUR STANDARD TRADITION

Interest in the teaching of argumentation as a separate discipline was in the air as early as the middle eighties of the nineteenth century. How many of our colleges actually introduced courses in the subject about that time it would take considerable research to discover. We do know from the preface to Professor E. J. MacEwan's text-book[5] that he developed such a course in Michigan State College as early as 1886, and from Professor George P. Baker's history-making *Principles of Argumentation* that he had done "some years of teaching" of the subject at Harvard and elsewhere before he produced in 1895 the original edition of his work.

So far as text-books are concerned, Professor Baker's *Principles* was first in the new tradition, not only in point of time, but also in prestige. It carried the power to be first in prestige, that is, the power to set the main pattern in the development of the discipline, not because of its unusual theoretical soundness or profundity, but because it embodied devices and methods demanded by the modern pedagogy and use of the subject.

The point just made is an important one. We can understand adequately neither the work of Professor Baker nor the nature of our traditional treatment of argumentation unless we appreciate the fact that the makers of this tradition were dealing not so much with the theoretical foundation of their subject as with the shaping of that subject into a discipline for modern classroom use.

[5] E. J. MacEwan: *The Essentials of Argumentation;* D. C. Heath & Co., 1898.

A discipline is the treatment of a subject with a view to its practical pedagogy. What such a treatment will in any particular case be depends partly on the character of our pedagogical aims, principles, and methods, and partly on the kind of students we must have in mind as we plan. Any or all of these factors may differ more or less with changes in time and place.

That these changes do take place may be illustrated by the history of the teaching of rhetoric itself. There was a time when the teaching of rhetoric was done by lecturers on the subject. Such men could be content with treating the matter mainly as an organized body of knowledge to be communicated. It was just as easy for them to write a treatise or a series of essays on the subject, as to present their material orally to their assemblies. All that was expected of them was a knowledge of the subject, ability in exposition, and brilliance of expression. But in the course of time this method gradually gave way to the methods of the modern classroom. In place of the lectures there came text-books. And instead of the student's duty to apply the principles of rhetoric freely, there came his duty to master the theory in small assignments, and to apply it bit by bit in the writing of many themes.

Now, at the time when Professor Baker started to develop his course in argumentation the methods of the modern classroom were generally established in American colleges. What this pioneer had to do, therefore, was to create a discipline which would be theoretically sound, culturally substantial, practically useful, and pedagogically adequate. And the materials out of which he had to evolve it were rhetoric, logic, rules of court procedure, modern controversial technique, oratory, and various pedagogical devices which he either invented or borrowed from existing sources. This was a task of years of experimentation and study, the outcome of which was a course in argumentation which aimed to make it possible for a student to master the subject by taking it step by step in small assignments. Two other books on argumentation appeared shortly after the publication of the *Principles*—the only books on the subject which did not lean on Baker. These were *The Essentials of Argumentation* by Professor MacEwan,[6] and *A Course in Argumentative*

[6] See footnote No. 5.

Writings by Miss Gertrude Buck.[7] Of these two at least the first ranked somewhat above the *Principles* in thoroughness of scholarship. But the *Principles* outranked them both in influence. And that was because it contained the pedagogical essentials of a well-rounded discipline.

The *Principles* has been twice revised, first with the aid and then under the direction of Professor H. B. Huntington as junior author. The first revision appeared ten years[8] after the original edition, and the second revision twenty years later.[9] Between the two revisions there is very little substantial difference.[10] Between the original book and the first revision, however, the difference is considerable. The first edition shows many signs of having been just a trail-blazer. The second edition represents a thorough re-writing of the original in terms of ten additional years of experience in the teaching of the subject. It is of this edition that Professor Huntington speaks when he tells us that "the methods there set forth have been widely accepted as basic in the teaching of argument to college classes."[11] And it is this edition which we must regard as representing the ripe thought of Professor Baker about the subject. Since, then, the first edition was just a trail-blazer, and the third was written after the publication of Miss Yost's and Mr. Woolbert's attacks on the standard tradition, it would seem most fair in continuing our analysis to center our attention chiefly on the second edition and refer to the other two only when they help to bring the ideas of the *Principles* into clearer perspective.

In scope the *Principles* is restricted in one respect. It points out the fact that in the realm of rigorous science a kind of argumentation may take place which in some respects approaches the quality of such pure conviction as is found in mathematical proof, but it chooses to ignore this phenomenon on the ground that "ordinarily the people with whom we argue have many prejudices or idiosyncracies which make it difficult to develop our case unobstruct-

[7] Holt, 1899.

[8] 1905.

[9] 1925. This was after Miss Yost's and Mr. Woolbert's attacks on the standard tradition.

[10] Some effort was made in the third edition to bring the book theoretically in line with the concept of psychological monism.

[11] In the preface to the third edition, p. viii.

ed."[12] So it proposes to deal only with the "argumentation of everyday life," and to offer the general training which must precede all specialized techniques. In the second and third editions its authors include chapters on debating, but they refrain from warping the course as a whole to cater to even that special interest.

Basically the *Principles* has a genuine social outlook. Its authors deal with "the argumentation of everyday life," and keep the student reminded of the real social situation in which his post-collegiate arguing will have to take place. They fail, however, to go as far with it as some of our recent writers believe to be necessary. This is due in part to the fact that they are addressing themselves to students in the classroom. (A hindrance to a thoroughgoing social outlook which no author in our field can easily surmount!) But it is also due, and that in larger measure, to the fact that they do not take the audience adequately into account until after they have dealt with the subjects of analysis,[13] evidence, and brief-drawing.

At once one of the outstanding examples of Baker's ability in the organizing of the new discipline and one of the three crucial features[14] whereby we can gauge the extent of Baker's influence on the development of the teaching of argumentation in America is the exposition of argumentative analysis. This subject gave Baker a great deal of trouble. His original treatment of it had to be extensively corrected in the second edition of the *Principles*. The outcome of Baker's work was, however, that this feature became one of the most valuable features of the new discipline. In nature this analysis is almost exclusively a subject analysis. It does not include a consideration of the audience to be addressed.

The most characteristic feature of the *Principles* is the device known as the brief. Baker borrowed this brief from legal practice, and adapted it to the teaching of argumentation through several years of experimentation. How he looked upon this feature we can discover from a footnote in the first edition.[15] He speaks there as follows: "The system of drawing briefs explained in this chapter

[12] Second ed., p. 8.

[13] See "Argumentative Analysis" in Cable's *Cultural and Scientific Speech Education Today*.

[14] The other two are the treatment of brief-drawing and the combination of legal and logical materials in the discussion of evidence.

[15] On page 83.

has been developed during the last five years of the work in forensics at Harvard College. Lest the tone of the chapter may seem too dogmatic it may be well to say that since the system is an evolution, each year of forensic work making some improvements in it, teachers will probably find it wise to make some changes to meet the particular needs of their classes. The system is offered simply as a method which has greatly aided logical thinking and convincing argumentation among Harvard students, and has been used by some recent graduates with marked success in their practice as lawyers."

According to the *Principles* the brief performs three kinds of functions, the pedagogical, the logical, and the rhetorical. The definition given in the second edition tells us that the brief "is the subdivision of the genus outline which furnishes to a critic a clear and concise exposition of the convincingness of the argument and at the same time aids the writer in the ordination, arrangement, and grouping of evidence."[16] Here the pedagogical and logical functions are stated. In the discussion of the relation of the forensic to the brief Baker amplifies this definition by telling us that the forensic "is really but an expansion of the brief."[17] This indicates the rhetorical function of the brief, for it makes the brief an outline for the speech.

The form of the brief taught in all editions of the *Principles* is the commonly adopted one in which the "brief proper" consists of categorical propositions joined in a logical sequence by the conjunctions "for" and "because," and which deals exclusively with the processes of conviction.

As if inevitably, the authors employ in their system the old dichotomy of "conviction" and "persuasion." They accept the distinction between the two concepts as valid, and they organize their course in terms of that distinction.

In defining this dichotomy the authors offer us the following formulation of their understanding of the two concepts: "Conviction aims only to produce agreement between writer and reader; persuasion aims to prepare the way for the process of conviction or to produce action as a result of conviction. In pure conviction one

[16] Page 212.

[17] This statement appears only on page 269 of the first edition, but the principle is employed in the second edition as well.

appeals only to the intellect of a reader by clear and cogent reasoning. In persuasion one may produce desired action either by arousing emotion in regard to the ideas set forth, or by adapting the presentation of one's case as a whole or in part to special interests, prejudices, or idiosyncracies of a reader."[18] Which, in simple summary, means that conviction is the process of securing agreement through appeals to the intellect and that persuasion is the process of aiding conviction or of producing action through the arousing of emotions or through adaptations to the various attitudes found in the hearer. In discussing the two processes in the body of the book the authors adhere rather consistently to this definition, but they do qualify it in one respect: they warn the student against conceiving of the distinction between the processes in too rigid or mechanical terms. Thus they say that conviction and persuasion must be thought of as as closely complementary as the warp and woof of a fabric, that the separation of the two processes in the book is "artificial and made wholly for pedagogic reasons,"[19] and that "very often the very exposition which convinces is also made to persuade."[20]

The question of the possible primacy of one or the other of the two processes in argumentation the authors do not discuss. Indirectly, however, they do commit themselves to a point of view with regard to it. In the definition quoted above they make persuasion accessory to conviction. In the organization of their course they make conviction fundamental. And in the disposition of the materials of their book they show the same tendency by placing the discussion of persuasion in a chapter headed "Presentation." This evidence can mean only one thing. True, Huntington tells us in the third edition that one of the processes "is no more necessary than the other to the effective argument,"[21] and that the principles which underlie successful conviction are treated first in the book only because their comparative definiteness makes that arrangement more convenient,[22] but these statements sound like after-thoughts inspired by the contemporary attacks on the traditional teaching. Certainly no amount of explaining can prevent an author from giving convic-

[18] Second ed., p. 7.
[19] Second ed., p. 10-11.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Page 7.
[22] Page 11.

tion primacy in the course so long as the Bakerian brief remains unchanged.

As it is discussed in the *Principles* this duality of conviction and persuasion does not represent a psychological distinction in the sense of being based on some pychological doctrine. It represents rather a social recognition of an opposition which is closely akin to the popular antithesis of *mind* and *heart* and which in this case is lifted to a semi-scientific status. Some psychology is, of course, involved in this, but it is very largely the psychology of common sense rather than that of a school. We can fit this thought of Baker and Huntington into the system called the "faculty psychology," but the statements found in the *Principles* hardly force us to do so.

A striking characteristic of the *Principles* is the fact that a liberal proportion of its space is devoted to the discussion of the processes of persuasion. In our own era the complaint is frequently heard that we are ignoring the psychology of the audience. Baker and Huntington do not ignore it. They give this material about sixty pages in each of the revisions of their book. True, the discussion embodied there is based on a popular psychology rather than on the technical principles of a science. Nevertheless it is a kind of material which could not properly be denied space in any comprehensive psychology of argumentative speaking.

The processes of conviction the authors treat under the head of "Evidence." This material consists chiefly of adaptations from the fields of legal practice and logic. In the first edition of the book the logical element is reduced to terms of everyday use. As little as possible is made there of logic in the technical sense of the term. In the second edition this factor is given very much enlarged scope, and its technical features are given more explicit recognition. We thus meet here at least a fragment of the deductive and inductive logical forms.

Now, we have said that our traditional treatment of argumentation has followed the pattern set down in the *Principles*. That this assertion is true, an examination of our text-books[23] will easily reveal, even where the authors fail to make proper acknowledg-

[23] In this group of texts we include only those which have not been written under the influence of the Yost and Woolbert articles referred to in the first chapter of this study.

ments to the Harvard pioneer. This is not to say, however, that our standard tradition is no more than a copy of the course originated by Baker. This is not the case. The new discipline has undergone an evolution in which several departures from the thought found in the *Principles* have developed. This evolution we shall now endeavor to point out.

In scope and outlook our standard tradition has departed from the *Principles,* not conspicuously, but nevertheless significantly. Our tradition has followed Baker in addressing itself to the student in the classroom, but it has catered more to the college debater and has tended to slight the "argumentation of everyday life." The most frequently used definitions of argumentation have reminded us more of "beliefs" than of the world of social action.

Baker's exposition of argumentative analysis our tradition has continued without significant change.

As regards the brief, that our tradition has adopted almost blindly. Where in the first edition of the *Principles* Baker took the experimental attitude toward it, knowing he was arbitrarily transferring a device from one realm to another, our tradition has tended in the direction of teaching brief-drawing dogmatically,[24] as if this particular type of brief were an element inseparable from the teaching of argumentation. And where at first Baker emphasized most its pedagogical function, our tradition has been to emphasize strongly its logical and rhetorical functions. Thus the formal linear brief has tended to be to argumentation in particular what the common outline is to composition in general.

With reference to the definition and use of the concepts of conviction and persuasion our tradition has also deviated from the teaching of Baker. In the first place, it has made the distinction between the two processes more rigid. And in the second place, it has expounded the operation of these processes in terms of psychology. In most of the texts conviction is defined as the "appeal to reason," and persuasion as the "appeal to emotions." The authors fail to agree, however, when they attempt to explain the mechanics of the two processes. Thus, in Laycock and Scales[25] the aim of both processes is belief, to which the speaker guides us through our intellects and moves us through our wills by way of our emotions.

[24] Foster's attitude in this matter is a notable exception to the general tendency.

[25] *Argumentation and Debate,* Macmillan, 1904.

In Foster[26] the aim of conviction is belief, and the aim of persuasion, action. Conviction establishes belief through an appeal to the understanding while persuasion secures action by inclining the will through the stirring up of the emotions. And in Stone and Garrison[27] the aim of both processes is belief, and the two processes are simply different ways of approaching the mind. These are differences in interpretation which remind us of the variety of views on the same subject which prevailed in the last period of rhetoric.

Traditionally we have been interested in the subject of persuasion much less than was Baker. Our text-books have given the matter comparatively little space, and our scholarship has not until in recent years added anything new to our knowledge of its processes.

As regards the question of the primacy in argumentation of the processes of conviction, our tradition has followed the precedent set by the *Principles*. As a matter of fact, the question has not often been raised, and whenever it has been raised, it has been very little discussed.

And, finally, our tradition has departed only slightly from the *Principles* in dealing with the processes of conviction. It has borrowed from law, and it has borrowed from logic. But it has borrowed from logic somewhat more than can be found in the *Principles*. This has not been a great deal more, however, for as far as logic is concerned, our text-books in argumentation have not carried us far beyond John Stuart Mill.

This is where our standard tradition stood in 1917, when its soundness was first seriously questioned by its critics.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Several summary conclusions might be drawn from this historical analysis. But we have not sought for conclusions. We have sought for vantage points from which to view, tools with which to analyze, and data in terms of which to deal with the problems raised by the critics of our standard tradition. We are now prepared to examine in detail the ideas of the critics themselves.

[26] *Argumentation and Debating*, Houghton Mifflin, 1908.
[27] *Essentials of Argument*, Holt, 1917.

THE QUALITIES OF THE VOICE

F. LINCOLN D. HOLMES
University of Minnesota

IN a paper, published in the QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH for April, 1931, called *The Problem of Voice Placement*, the theory concerning the part played by infra-glottal resonance in *voice placement* was set forth. Briefly, the theory is this: The resonance provided by the oscillation of the air particles in the trachea and bronchial tubes affects the larynx tone in such a manner that it (the resonance) is the prime factor in *voice placement*. The contention of the writer in that paper is that "frontal placement" is the result of using a pitch level at which the larynx tone is aided by the infra-glottal resonance.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relation of infra-glottal resonance to certain vocal phenomena conventionally referred to as the "qualities of the voice."

Before proceeding to that discussion let us consider what we hear when an individual speaks. Most of the modern writers on the subject classify what is heard in the human voice under four headings: Quality, force, time, and pitch. Most of us are able to observe distinctly what is involved in the last three. The first one, quality, however, encompasses even more than is commonly attributed to it. Woolbert says of it, "The quality, or timbre, of a sound is a matter of wave complexity. Every sound, except under laboratory conditions, is really several sounds mixed together; the kind of mixture in any given case is its quality, its complexity."[1] In other words, what we hear in the way of quality is due to the frequencies, the fundamental and "overtones," involved. It seems to me that we can distinguish three sets of phenomena when a person produces speech sounds for the purpose of arousing responses in others: (1) The speech sounds themselves, i. e., the frequencies characteristic of the speech sounds; (2) the frequencies characteristic of the individual's personal quality; and (3) those frequency combinations characteristic of the "qualities of the voice." Only a portion of the phenomena that distinguish one person's voice from that of another is due to

[1] C. H. Woolbert: *The Fundamentals of Speech;* Harper & Bros., 1920, p. 156.

the frequencies present in the complex tone. The rest of the complex set of auditory stimuli is provided by his use of force, pitch, and time. Since the scope of this paper excludes this phase of quality, it must be left for a later discussion.

The connecting link between the paper mentioned and this discussion of the "qualities of the voice" is infra-glottal resonance, since it seems to be the only factor capable of effecting *frontal placement* and *normal* quality; for when a person achieves *frontal placement*, providing the muscles of his larynx, pharynx, lips, jaw, tongue, and velum are properly relaxed and coordinated, he will also produce *normal* quality. Since this quality can be more easily understood after most of the others have been discussed, let us follow the order given by O'Neill and Weaver. They refer frequently to *The Philosophy of the Human Voice* by Dr. James Rush, and list the following qualities: The aspirate, the guttural, the pectoral, the nasal, the oral, the falsetto, the normal, and the orotund. Woolbert omits the *falsetto* from his list.

O'Neill and Weaver point out that the true aspirate is not a quality in a certain sense of the word. Although it is true that it is marked by the absence of a laryngeal tone, it must be made up of a certain complexity of frequencies since we are able to hear the various speech sounds when they are whispered. Also frequencies characteristic of the guttural quality, and others representing characteristics of the individual may be observed in the aspirate quality.

The guttural quality is attributed by O'Neill and Weaver to throat tension. According to my observations this quality is usually accompanied by a lower than normal pitch; and, although the constricted throat can be added to the pattern that is produced when the larynx tone is above normal, I believe that the term *strident* is more appropriate for the resulting tone. If these observations are accurate, the pitch level of the individual plays some part in the production of the guttural quality. We must constantly remember that these various qualities are what they are because of the frequency combinations present in the sounds. Although the relative pitch level is absent in the aspirate quality and plays a minor part in guttural quality, it takes on a more important role in the other six.

The pectoral quality reminds me of the results obtained from shouting into a rain barrel or a cistern. The fundamental seems to

be stronger than ordinarily. O'Neill and Weaver quote Rush, saying,[2] "Dr. Rush maintains that it comes from an over expansion of the pharyngeal walls, producing the effect of vibrations within a resonator a little too large for efficient amplification." The absurdity of this statement will be evident to those who have observed the X-ray photographs presented in Dr. Russell's books. His pictures show that the extreme expansion of the pharynx is a characteristic necessary for the production of the vowel [i] as in *see*. If Rush's idea of the cause of pectoral quality were correct, we would always produce a vowel [i] quality on all our pectoral sounds because of the expansion of the pharynx necessary in the production of this vowel. The pectoral quality can be produced for all voiced speech sounds, yet there is no trace of the sound of [i] except when the vowel [i] is produced. What then is responsible for the pectoral quality? By observing my own voice I have found that I am able to produce my best pectoral quality an octave below my normal pitch level. At no other point within this octave am I able to produce the pectoral quality so effectively. I believe that this phenomenon occurs because the larynx tone is reinforced by the infra-glottal resonance at that pitch level. This accounts for the strength of the fundamental. At that low pitch the larynx tone is not very strong. The air in the vocal resonant tube* is set in oscillation less violently than it is when the larynx tone is stronger. Compared with the strength or amplitude of the speech sound frequencies, the larynx tone is greater, giving rise to the seeming exaggeration of the larynx tone. Good pectoral quality can be produced at one pitch level only. Infra-glottal resonance must be the cause of the static pitch requirement. Perhaps it is this monotony of pitch which makes the pectoral quality suggestive of the Ghost in *Hamlet*.

The nasal quality depends upon an unconventional dropping of the velum combined with an unconventional tension in the larynx and pharynx. I am assuming that the term nasality refers to that unpleasant nosey quality attributed to most Americans by the English and used to characterize the small-town constable and the down-

[2] O'Neill and Weaver: *Elements of Speech;* Longmans Green, N. Y., 1926, p. 157.

* The term *vocal resonant tube* is applied to the mouth and respiratory tract above the glottis, because the sound waves must pass through this tube on their way to the outer air.

east farmer in melodramas. This quality, although caused mostly by the factors mentioned is affected by the pitch level of the individual. As long as the pitch level is normal, or below normal, the unpleasantness will be only mild. One can speak with the velum down and not introduce into the complexity of frequencies any more than some slightly unconventional frequencies, not really unpleasant. However, add to this muscular pattern sufficient constriction in the larynx to raise the pitch above normal, and frequencies are introduced, or amplified, which are most unpleasant. Since constriction in the larynx usually raises the pitch, one's pitch level is partly responsible for the most marked types of nasality.

Of oral quality the authors mentioned say,[3] "As the name implies, the *oral* is a 'mouth' quality. It emphasizes the mouth as a resonator, at the expense of the pharynx." If you observe the relative pitch level of the individual when he is producing good *oral* quality, you will find that his pitch is above normal. I am able to produce my best *oral* quality a musical fifth (from *do* to *sol* above the normal pitch level) above my normal pitch. However, there is a slight suggestion of oral quality as soon as one phonates above his normal pitch. The quality becomes more marked as he goes up the musical scale. What makes this quality what it is? The aid from the infra-glottal resonance falls off in the interval between one's normal pitch and a musical fifth above. This is largely responsible for the weak tone; for apparently not every successive "puff" of compression from the glottis is aided by a reflected wave from the trachea and bronchial tubes. When one remembers that a woman may have a good normal quality at a pitch at which a man would produce oral quality, and that the frequencies responsible for the speech sounds are relatively constant for both men and women, he must conclude that the factor responsible for *oral* quality is not the relation of the pitch of the larynx tone to the vowel frequencies. Therefore the cause of oral quality must be the effect of the infra-glottal resonance upon the larynx tone.

If one continues up the musical scale from his normal pitch level, he will find a pitch at which it is difficult for him to produce a clear tone. Unless he has trained himself to sing at this pitch, his voice will break. He may produce a squawk, or his larynx may move

[3] O'Neill and Weaver; *op. cit.*, p. 159.

up and down and his pitch change between two levels. This "breaking" point, according to a few cases studied in our laboratory, occurs about a musical sixth above normal pitch. This is true in my own case. The trained singer can proceed up the musical scale without showing this break perceptibly. The untrained person lacks sufficient control of the laryngeal musculature to adapt it to producing a tone at a pitch level interfered with by the infra-glottal resonance. This point is frequently mentioned as the dividing line between the chest and falsetto registers. If one substitutes for a reed that responds most favorably to an infra-resonance column, one that is a musical sixth higher, he will find that it responds very feebly, or not at all.

When one continues up the musical scale from the pitch at which the "break" occurs, he will find that he is producing what is known as "falsetto" quality. He will be able to produce his loudest tone at an octave above his normal quality pitch level. The *falsetto* is usually shrill and unpleasant. It is possible that the general muscle tension necessary to constrict the larynx enough to produce that high pitch tends to exaggerate the high frequencies. A fairly pleasant tone can be produced if the larynx and pharynx muscles are relaxed. The high notes of a soprano, which are far above the pitch a man can reach in his *falsetto,* are frequently flute-like in quality. This fact indicates that it is not alone the high frequency of the larynx tone, but undoubtedly other unnecessary tensions, that introduce the frequencies that make the *falsetto* quality unpleasant.

Since the qualities that are produced by the various pitches above and below the normal pitch of the individual have been discussed, let us now turn to the quality produced at that pitch level. The term applied to this type of quality is "normal." O'Neill and Weaver say of this quality, [4] "This quality should be first of all clear and agreeable. It should employ all the resonators; it should be free from improper nasality; from too much guttural growl; the hollow pectoral murmur, and the oral and falsetto thinness and squeakiness. All the breath should be vocalized, rather than allowed to escape as it does in the aspirate." The only pitch level, or key, that will aid in producing the quality described and serve in eliminating the undesirable types mentioned is the one I have called, in the paper mentioned, the normal pitch level. In addition to avoiding the

[4] O'Neill and Weaver; *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

undesirable qualities, the normal pitch aids in the production of a positive tone. What gives the sounds produced at that pitch that positive characteristic? Is it the relation of the frequency of the larynx tone to the frequencies of the speech sounds being produced? This is not likely because the frequency relationship varies with every speech sound and the positive qualities continue as long as the pitch is close to normal. The only constant, as I asserted in the paper previously mentioned, is the infra-glottal resonance, which reinforces the larynx tone produced at the normal pitch. Therefore it must be this factor that provides the positive quality and the greater intensity for the same or less effort, than that produced at any pitch below normal. When the air column below the glottis is the right length, i. e., when the frequency of the infra-resonance has a relation of 1:1, 1:2, 1:3, or 1:4, with the frequency of the reed, the tone is rich and full. When the length of that column of air has no integral relationship the tone will be less pleasant and less powerful. It is possible to provide a length of infra-resonance that will not allow a reed to respond at all. These observations support the conclusion that the normal pitch of an individual is a requisite for the production of good normal quality.

The question of pitch change will likely puzzle the reader. If one obtains the best results from one pitch level, how can he use pitch changes effectively? Since the efficiency does not drop off abruptly, I believe that one can modify his pitch about two full tones up and two full tones down from his normal pitch without too great a loss. Moreover, there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that the conventional pitch change covers a very wide range. However, one must maintain his normal key to give the suggestion of normal quality. If he strikes the "key note" often enough he will establish the positiveness of the quality.

The orotund quality has been adequately explained by O'Neill and Weaver[5] when they speak of its being a "normal made more vigorous and effective." Dr. Fletcher in his *Speech and Hearing* points out that the louder the energy tone, the greater the number of partials produced. This probably explains the richness, the brilliance, of the orotund quality.

It is pertinent, at this point, to discuss briefly the capacity of

[5] O'Neill and Weaver: *Op. cit.*, p. 161.

each of the various "resonators of the voice" to respond independently of the others. One must remember that the sound waves set up by the larynx, due to its periodic interruptions of the column of air being exhaled, must pass to the outside through the cavities of the mouth or respiratory tract. These waves of compression from the larynx can travel outward only when they set the air particles into oscillation. Hence, the air in all the connected cavities is set into oscillation regardless of the natural frequency of the cavity-enclosed air. This fact makes it impossible for the air in the pharynx to act independently of the air in the mouth or in the nasal passages. Undoubtedly the air in the nasal passages is set into oscillation by forced vibration even when the velum is closed. The oscillation of the air particles in those passages may add very little to the conventional combination of frequencies necessary to the speech sounds, but it undoubtedly contributes something to individual quality. Many writers on vocal resonance have overlooked these facts. Perhaps it is this oversight that has led to supposedly descriptive words such as *pectoral, oral,* and *orotund.*

In my attempts to understand the human voice, the premise *every acoustical phenomenon must have an acoustical cause* has directed my search for the causes of observed phenomena such as *voice placement* and the *qualities* of the voice. I have been unable to find any acoustical cause for the phenomena mentioned other than infra-glottal resonance. My experiments with reeds equipped with infra-resonance columns have verified my observations concerning the human voice. Further investigation in which I plan to use the trachea and bronchial tree from a cadaver may verify or disprove my theory concerning the effect of the infra-glottal resonance upon various aspects of the human voice. Meanwhile the application of this theory to the problem of obtaining normal quality will prove it to be a working hypothesis fundamental to voice improvement.

THE VEGETATIVE VERSUS THE SPEECH USE OF BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS*

L. S. JUDSON
University of Wisconsin
and
R. C. PROCTOR
New Orleans Public Schools

IN CERTAIN parts of our field so much use is being made of skiagraphic, oscillographic, and kymographic recording of various phenomena associated with normal breathing, normal speech, and anomalous speech that it seems timely to consider a phase of the working of the speech-producing organism which is sometimes overlooked in the study of records. We are suggesting that graphic records and experimental evidence indicate a difference in the degree of amplitude of: (I) the contraction of muscular systems, and (II) the utilization of secretory products as distinguishing the vegetative from the speech use of biologic systems. From the standpoint of analysis we are presenting nothing new; the objective record forces the student to an observation of amplitude differences. From the standpoint of synthesis we are putting into words that which too often is neglected, the picture of the functional activity which "wrote" the record. We feel that many times this failure to go behind the record leads to misinterpretations which may invalidate an entire study.

Numerous writers have called attention to the superimposed nature of speech. The point has often been made that speech may continue only by interrupting, changing, diverting, or bringing to a stop more fundamental organic functions; that, conversely, speech must give way to biological demands (e. g., coughing). These are generalized observations and in the main do not take into consideration the fact that the difference between these biological systems, used for speech or for vegetative processes, is one of amplitude. By differences in amplitude we have reference, particularly, to variations in the contraction of muscle systems. Specifically, the difference in amplitude may be referable to muscle fiber contraction

*The writers are indebted to Dr. Robert West for numerous suggestions relating to this paper.

and its resultants, or to secretion and its resultants. We are primarily interested in contraction and shall mention secretion only incidentally.

Muscular systems operate, normally, from a position of tonus to a definite degree of contraction. This deviation establishes a normal amplitude of movement. This assumption is at the basis of the establishment of an individual's basal metabolic rate. If we may represent the flaccid muscle as being in zero (0) degree of contraction, the muscle in normal tonus as being at a contraction point 10 units on a linear scale, and normal biologic contraction as being at a point 100 units on the scale we may say that normally the amplitude of our muscle system is between 10 and 100 units. Stated in another way, we may think of degrees of muscle contraction as being plotted on a linear scale so that the normal amplitude of such contraction is through 90 units. Under unusual conditions, running, e. g., the system may be called upon to go beyond the normal range of 90 units. The abnormality of the situation is apparent when it is clear that such activity may not long continue, or if it does the body must go into debt for such a necessity as oxygen.

We are not unaware in developing this presentation that behind amplitude changes, either muscular or secretory, there is the stimulus. In analyzing any record one should be able to do so with the confidence that it represents the responses to "controlled" stimuli. Previously one of the authors,[1] and more recently Wever and Bray,[2] have shown that there is basis for the belief that all stimuli received by the organism have their more or less exact counterpart in the response of the organism. For example, the physiological rhythm

[1] Reference is here made to a few sources, most likely to be available to students of speech, which include kymograph or oscillographic records demonstrating certain of the phenomena mentioned in this article.

BOOKS:

Howell, W. H.: *Textbook of Physiology*

Travis, L. E.: *Speech Pathology*

JOURNALS:

Judson, L. S.: Objective studies of the influence of the speaker on the listener as observed in respiratory changes, *Journal of Expression;* No. 4, pp. 3, 5, 1930.

Lindsley, C. F.: An objective study of the respiratory process accompanying speech, *Quarterly Journal of Speech;* No. 15, p. 56, 1930.

[2] Wever, E. G. and Bray, C. W.: The nature of acoustic response: the relation between sound frequency and frequency of impulses in the auditory nerve, *Journal of Experimental Psychology;* No. 13, pp. 373-387, 1930.

of a speaker appears to be accepted and adopted, wholly or in part, by a listener. The organism is in tune with, or is tuned to, the besetting stimulation. The work of Wever and Bray, and of Wever,[3] shows that if the receptor (cochlea) receives a stimulus the auditory nerve carries a faithful reproduction of the stimulus. It is possible that the afferent nerves stimulate efferent nerves or their motor centers, or association centers, in the same pitch or at some ratio of that pitch, so that muscular contractions and glandular secretions are, within limits, in harmony with the stimuli. Studies in pitch, by Weaver,[4] appear to demonstrate that intense voluntary associational activity may decrease the exact relationship between the efferent responses and the afferent stimulation. The difference (5 d.v.), however, amounts to only about 1.5% and may conceivably be explainable in synaptic or muscle losses.

Concerning the speech muscle systems, we shall consider first the breathing mechanism, and then those of phonation and articulation. Almost without exception records showing graphically the working of these muscular systems during speech demonstrate, for our purposes, two things: (a) a disturbance of the normal amplitude of movement in respect to duration, and (b) the attempts of the organism to compensate for this disturbance.

A study of various records[5] shows that in "normal" breathing there is a definite and regular amplitude, in relation to duration, for inspiration and expiration. This recorded deviation may be said to picture graphically a regularity in the limits of the movements of the abdominal muscles, the diaphragm, and the thoracic muscles involved in breathing. In speech, with the shortening of the inspiratory and the lengthening of the expiratory phase there may be an increase or a decrease in the vertical excursions of the tambour lever. The record of the lever movement is but a means of visualizing the fact that there has been an increase or a decrease in the linear units of amplitude of the contracting muscles.

Not only does a change from the normal amplitude take place, but the movements are out of their ordinary rhythm. Whereas the

[3] Wever, E. G.: Impulses from the acoustic nerve of the guinea pig, rabbit, and rat, *American Journal of Psychology;* No. 43, pp. 457-462, 1931.

[4] Weaver, A. T.: Experimental studies in vocal expression, *Journal of Applied Psychology;* No. 8, pp. 23-51, 159-186, 1924.

[5] See footnote No. 1.

normal inspiration phase may take x-sigma, the same phase during speech may take only ½x-sigma; normal expiration may also take x-sigma, but during speech 5x-sigma may easily be required for this phase. The muscle system as a whole, then, moves through an amplitude of 60, 90, or 120 units, let us say, not in a steadily built-up motion, but in irregular, vacillating, retreating and advancing movements which might be illustrated, by comparison, in the jerky advance of a motor car "hitting on two cylinders." (As with most analogies, this one should not be carried beyond its liberal application to the point in question.)

At frequent intervals, in order to free itself from debt, the organism will record contractions of exceptional amplitude. This attempted compensation demonstrates the out-of-the-ordinary nature of the speech processes.

Before leaving the mechanism of breathing and passing to the equipment used in phonation and articulation, it should be emphasized that whereas expiration (the speech-useful phrase of breathing) is a result of *muscular relaxation*, the "molding" of the air stream into voice and speech is the result of *muscular contraction*.

The contraction of laryngeal muscles and accessories resulting in the partial closure of the glottis during normal breathing, and closure during such functions as defecation, parturition, and lifting seems to lead to an interpretation of absolute closure of the glottis as being the ultimate in normal amplitude. In speech the rapidity of movement required prevents the involved muscles from following their normal excursions. The muscles may contract at only half their normal amplitude over a period of time. At other times they must rapidly fluctuate between a voice-producing minimum, and almost normal contraction. It may be questioned if, during speech, tonus-to-closure contraction, in uninterrupted sweep, can take place. Figures 40 to 50, together with the explanatory paragraphs, in the reference (Travis) already cited, illustrate this point. A distinction should be drawn, however, between our use of "absolute closure of the glottis," and that author's use of "approximations of the vocal bands."

Next we may consider the differences which exist between the normal use of the tongue muscles and the lip muscles, and their use for speech purposes. In the case of the tongue, not only does speech affect the amplitude of its muscle systems (and also movements of

sublingual attachments) but, as Dr. Muyskens has so often pointed out, there is a reversal of the direction of the major movements. Speech might almost be termed, from this point of view, regurgitated air-stuff. Ordinarily the tongue contracts to such a maximum as will place it in pushing contact with food. It acts against a more or less solid medium through a specific cycle of movements. With liquids contact is almost directly against mouth walls. During speech the normal function is entirely upset. There may be movements from the solid contact position against the palate, under pressure of air, to a position of no contact (*poised*), followed by another contact, e. g. the sound formation of "cot." From the normal viewpoint the occasions during speech when the tongue is not in pressure contact with some part of the buccal cavity boundaries deserve close study. Furthermore, the amplitude of the movements of the tongue may be greater during speech because there is no bolus of food between it and the palate.

Many articulatory movements of the tongue require the poising of the muscle system at some inter-point between the roof and the floor of the mouth, although normally it would press against one or both of these boundaries. Such poising demands a nicety of diadokokinetic control. Although there are remarkable differences between the tongue and the index finger, this poising may nevertheless be illustrated by connecting a key, buzzer, and battery in circuit and rapidly tapping the key. If we allow the force of the tap to close the key contact and actuate the buzzer, reciprocating extensor-flexor movements are easily maintained. If, however, the distance between the key contacts is set at two centimeters and we try to tap the key rapidly so that our blow will depress the key only about one centimeter, the lack of solid contact limiting the finger excursion and the necessity of a fine balance of the muscles will in a high percentage of cases result in either a failure to touch the key or a (normal) movement of such amplitude as to close the circuit and actuate the buzzer.

The poising of the lips in articulation places them, in the speech situation, in about the same rubric as the tongue. Naturally the lips tend to come together in contact. The early sucking movements of the child are conformable to contact, establishing thereby an amplitude of contraction of these muscles which is pressure-directive. Nicely articulated speech prevents normal, continuous contact of

the lips; it substitutes rapid alterations of amplitude in the contraction of the muscles involved.

This difference between the biologic and the speech use of the lips has been advanced as a cause of spasmophemia. Proponents of this hypothesis see in the stutterer's difficulty with such a sound as "m" followed by o-umlaut, or a poised sound, either a reversion or a perversion.

In addition to the differences in muscular amplitude which set apart the normal and the speech use of the organism we mention briefly the amplitude differences which apparently exist in the amounts of secretions, of all kinds, in normal and in speech situations. In normal biological functioning we may assume a regular rate of secretion. Under conditions such as of flight or fear there is a tremendous increase or, from the opposite standpoint, decrease in the utilization of these secretions. In the speech situation, however, we often find not only the condition similar to fear, but an intermediate amplitude. Over a period of time this places the body under a heavy recuperative burden. Witness the results of blood sugar determinations on debaters,[5] and the complete exhaustion and fainting of women forensic participants. This is a fertile field for the scientific speech investigator.

By way of summary we would reiterate that the objective deviations in amplitude shown on records which compare normal bodily functions, such as breathing, with such a superimposed function as speech must be pictured as a synthesized activity variation on the part of the organism—that this variation is one of amplitude of contraction or secretion.

SPEECH TRAINING IN TEXAS COLLEGES

EARL C. BRYAN
Texas State College for Women

IN THE first place this survey was undertaken solely for its informative value. A department in the midst of such a large state has little opportunity for contacts with the aims and accomplishments of other speech departments. Distances are so great in

[5] Kopp, G. E.: Unpublished studies at the University of Wisconsin.

Texas that some of the leading departments of speech are seven hundred miles removed from other similar departments. A glance at a state directory reveals the interesting fact that Texas has fifteen state colleges and twenty-two denominational and endowed colleges. With three exceptions those colleges all offer credit for speech training. In addition to the above there are twelve municipal junior colleges, eight of which offer speech courses. There was no available information as to the courses taught in the various colleges, and little was known about the interests or qualifications of the instructors. This resulted in a self-centered interest within individual departments and, in some instances, a tendency to go around and around in their own tracks. Under these conditions no intelligent appraisal could be made of the instruction in other departments. As a result, information between departments traveled mostly by hearsay, and that was often colored by individual prejudices. Under such conditions the transcripts of students from other colleges were unfairly penalized. Students were advised or warned according to mere hearsay reports. Thus no instructor could honestly advise a student, regardless of his intentions. Consequently, many of the departments were turning out graduates of So and So rather than well founded students of Speech who were qualified to make a real contribution to the development of speech training in Texas.

Having collected definite data, the second function of the survey was to point out certain tendencies in various departments and to more properly evaluate speech training in the state. This common information and understanding must serve as a basis for an honest evaluation and direction of speech training in its broader sense.

The following Texas colleges are included in this survey: University of Texas (2); Texas A. & M. (1); Texas Technological College (3); Texas State College for Women (6); Texas College of Arts & Industries (1); John Tarleton Agricultural College (1); North Texas Agricultural College (1); Texas College of Mines (1); West Texas State Teachers College (2); North Texas State Teachers College (2); Sul Ross State Teachers College (1); East Texas State Teachers College (1); Southwest Texas State Teachers College (1); Stephen F. Austin State Teachers College (1); Sam Houston State Teachers College (1); Abilene Christian College (2); Austin College (0); Baylor Belton College (1); Baylor University (2); College of Marshall (1); Daniel Baker College (1);

Howard Payne College (1); Jacksonville College (1); Kidd-Key College (2); Lon Morris College (1); Our Lady of the Lake (0); Rice Institute (0); Simmons University (3); Southwestern University (1); Southern Methodist University (4); Texas Christian University (2); Texas Woman's College (1); McMurry College (1); Trinity University (1); Wayland College (1); Wesley College (1); Weatherford College (1).[1]

Regardless of the current social standing of questionnaires among busy people, thirty colleges responded to lengthy interrogations. That most sincere interest in the welfare of speech training has been fostered in part by the Texas Speech Arts Association which has been very active during the past ten years. Much valuable information was also gained from the current catalogues of the colleges listed above.

In the thirty-seven Texas colleges there are fifty-three full-time speech teachers.[2] Fifteen of those teachers are men. Six of the colleges have speech faculties of three or more members. Twenty-one instruetors hold master's degrees from the following institutions: Pennsylvania University; Northwestern University (2); Columbia University (2); Iowa University (3); Southwestern University (2); Texas University (2); University of Wisconsin; University of Illinois; University of Michigan; Colorado University; Baylor University (2); Southern Methodist University (2); and Carnegie Tech. Six of these universities do not give graduate speech training. There are only four college teachers of speech without a bachelor's degree. Twenty-one list training in nationally known special schools of speech. The amount of preparation in such schools is not indicated.

A most interesting comparison is found in the titles of departments. We find the following names being used: Speech (10); Public Speaking (9); Speech Arts (3); Expression (4); Dramatic Arts (1); Public Speaking and Expression (1); Public Speaking and Dramatic Literature (1); and in only three instances is speech included as a part of the English Department.

College officials in Texas apparently have ceased to question the

[1] The figures in parenthesis indicate the number of full-time speech teachers in each school. Student assistants are not included.

[2] This survey does not include twelve municipal junior colleges.

academic value of speech training. According to their catalogues, the following colleges give twenty-four or more semester hours credit or the equivalent of a major in speech.[3] Texas University (33); Texas Tech (46); Texas State College for Women (76); College of Arts and Industries (33); Canyon Teachers College (32); Sul Ross Teachers College (30); Commerce Teachers College (34); Abilene Christian College (36); Baylor Belton College (24); Baylor University (24); Kidd-Key College (24); Simmons University (46); Southwestern University (30); Southern Methodist University (54); Texas Christian University (40); Texas Womans College (24); Trinity University (30).

Only four Texas colleges require at least one speech course for graduation. Five additional colleges require it in certain major departments. Twelve of the thirty-seven colleges grant college credit for private lessons in speech. In some few instances fees from private lessons contribute materially toward speech faculty salaries although most of the instructor's time is devoted to class instruction.

These colleges report that seventeen per cent of the present college enrollment is taking some form of speech instruction. One report stated that thirty-eight per cent of their students were enrolled in speech classes. Six colleges report over twenty-five per cent enrollment. The smallest enrollment is five per cent. The enrollment in Texas institutions of higher learning this year is approximately twenty-four thousand.

In most cases the size of the speech classes is limited to a certain number. A few of the colleges have sufficient teaching staff to limit sections to ten or twelve students. However, most of them report that they have twenty-five or thirty in their classes. Opinions apparently differ as to the desirable size of a speech class. Some classes take on camp meeting proportions. One instructor even reported that she limited each class to fifty students "in order to have time for individual work."

The total number of speech courses offered in the different phases of speech indicate certain tendencies very clearly. Fundamentals of Speech (34); Public Speaking (73); Debate (29); Interpretation (80); Drama (86); Speech Methods (14); Diction

[3] This data is scaled on the basis of one hundred twenty-four hours credit for graduation. The numerals indicate the hours credit offered in speech.

(20); Auditorium Activities (2); Psychology of Speech (1); Playwriting (2); Story-telling (9); Practice Teaching in High School (2).

It appears that Texas colleges do their full turn in the theatre. Sixty-three full length plays and twenty-two one-act plays were presented before public audiences during the 1930-31 school year. The royalties paid for those plays last year amounted to twenty-three hundred and seventy dollars.

When one tabulates the books used as class texts in Texas, there appears an almost endless variety. Since there is no way to summarize such a tabulation and since the value of such a list depends upon the prevalence of the books used, the list is given complete. The numerals indicate the number of colleges using the text.

Fundamentals

Woolbert: *Fundamentals of Speech* (7); Curry: *Spoken English;* Curry: *Foundations of Expression* (6); Phillips: *Natural Drills in Expression* (2); Patterson: *How to Speak;* Avery, Dorsey, Sickles: *First Principles of Speech Training* (2); Crofton and Royer: *Self Expression Thru the Spoken Word;* O'Neill and Weaver: *Elements of Speech* (2); Powers: *Practice Book;* Gough: *Effective Speech;* Monroe and Lull: *Projects in Speech* (2).

Public Speaking and Debate

Roberts: *Parliamentary Practice;* Baird: *Public Discussion and Debate* (5); Brigance: *The Spoken Word* (5); Shaw: *History of American Oratory* (2); Sandford and Yeager: *Principles of Effective Speaking* (3); Shurter: *Winning Declamations;* Shurter and Marsh: *Practical Speech Making;* Foster: *Argumentation and Debate* (2); Webster: *The Short Speech;* Collins: *Platform Speaking;* Brigance: *Classified Speech Models;* Baker and Huntington: *Principles of Argumentation;* Mosher: *Essentials of Extemporaneous Speaking;* Winans: *Public Speaking* (2); O'Neill, Laycock, Scales: *Argumentation and Debate;* Phillips: *Effective Speaking* (2); Law: *How to Write and How to Deliver an Oration;* Neil: *Sources of Effectiveness in Public Speaking;* Houghton: *Elements of Public Speaking;* Ketcham: *Argumentation and Debate;* Collins and Morris: *Persuasion and Debate;* Baker: *Forms of Public Address;* Baker and Huntington: *Argumentation;* Winans and Uterback:

Argumentation; Orr: *Essentials of Effective Speaking;* Dolman: *Handbook of Public Speaking;* Horner: *Elements of Public Speaking* (3); Willhalf: *Modern Debate Practices.*

Drama

Smith: *Play Production;* Lutz: *Art of Pantomime;* Dolman: *Art of Play Production* (13); Fish: *Drama and Dramatics;* Chandler: *Aspects of Modern Drama;* Bosworth: *Technique of Drama* (9); Dickinson: *Chief Contemporary Dramatists;* Taft: *Technique of Pageantry* (2); Hughes: *Story of the Theatre;* Crafton and Royer: *Process of Play Production* (6); Cheney: *Stage Decoration;* MacGowan and Jones: *Continental Stagecraft;* Baker: *Dramatic Technique;* Swan: *Playwriting;* Baird: *Make-Up;* Andrews and Weirick: *Acting and Play Production;* Selden and Sellman: *Stage Scenery and Lighting* (2); Tucker: *Twelve One-Act Plays;* Krows: *Play Production in America;* Nicholson and Clark: *The American Scene.*

Interpretation

Clark: *Interpretation of Printed Page;* Johnson: *Modern Literature for Oral Interpretation* (4); Bryant: *How to Tell Stories to Children* (3); Farma: *Prose, Poetry and Drama for Oral Interpretation* (4); Woolbert and Nelson: *Art of Interpretation* (4); Monroe and Henderson: *Oral Interpretation of Contemporary Poetry;* Curry: *Vocal and Oral Interpretation of the Bible* (3); Shedlock: *The Art of Story-Telling* (2); Emerson: *Evolution of Expression* (2); Cather: *Educating by Story-Telling* (2); Curry: *Imagination and Dramatic Instinct* (2).

Diction

McLean: *Reading in English Phonetics;* McLean: *Good American Speech* (2); Ripman: *Good Speech;* Ward: *Phonetics of English;* Ward and Armstrong: *English Intonation;* Armstrong: *English Phonetic Reader;* Jones: *Standard English Pronouncing Dictionary* (2); Kenyon: *American Pronunciation;* Rogers: *English Diction;* Stinchfield: *Speech Pathology.*

Psychology of Speech

Pillsbury: *Psychology of Speech;* Stinchfield: *Psychology of Speech.*

The most discouraging problem is the nomenclature of courses. There is little wonder that registrars throw up their hands when

they are approached with speech credits. In many instances our students are losing credit on their transcripts because we do not get together on nomenclature—and then fit the content of the course to the catalogue description. It seems that there should be a limited number of course names under each phase of speech. Some of our departments have made great strides in nomenclature and in the description of courses. However, those ear marks still signal a marked weakness in our speech training. I quote the following course description from a Texas college catalogue. It is not typical, but it illustrates the broadside objectives of many speech courses to be found in any state. It is a two semester course which meets just one hour each week.

> "This course consists of work in enunciation, pronunciation, correct breathing, psychological development of famous orations, outline work, and logical formation of an oration, talk, sermon, etc.; five minute talks constructed and delivered by students; study in atmosphere weaving, introductory to a sermon, lesson teachings; American and English poets, their homes and the interpretation of a portion of the literature of each poet; extemporaneous speaking; argumentation; debate."

After a student has taken such a course as that he feels that he has "had" all those things and his mind is closed to all further training. A detailed enumeration of this nomenclature is most impressive but not complimentary to our profession in all respects. There apparently is very little agreement upon the names of courses, even though they cover the same theory and materials. The need for a certain degree of standardization is most apparent. The number of colleges using the same titles of courses is indicated by numerals in parenthesis.

Fundamentals

Fundamentals of Speech (5); Principles of Speech (4); Fundamentals of Expression (5); Fundamentals of Speaking; Introduction to Public Speaking; Public Speaking (Introduction); Evolution of Expression (2); Foundation of Public Speaking; Fundamentals of Vocal Expression (2); Introductory Course; Fundamentals of Interpretation.

Public Speaking and Debate

Practical Speech Making; Public Speaking (23); Oratory (4); Extempore Speaking (8); Debate (12); Forms of Public Address

(3); Persuasion (2); Argumentation and Debate (4); Parliamentary Law; History of Oratory; Argumentation (3); History of American Oratory; Practical Speaking (2); Intercollegiate Debate; Platform Deportment and Speech; Public Speaking and Debate (2); Public Address; Parliamentary Procedure; Platform Address; Oratory; The Public Speech (2); Public Address; Radio Speaking; Psychology of Speech Platform Speaking; Contemporary Thought; Speech Composition and Oratory.

Interpretation

Oral Interpretation of Poetry; Oral Interpretation of Modern Drama; Platform Reading; Story-Telling (7); Interpretation (4); Recitals (2); Literary Interpretation (5); Technique of Reading; Beginning Interpretation; Oral Reading; Interpretative Reading (4); Interpretation and Public Speech; Oral Interpretation (2); Oral Interpretation of Literature; Dramatic Interpretation (2); Dialect (2); Literary and Vocal Interpretation of the Bible; Vocal Expression; Public Reading; Dramatic Thinking and Interpretation; Literary Analysis and Interpretation (2); Fundamentals and Literary Interpretation; Vocal Interpretation of Poetry and Drama; Literature and Vocal Interpretation (2); Speech Making and Oral Reading; Oral Interpretation of the Bible; Interpretation of Contemporary American Poetry; Interpretation of Shakespearean Drama; Oral Interpretation of Poetry; Platform Art (2); Vocal Interpretation of Literature; Imagination and Its Relation to Speech; Vocal and Impressionistic Speech; Expression; Etiquette; Impersonation.

Drama

Harmonic Training and Pantomime; Play Production and Stage Craft; Make-Up (2); Dramatization and Festival Plays; Play Production (12); Acting (3); Dramatization; Educational Dramatics; Contemporary Drama (2); Theatre Art; Technique of Dramatic Art; Play Writing (3); Stagecraft and Direction; Marionette Construction and Rehearsal; Dramatic Production (7); Stagecraft (4); Acting; Theory and Technique; Acting: Rehearsal and Performance; Stage Direction; Dramatics (6); Dramatic Technique; Dramatic Art (2); Survey of Drama; One-Act Play; Modern Drama (3); Physical Training; Pantomime (2); Vocal and Pantomimic Training; Voice and Pantomime; Shakespearean and

Modern Drama; Scenic Design; Little Theatre and One-Act Play; Dramatic Art and Play Production; Physical Culture; Study of Principles of Pantomime; Stage Management; Fundamentals of Body and Voice; Children's Theatre; Community Drama; Elementary Dramatic Production.

Diction and Voice

Voice and Diction (4); Phonetics and Pronunciation (3); Voice; Phonetics and Speech Correction; Enunciation and Pronunciation; Public Speaking Diction; Expressive Voice; Corrective Speech; Voice Training.

Methods

Methods of Teaching; Teaching of Public Speech; Methods in Public Speaking; Methods of Directing Dramatics in High School; Speech Training in High Schools; Supervision and Teaching of Reading and Speaking in Public Schools; Teacher's Course in Argumentation and Debate; Teachers' Course (3); Methods of Teaching Speech; Teaching of Speech Arts in Secondary Schools; Public Speaking in High School; Auditorium Hour; Auditorium.

This survey has been most enlightening to many teachers of Speech. Careful consideration of this data convinces one that this state is no longer pioneering in the speech training field. It also reveals a most urgent need for a broader understanding and co-operation within the state. In this respect it sets forth problems common to all states.

There is a definite place for state surveys in our general speech development. In any state we find teachers from many sections of the country. Each one brings his preconceived idea of a speech curriculum according to the school or the department from which he was graduated. Immediately he tries to set up his own curriculum without knowledge of or any vital interest in his new speech environment. Accordingly, he has a tendency to give the impression that no one knows anything about speech unless he has been to such and such a school or university. Such an attitude is detrimental to the cause of speech development in the state in a broader sense. He may be cognizant of speech developments in distant states and yet have little understanding of his immediate problems or his total speech situation. A comprehensive understanding of the whole speech training problem, like charity, should begin at home.

EXPRESSION AND PERSONALITY

EDWIN G. FLEMMING
New York, N. Y.

A criticism often leveled at higher education is that it is lacking in purpose; that it gets nowhere because it has not established for itself a goal. A not unusual answer to the criticism is that education needs no purpose outside itself; it is an end in itself; the mere process of becoming educated is good.

The teacher of speech and dramatics, however, is likely to have a fairly definite purpose in his work. It may be variously stated, but in substance it is to make the dumb articulate, and the articulate more artistic. To give a medium of expresion to human beings is quite desirable in the light of modern psychology, since some form of expression is necessary for psychological health. Because the direct "natural" modes of expression are not always permissible in the social scheme of things, controlled, artistic expression through words provides an adequate substitute in many instances.

Teachers of speech and dramatics are inclined to believe that the ability to express one's thoughts and emotions through speech and pantomime is good; and that the increase in an individual's ability so to express himself justifies their labors. They believe that expression somehow adds to the pleasingness of personality, and increases the chances of making a satisfactory social adjustment.

Of some of the dangers of speech they are well aware. They know that too glib a tongue may give the impression of insincerity; that expression may prove to be mere contentiousness; that acting may result in vapid, shallow emotionalism.

But I do not recall reading in the literature, nor of hearing any teacher of speech or dramatics refer to the steadiness or evenness of emotional response. Teachers of speech and dramatics seem not to have given any attention to the predictability of expressiveness as a factor either in the personality which they are trying to affect or in the problem of social adjustment which is claimed to be facilitated by the art of expression.

The purpose of this study, then, is to investigate the interrelations among pleasing personality, social adjustment, emotional

expressiveness, and emotional steadiness, with the implications for the teacher of speech and dramatics.

In the study which was made, the criterion of a pleasing personality was the judgment of the fellow students of the subject. The names of all the students in a large class—a total of about two hundred—were mimeographed, and opposite each name were the numbers from one to ten. Each student was given such a list with an instruction sheet worded as follows:

> Rate the following individuals on how they affect you. Do not consider their general reputations. Try to answer the question: "Is my response to this individual pleasant or unpleasant?" If your response is very pleasant, draw a circle around the figure ten (10); if your response is unpleasant in the extreme, put a circle around the one (1). In order to gauge the pleasantness of your response, consider the response that you make to the individual you like best as the standard for circling the ten (10). In gauging the unpleasantness of your response, consider the response you make to the individual you dislike the most as the standard for encircling the one (1). Rate the rest in relation to these two extremes.
>
> *Do not rate any individual whom you feel you do not know well enough to rate.*

For emotional steadiness the instructions were:

> Rate the following individuals on the steadiness or evenness of their emotional responses. Try to answer the question: "Is he erratic or uncertain; is it impossible to tell how he will respond emotionally to any situation?" Consider only actual evidence of his behavior. Consider the most erratic and unsteady individual you know as rating ten (10); and the steadiest individual you know as rating one (1). Rate all the others with these two as the standards for extremes.
>
> *Do not rate any individual whom you feel you do not know well enough to rate.*

For emotional expressiveness the instructions were:

> Rate the following individuals on the basis of their emotional expressiveness. If you consider the individual to be emotionally expressive to a high degree, draw a circle around the ten (10). If you consider the individual to be phlegmatic or emotionally unexpressive to a high degree, draw a circle around the one (1). Take into consideration only actual

evidence that you have of the expressiveness or lack of expressiveness; do not consider what you think him capable of. Also do not consider his "acting" ability. As a guide to your estimates, take the most emotionally expressive individual that you know as representing ten (10), and the most inexpressive individual as represented by one (1). Rate the rest accordingly.

Do not rate any individual whom you feel you do not know well enough to rate.

For adjustment the directions were as follows:

Rate the following individuals on the basis of whether you consider them well adjusted or poorly adjusted to the usual situations of life. "Well adjusted" means that he "fits in well" into the various situations of life; in social situations as well as in the academic environment; with old people as well as with people of his own age; with individuals of the opposite sex as well as his own sex; with people of importance as well as with those of not much importance! and so on. "Poorly adjusted" means that he does not "fit in well"; that he is "queer"; that he appears to be uncomfortable in all or some of these situations. Base your judgments on actual evidence only; do *not* estimate what you think the individual might do. Rate the most adequately adjusted individual as one (1). Place the others along the scale in the positions where you think they belong.

Do not rate any individual whom you feel you do not know well enough to rate.

In every case the average rating was taken as the measure on the criteria. Table I shows the average number of ratings on each trait studied, the range and the sigma. The large number of ratings secured on the average makes the scores used exceedingly reliable. In no case was a subject included unless he had at least five ratings on each criterion.

TABLE I

Showing the Average Number of Ratings on Each of the Traits Studied, Together with the Range and the Sigma.

Trait	*Average Number of ratings*	*Range of Number of ratings*	*Sigma*
Pleasingness	51.3	7-134	24.9
Steadiness	34.9	5-102	18.4
Expressiveness	34.1	3-102	18.3
Adjustment	37.0	5-107	20.4

The subjects were eighty-nine men and one hundred eighteen women—mostly sophomores, with a sprinkling of juniors and seniors; there were no freshmen. The rating sheets were distributed in December before the Christmas recess. The subjects, consequently, had an opportunity to know each other for over a year, and in no case for less than three months. Since they were attending a small college with an enrollment of less than fifteen hundred in a small town with about two thousand white inhabitants they had many opportunities to meet and know each other in many situations in and out of the classroom. And since they were cautioned on all rating sheets not to rate anyone whom they did not know well enough to rate, the probabilities are that no ratings were made without a certain measure of confidence in the ability to make the rating.

The results for the men and for the women are given separately in order to determine whether there are any sex differences.

In interpreting the correlations found with steadiness as a component it must be remembered that a large score on steadiness means unsteadiness.

Tables II and III give the inter-correlations among the traits for men and women respectively.

TABLE II

Showing the Inter-correlations Among the Characteristics Indicated. Men.

	Steadiness	*Expressiveness*	*Adjustment*
Pleasingness	—.46	.27	.70
Steadiness		.25	.08
Expressiveness			.60

TABLE III

Showing the Inter-correlations Among the Characteristics Indicated. Women.

	Steadiness	*Expressiveness*	*Adjustment*
Pleasingness	—.52	.12	.67
Steadiness		.43	—.16
Expressiveness			.55

The simple correlations show no essential sex differences.

It appears that expressiveness is only to a slight extent associated with pleasingness of personality. But expressiveness is definitely associated with adequate social adjustment; the more expressive individuals show a marked tendency to fit in well with various types of social groups.

Of course, we do not know to what extent the expressiveness measured by our rating sheet is associated with expressiveness in terms of public speaking and dramatics. But in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it seems logical to suppose that an individual trained to express his thoughts and emotions on the public platform is likely to be more expressive in social situations rather than less so.

Nor do we know to what extent training for expressiveness in the speech arts transfers to social situations; but again it is reasonable to suppose that some transfer takes place, since there are so many elements in common between the platform and the social gathering.

So on the assumption that transfer of training does take place in this instance, we may conclude that training in the speech arts contributes to better social adjustment. But an individual so trained does not necessarily develop thereby a more pleasing personality.

Emotional steadiness, on the other hand, tends to be associated with pleasingness of personality, while it contributes nothing of significance to social adjustment, as indicated by the correlations of —.46 and —.52 with pleasingness, and .08 and —.16 with adjustment.

So training in the speech arts, if it develops an emotionally unsteady temperament, may defeat its purpose. That such may be the tendency unless great care is used and the teacher consciously guards against it, is indicated by the correlations between expressiveness and steadiness; .25 for the men and .43 for the women. It is also interesting to note that the tendency is greater for the women than it is for the men, so that teachers of speech and dramatics need to somewhat more on their guard with the women students than with the men. Unless teachers of the speech arts take cognizance in their efforts to improve the personality of their students of the necessity for integrating the entire personality,

giving due emphasis to emotional steadiness as well as emotional expressiveness, more harm than good may be done.

When we combine expressiveness and steadiness in a multiple correlation, the correlation with pleasingness is raised to .61, high enough for prediction with a fair degree of certainty. In other words, a man who is both expressive and steady is almost certain to have a relatively pleasing personality. But it takes steadiness as well as expressiveness for a pleasing personality, and steadiness is of more importance than expressiveness, since the simple correlation between steadiness and pleasingness is higher than it is between expressiveness and pleasingness.

Adding steadiness to expressiveness in a multiple correlation with adjustment, using the men as subjects, does not affect the simple correlation of .60 between expressiveness and adjustment. So apparently in the social adjustment of men expressiveness is the important factor.

Using the women as subjects, however, steadiness and expressiveness combined in a multiple correlation with adjustment yields a co-efficient of .70, high enough for prediction with a fair degree of accuracy. Steadiness, then, is a more important factor in the social adjustment of women than it is in the social adjustment of men.

The pleasingness of women correlated with expressiveness and steadiness combined yields a co-efficient of .64. So here, as with men, women who are both expressive and steady show a strong and definite tendency to be pleasant to others. But again steadiness is a more important factor than expressiveness, since the simple correlation between pleasingness and steadiness is —.52, while the simple correlation between pleasingness and expressiveness is only .12.

Conclusions

From this study we may conclude:

1. An expressive man or woman is likely to be well adjusted.

2. Expressiveness, uncombined with steadiness, has only a slight relationship to pleasingness of personality.

3. There is a tendency for expressive men and women to be unsteady. The tendency is more marked with women than it is with men.

4. Emotionally steady men and women show a definite tendency to be pleasing to others.

5. For both men and women the correlation between steadiness and expressiveness combined and pleasingness of personality is high enough for fair accuracy in prediction.

6. For women, but not for men, there is a high degree of relationship between steadiness and expressiveness combined and social adjustment. For the men the relation between expressiveness alone and adjustment is significantly high.

7. Assuming that training in the speech arts has some definite effect upon expressiveness and steadiness as defined and measured in this study, which appears to be a reasonable assumption, the teacher of speech and dramatics should take cognizance of the emotional steadiness as well as of the emotional expressiveness of his students, if he is to have the maximum effect for good upon their personalities and social adjustments. There is real danger that emphasis upon expressiveness to the neglect of steadiness may damage the pleasing aspects of personality.

EDITORIALS

"THE GOOD OLD DAYS"

One of the favorite indoor sports of people who are growing old is the mental Tom Thumb golf known as reminiscing. Thus, it is perfectly natural that one-time college and university debaters and orators should view what they invariably refer to as "the good old days in forensics" through slightly rose-tinted spectacles and consequently deplore present conditions about which they are frequently quite inadequately informed.

Not long ago the Editor had an opportunity to examine the scrap-book of a professor who from 1869 to 1906 directed public speaking activities in one of our large mid-western universities. This scrap-book was filled with old newspaper clippings many of which sounded a strangely familiar melancholy note about small audiences at debates, the ever recurring problem of finance, the failure of the forensic program to capture the enthusiasm of the campus, etc.

The plain fact of the matter is that "the good old days in forensics" are pretty largely like "the good old days" in other affairs —the fiction of some human being's rather inaccurate memory for facts. There never were any better days in high school and college forensics than those in which we are living now. In this year of the great depression, 1931-32, there is a great deal more first-class debating going on throughout the land than ever before in history.

As was the case with the report of Mark Twain's death, the stories concerning the demise of debating are considerably exaggerated! The muffled mourners chanting their solemn requiem at the open grave of forensics are likely to experience no little embarrassment when they discover the fact that the coffin contains a straw man and that the alleged corpse is still decidedly able to be up and about. Doubtless it is the part of wisdom, now and then, to take stock of ourselves and look back over the long way behind us. How-

ever, we should not become so engrossed in the contemplation of the romantically great past that we are unable to see anything worthy of commendation in the present. We may well ask in all seriousness: Are there really any "good old days in forensics" to which well-informed teachers of speech would care to return?

THE NEED FOR TESTS

One of the major difficulties barring the way to a more accurate evaluation of pedagogical procedures in the speech classroom is the fact that, at least so far as is generally known, we have no satisfactory set of comprehensive tests by which we can measure achievement and improvement in speech. Many interesting and potentially valuable investigations must wait until such tests have been devised and standardized. Here then is a basic research problem. What elements of speech are susceptible of quantitative and qualitative measurement? What test techniques already developed and applied in other fields might conceivably be adapted to the measurement of these elements?

One thing is clear: In discovering and perfecting these tests, we must not think of speech as if it were identical with spoken language. There is a good deal more to speech than simply language made with the mouth rather than with pen, typewriter, or printing press. It is something far deeper and more inclusive than articulation, pronunciation, and enunciation. It involves, nay, it consists of, those direct face-to-face adjustments of the individual to his social environment which are central in the function of living. Probably it is true that much of our apparent difficulty in the development of adequate tests can be traced to the fact that speech does include so much. Of course, investigators, here and there, have already made significant beginnings along this line. Nevertheless, a concentrated and determined attack upon the problem of designing and standardizing tests in speech should be undertaken—and that right early.

THE PUBLICATION OF RESEARCH

"No research; no favor in the eyes of educators. We occupy a delightful position among disciplines, but the test of its permanence is our willingness to do in Rome what all good Romans do.

We may long and sigh and pine but presidents and deans are not moved that way—sad to relate. They are becoming pretty stony-hearted toward all who conclude not to make serious and persistent efforts to increase the kingdom of knowledge. I, for one, am ambitious to see the profession make the best of the situation and play the game according to the rules; this year's copy. Only thus, I firmly believe, shall we know the truth, and the truth once found will in very deed make us free." These words of Woolbert's epitomize one of the drives which have dominated the life of our National Association. Under the inspiration of this ideal of research we have pushed ever forward and, in so doing, we have achieved some measure of that freedom promised to the faithful searcher after truth. Our feet are still set in that way.

All through its history, the QUARTERLY JOURNAL has been attempting to present the findings of research, at least those findings which could be stated in such a way as to seem interesting and valuable to any considerable proportion of its readers. In a sense, making available such material is the first function of an academic society's publication program. We believe that a fair survey of the past seventeen volumes of the JOURNAL will reveal the fact that the *Editors* have not been negligent in the discharge of this major responsibility.

From time to time, however, there has been a call for the opening of other avenues of publication to our research workers. In some cases perhaps, it may be suspected that this demand has arisen because of the inability or unwillingness of some specialists to present the results of their study in such form as would interest and instruct the lay reader. There is an ever present danger that researchers in any line will be slow to admit even the possibility of making their materials intelligible and interesting to any considerable number of laymen. We need always to guard ourselves against this insidious assumption that the better the research, the smaller the number of people who can appreciate it and find anything of practical significance in it.

Theodore Roosevelt once wrote:

> "In its most perfect expression scholarship must utter itself with literary charm and distinction; although, I am sorry to say, the professional scholars sometimes actually distrust scholarship which is able thus to bring forth wisdom divorced

from pedantry and dryness. As an example, Gilbert Murray's 'Rise of the Greek Epic' not only shows profound scholarship and the profound scholarly instinct which can alone profit by the mere erudition of scholarship, but is also so delightfully written as to be as interesting as the most interesting novel; and, curiously enough, this very fact, coupled with the fact that Mr. Murray's translations of Euripides and Aristophanes are so attractive, has tended to excite distrust of him in the minds of worthy scholars whose productions are themselves free from all taint of interest, from all taint of literary charm."

However, it now appears that we have passed on from this stage of publication to a second. It has become advisable to provide some medium for the dissemination among our specialists of rather concentrated, and sometimes even uninterpreted, results of investigation. Be it freely admitted that often there may be wisdom in allowing the research worker to conduct his operations without being challenged at every step to evaluate, synthesize, and interpret his findings. At times it is expedient for him to publish his results in highly technical terminology so that other investigators may be enabled to work intelligently in assembling the mosaic of truth which is always the product of coöperative effort.

Mindful of this second function of publication, at the recent Detroit Convention, our Executive Council voted to set aside a sum of money for the publication of research studies during the current year. This action, representing a distinct forward step in our progress, has been made possible by those generous individuals who have become sustaining members of the Association. It is hoped that Professor Wichelns, *Editor of Research Studies*, may receive the cordial support of all those who can help to bring to his attention high-class research material which may be available for publication. Apparently the hour has now struck, and again we move forward all along the line!

AFTER RESEARCH WHAT?

In the preceding editorial we have done ungrudging homage at the shrine of research; we have averred that it has been and is one of the strongest motivating forces in the building up of our profession. Without retracting any of that point of view, we may

well ask: Is there not something more than excellence in research required of us?

It is almost axiomatic to say that, first and foremost, we are teachers. With inexorable logic it follows that the *teacher* must inevitably be judged not only by how much he *knows* but also by how well he *teaches*. Has our research activity made us more skillful and effective as teachers? If not, somehow or somewhere, we have failed properly to connect up these two functions, research and teaching, each of which means less than it should until it has been united with the other. In the final analysis, our standing as an academic group is determined in part by what our students think of us and in part by what our colleagues think of us. (Of course these two opinions are necessarily interrelated.) We must be diligent and inspiring teachers as well as learned and impressive scholars. The proof of the research pudding is in the teaching.

To quote Roosevelt again:

> "Scholarship that consists in mere learning, but finds no expression in production, may be of interest and value to the individual, just as ability to shoot well at clay pigeons may be of interest and value to him, but it ranks no higher unless it finds expression in achievement. From the standpoint of the nation, from the broader standpoint of mankind, scholarship is of worth chiefly when it is productive, when the scholar not merely receives or acquires, but gives."

The object of our Association as stated in the new Constitution is "to encourage high standards of study, of scholarship, and of teaching the various phases of speech." As we learn more and more, may our broader and deeper knowledge manifest its finest fruition in increasingly competent classroom instruction! The house of our future rests on these two sustaining pillars; *research* and *teaching*.

THE FORUM

Editor of the QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH:

It was my pleasure to be present this fall at the final National Speaking Contest for the youth of England. Although the contest lasted from 2:00 P. M. to 6:30 P. M. and an additional forty-five minutes was consumed in criticisms by the judges and remarks by the chairman and others present, not one minute of the time was uninteresting.

The contest is sponsored by the National Conservative Party and is limited to members of the Junior Imperial League. This League also fosters contests in music and readings. The finals in these are held in April.

In the final, which was held in the Friends Meeting House, Euston-road, London, Saturday, November 27, twelve teams competed; each team is composed of four members—a chairman, who is allotted five minutes, a principal speaker who has ten minutes, a proposer and a seconder of a vote of thanks, three and two minutes respectively. Thus each team has twenty minutes.

At the conclusion of the speaking by the sixth team there was an intermission of fifteen minutes during which the judges and contestants had tea. Also, the six doors leading into the auditorium were opened, presumably to let the tobacco smoke escape, making it possible again to see the speakers.

A "team" is, in miniature, an actual campaign meeting. Each team represented a political district and secured the right to compete through a process of elimination earlier in the fall. More than 1,500 took part in these preliminaries. The age limit for competitors is thirty. The youngest was Master J. McEvoy, aged 15; the youngest girl, Miss Betty Owen, was 19—both from Cardiff. The average age was 23.

The subject of the principal speaker was the "King's Address" at the opening of Parliament, November 11. The time of preparation for the final was less than a fortnight.

"Stop" and "Go" lights were in a small black box on a table in front of the speaker. White lights turned to green when only two minutes of the allotted time was left; then flashed red, which meant "Finish." Some speakers seemed quite disconcerted when the green light appeared, and made valiant efforts to condense the remainder of their carefully prepared speeches—some were obviously memorized, others appeared quite extempore, using notes lying on the table in front of them. The use of copious notes seems to have been copied from Lord Stanley Baldwin, Lord Beaverbrook, Hon. Lloyd George, Hon. Ramsay McDonald, et. al. All seemed to prefer to have the notes on a flat table rather than to hold them in their hands.

Of the forty-eight speakers, twenty-eight were boys; of the twelve principal speakers, nine were boys.

The team from Wessex won first place, and received a silver challenge trophy offered by Sir Robert Horne, M. P. Each member of the winning team was given a small silver cup. Silver cups were also presented to the members of the teams ranking second and third. These were from Deptford of the London Area, and Lowestoft of the Eastern Area, respectively. The silver trophy has inscribed on it in Latin: "Speak your mind, and stake your life on the truth."

The chairman, Lord Stanley, M. P., qualified for the post in not extending his opening remarks, in beginning the program on time, and by announcing the winners in the sensible order—beginning with the winning team, then the second and third and not in reverse order. His introductory remarks ended with: "As is customary we hope the best team wins. However, knowing the qualifications of the judges, I can say that the best team *will* win." (In my judment the *best* team—from Kent—didn't even place!) The judges were Lady Astor, M. P., Col. John Buchan, M. P., and Mr. J. D. Cassel, K. C., M. P. The judges sat together but there was no consultation. They were introduced after the winners were announced. Each responded with a few remarks, some offering constructive criticisms, others telling of the real pleasure they had in functioning as judges—all expressing themselves with such eloquence that one could not doubt that they were well selected for their task. However, judging from their joint decisions it appeared to them more of a contest between the principal speakers of the teams than between the teams as a whole.

Although Lady Astor stated quite boldly and forcefully that the King's Address had little meaning and was of no importance, it seemed quite adequate as a subject for discussion. The writer cannot imagine a more appropriate contest for the English youth. It is immensely interesting. A few contestants had taken the platform in the recent election.

Considering the fact that there are no departments of speech in the English universities and no classes in public speaking outside of some private schools, the young men and women spoke remarkably well, although not on a par with the best in the United States. They seemed to sin mostly in the awkwardness of their gestures.

Very little humor was attempted; each speaker seemed in dead earnest to get his ideas "across the footlights." Although the chairman warned the audience against applauding and stamping, clapping of hands and cries of "Hear! Hear!" frequently interrupted a speaker and always greeted each speaker at the close of his speech.

There were about 400 present including some twenty members of parliament and other political leaders. Admission was by tickets which could be had for the asking.

The Hon. Ramsay McDonald has frequently deplored the fact that dialects in England are disappearing and advocates protection against "Hollywood" speech as well as the stereotyped speech of the B. B. C. announcers. He would have been greatly disappointed had he listened to these contestants. Nearly all spoke an excellent "King's English." Dialects were not particularly marked. One member from Chippenham had the broad vowels of Wessex, and only the proposer of the vote of thanks of the Yorkshire's team betrayed her origin. Lancashire had one obvious son, but there was no true Londoner on the team where a hint of cockney might have been expected.

It was not a contest between college students, yet the thought, diction, and delivery were of a very high grade. The convincing and persuasive eloquence of their elders, who obviously have had little or no training in speech, yet use a better diction than the average American statesman, leads one to wonder just how much our own classes in speech contribute to platform eloquence in America.

December 1, 1931
University of London

J. N. Pelsma,
Kansas State Teachers College.

THE FUNDAMENTAL COURSE IN SPEECH

(For Institutions of Collegiate Rank)

Editor of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH:

On October 10, 1931, the teachers of speech from universities, colleges, teacher's colleges, and junior colleges, of Northern California, met in informal conference in San Francisco. The meeting was called by Prof. Lee Emerson Bassett of Stanford University, president of the Western Association of Teachers of Speech, and Prof. Martin C. Flaherty, chairman of the department of Public Speaking at the University of California, in the hope that an informal discussion of our common problems would be valuable to all. The hope was amply justified, for the group which assembled thus unofficially was a large and representative one, and the discussion was eager and prolonged. Prof. Bassett acted as chairman at the unanimous request of those present, a happy circumstance which did much to insure the friendly and co-operative nature of the proceedings. Even the summons to luncheon was disregarded till the last moment, so interested was everyone in the subject under discussion, and the afternoon saw no lessening of enthusiasm and attention.

It had been supposed that several problems would be discussed, but the consideration of what was termed "the fundamental course in speech" not only engrossed the attention of the group at both sessions of this meeting, but there was also a spontaneous demand for another meeting before the Christmas holidays, at which a committee representing the various types of institutions should present such facts and formulations as would in their judgment clarify future discussion, and determine a possible procedure.

The second conference was called for December 12, in San Francisco, and in spite of holiday distractions, was quite as well attended as was the first. Mr. Bassett insisted that another chairman be chosen for this meeting, and Mr. Anthony Blanks of the University of California was unanimously requested to preside.

The committee appointed in the interim by Mr. Bassett and Mr. Flaherty and consisting of Mr. Arnold Perstein of the University of California, Miss Elisabeth Lee Buckingham of Stanford University, Mr. John Wright of Fresno State Teachers College, Miss Ada Beveridge of San Mateo, and Mr. Benjamin Weed of Marin, representing respectively the large and the smaller Junior

College, and Mrs. Marian Stebbins of Mills College, chairman, presented its findings in the informal fashion which had been the key-note of the conference.

The committee made it clear at the beginning that it regarded itself as a clearing house for varied opinion, and that such conclusions and recommendations as were finally presented were intended in no sense as official or obligatory. The committee hoped that if the conference approved its findings, the result would be a kind of leaven throughout the departments of speech in the various institutions concerned, which should work toward a common ideal in such ways as were possible to each institution. In other words, no uniform policy could be formulated which would be agreeable or possible at present to all, but certain general principles could be agreed upon, and methods of procedure suggested, which might give the faculties of universities and colleges a working outline for development and progress.

The recommendations of the committee were as follows:

1. That no basic course, i. e., a course which should include instruction in voice and speech, instruction in reading, instruction in speaking and debate, was desirable in institutions of collegiate rank. The committee agreed that such a course must be necessarily superficial, and would tend to emphasize facility at the expense of thought and content.

2. It was found through surveys made by members of the committee of courses offered under the general head of speech, in the various institutions throughout the country, i. e., large co-educational universities, the smaller men's colleges, the smaller women's colleges, Junior colleges in this state, and Teachers colleges in this state—that the majority of the courses available in the first two years were courses in public speaking, understood to be by catalogue description, the organization and oral presentation of exposition and argument. This fact seemed to point to the importance of establishing and maintaining a uniformly high standard for such courses, in the interest, (a) of the dignity and educational value of the work itself; (b) of more stable transfer values than exist at present. The committee therefore recommended that the first course offered in Public Speaking conform to a reasonably definite standard in content, method and unit credit value in all institutions of collegiate rank. Such a course should, particularly in the first semester, empha-

size the discussion and analysis of content to be found in such essays as those of Huxley, Tyndall, Cardinal Newman, etc., or in articles dealing with matters of social and economic interest and presented in the pages of periodicals like the Nation, New Republic, Atlantic Monthly, Forum, etc.; in other words, such a course should look toward developing in the student the ability to think and the possession of something to say. The second semester should give extended practice in the various forms of address, formal and informal. Such a course should carry 6 units of credit, 3 for each semester.

3. The committee also recommended: that the same uniformity of standard as to content, method, and unit value be extended to the first course in oral interpretation or oral reading; that emphasis be placed upon content, and that great world literature be studied through and for oral interpretation.

4. The committee further recommended:

(a) That a laboratory course in the technique of voice production and speech be offered in connection with either or both the courses described, to meet from three to five times weekly, to carry one unit of credit a semester, such a course to be obligatory in either of the courses named upon the student whose voice and speech are inadequate, *for as long as they remain inadequate*. In this connection the committee recommended:

(b) That as soon as practicable a speech test be given to all students entering college, on the same basis as the examination in English (the technique of written expression) and that those students failing to pass such test be required to work in speech clinic without credit until the deficiency be removed. It was recognized that because of the low speech standards existing at present in secondary schools, and the difficulty of finding properly equipped teachers, such a test could not at present be made obligatory, but all agreed that its establishment and proper maintenance would materially raise speech standards in our schools, and ensure proper speech training in the lower grades where it can most effectually be given.

Much enlightening discussion followed the presentation of the report. The Junior College teachers present made clear the nature of their difficulty—the demand on the part of their students for a more miscellaneous and superficial training than was contemplated in the committee's recommendation. The general opinion was that

such a "terminal" course for students who did not continue their work beyond the two years of Junior College, might be necessary in the face of existing conditions, but that there was no reason why the other courses in Public Speaking, Oral Interpretation, and the Technique of Speech should not be offered also, for those students who expected to transfer to an institution of full collegiate rank. With this qualification, the committee's recommendations were unanimously accepted as the general policy of the group assembled.

The meeting then adjourned with many expressions of appreciation for the opportunity which had been given to meet and discuss common problems and of desire to repeat so profitable an experience at some date not too far in the future—and a vote of thanks to the committee and to Mr. Bassett and Mr. Flaherty for their initiative in the matter.

MARIAN L. STEBBINS, *Mills College.*

PROGRESS OF THE LINGUISTIC ATLAS

The issue of DIALECT NOTES—Volume VI, Part III, 1931—contains information which may well be considered as the stuff of which history is made. The plans for a dialect atlas, sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies, are fast coming into fruition, and a survey of that part of New England south of a line drawn from Rutland, Vermont, to Portland, Maine, will probably be nearly completed by September, 1932. The active members of the A. C. L. S. staff are as follows:

Director, Hans Kurath (on leave from the Ohio State University); Associate Director, M. L. Hanley (Research Associate in English, Yale University, on leave from the University of Wisconsin); Historian, H. L. Hansen, University of Illinois. Field Workers: Dr. Guy S. Lowman, Jr. (Sterling Fellow, Yale University); Mr. Cassil Reynard; Mr. Martin Joos; Professor Lee S. Hultzen, Dartmouth College; Miss Rachel Harris, Brown University; Mr. Bernard Bloch, Mount Holyoke College.

The territory indicated above has been divided into sections and the members of the staff have been assigned a section each. The staff has undergone a training period concurrent with the meeting of the Linguistic Institute at New York City, June 29 to August

8. During this time they had valuable associations and some study with Professor Jakob Jud of the University of Zurich, Dr. Paul Scheuermeier of Berne, Professor Henry Alexander, Professor Anders Orbeck, and Professor Cabell Greet of Columbia University.

Through the use of phonograph records of American dialects, the staff worked intensively in comparative phonetic transcription in order to build up facility in making uniform and rapid transcription of the phenomena discovered in the field.

Professor Kurath prepared and tested in Southern Ohio a work-sheet containing skillfully combined data, illustrating most of the speech phenomena likely to be encountered. This work-sheet was based upon his own work in the Phonology of American English and upon contributions of Grandgent, Kenyon, Krapp, Emerson, Read, and others, augmented by materials on inflection, syntax, and idiom, from G. O. Curme of Northwestern, Robert J. Menner of Yale and S. A. Leonard of the University of Wisconsin. This questionnaire, rearranged and revised according to suggestions by Professor W. E. Leonard of Wisconsin, has been available since August, 1931.

The field workers are now engaged at their work. Something of the scope and seriousness of the undertaking may be gathered from the fact that when the workers locate a suitable representative of a given dialect, they must arrange for him to spend some fifteen or twenty hours in answering a total of 807 questions. The prerequisite is that the individual selected must not be subject to foreign language influence, must not be too much traveled and must not indulge in conscious attempts at being elegant. In other words, he must render the true speech to which he has all his life been accustomed.

Scholars will look forward eagerly to the results of this noteworthy undertaking of the A. C. L. S.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF EXPERIMENTAL PHONETICS

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL is in receipt of a folder from Doctor L. Kaiser, of the University of Amsterdam, announcing the second meeting of the International Society of Experimental Phonetics.

THE JOURNAL is glad to reprint most of the folder and to urge American scholars to attend this significant gathering. English-speaking delegates, though most ably represented by Mr. Daniel Jones, were for the most part conspicuous by their absence at the Copenhagen meeting. It is to be hoped that this more centrally located meeting will attract scholars from every western country.

THE FOLLOWING IS FROM THE FOLDER:

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHONETIC SCIENCES

Second Congress of the International Society of Experimental Phonetics and First Meeting of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Für Phonologie. Amsterdam, 3-7 July, 1932.

In September 1930 the President of the International Society of Experimental Phonetics proposed to hold the second Congress of the Society in Amsterdam. We then formed an organising committee to discuss the best means of giving effect to this complimentary proposal. After some deliberation, and in view of the recent reorganization of the Dutch Society of Phonetics we decided that it would be wise to make the sphere of activity of the congress as extensive as possible and to have phonetic sciences treated in the widest sense.

Physiology of voice and speech, with its great problems concerning articulatory and acoustic structure of vowels and consonants, certainly has the oldest rights here. This science in its new development repeatedly comes into contact with the still young science of the psychology of evolution (Entwicklungspsychologie). The development of speech and voice in the individual, the phonetic origin of European children's language in its various periods, the special timbre of the voice of children as compared with the voice of grown-up persons are of great importance. The evolution of speech sounds in the case of some non-European peoples is perhaps still more important and seems to correspond with anatomical differences in the organs of articulation. (Cf. prognathia and the form of the lips in relation to the disappearance of the p in the languages of the Mediterranean peoples). Besides, some time ago it was demonstrated by an inductive method, that the majority of languages with a tendency towards open syllables belong to the warm regions.

whereas languages with complicated groups of consonants are found in the cold climates.

In experiments with the artificial palate, experimental phoneticians frequently observe the important differences in structure of the hard palate and the jaws and some investigators are convinced that those differences depend upon differences in race, viz. the differences between dolicho- and brachycephalics.

Thus we touch upon anthropology and also biology, because inheritance both in timbre of voice and in the rhythmical disposition and in the articulation basis of different languages has of late found convinced supporters.

Some have gone so far as to bring the origin of the chin in man in connection with the evolution of language. And some have not hesitated to combine the organic roots of language in man with chattering in birds. Although it is not the intention of the Congress to give its support to all these theories without criticism, we think it of great importance that representatives of "Entwicklungspsychologie," anthropology, biology, linguistics and experimental phonetics try to agree in the judgment of those problems.

In speaking above of linguistics, we mean not only the older science of phoneticians and linguistic historians, but also that of the workers on the "Schall-analyse" of Rutz-Sievers and above all phonology as taught by the Prague school. At first sight phonologists seem to be inclined to have no great respect for the work of experimental phoneticians, as this work deals with the apparently irrelevant phonetic realisations and never comes to the properly intended phonems (to use the new Prague terms). But after some more consideration it is obvious that the contact between phonologists and experimental phoneticians promises indeed to become most beneficial to both.

But phonology is not limited to language; it also comes into direct contact with musicology. It appears that tones of various scales are composed in definite systems just as phonemata of a language are composed in a phonological system, and there even exists a relation between tonal and language systems, as the geographical distribution of some phonological systems and that of definite scales in popular songs is nearly identical. Moreover, the striking fact that musical tones show a deviation from the mathematical number of vibrations, will probably be explained analogically

as the difference between objective phonetical realisation and the properly intended phonemata.

Also psychology of normal and abnormal comprehension of language is strictly connected with the knowledge of the phonological system. This is the reason why linguistic psychology was already represented at the last meeting of phonologists in Prague by more than one of its well known students. Psychiatrists and neurologists in describing their observations of pathological speech have for a long time clearly distinguished between a defect of representation of speech (aphasia) and a deviation in the realisation of speech (dysarthria, anarthria). The comparing of these dates with those found by linguists may certainly lead to important conclusions, in the same way as the theory of rhythm and melody in the sentence may only come to a definite result by the co-operation of linguistic psychologists and psychiatrists.

With the above we believe to have indicated the purpose of the *International Congress of phonetic sciences* which will be held in Amsterdam from 3rd till the 7th July 1932, and we have the honour to invite herewith phoneticians, psychologists, psychiatrists and neurologists, anthropologists and biologists, musicologists, sound-analysts, linguistic historians, phonologists and all others interested.

Those who wish to be admitted as members of the Congress are requested to apply to the Secretary (*L. Kaiser, Rapenburgerstraat 136, Amsterdam*).

The contribution which gives free admittance to all sessions is fixed at fl. 10.— for active members and at fl. 6.— for passive members to be paid to the second Treasurer, Mr. *C. H. Kuhn, Oosteinde 15, Amsterdam, Postal account 179597.*

A printed report of the addresses etc. will be obtainable for 5 guilders. The members of the International Society of Experimental Phonetics will receive a copy free of charge.

The members of the family of the Congressists may become at the price of 5 gilders associate members of the Congress, having admittance to all sessions, receptions, etc.

Members of the Congress who wish to read a paper or to present a communication on one of the above subjects or on another problem within the described sphere, are invited to communicate with the Secretary of the Congress (*Rapenburgerstraat 136*, Amsterdam) as soon as possible but not later than February 1st, 1932 and

to deliver a short excerpt of their address in English, French or German before the 1st of April 1932.

The Secretary will be pleased to send further copies of this circular on application.

The Municipality of the City of Amsterdam, which in the days preceding our Congress will commemmorate the 3rd centenary of the foundation of its University, will graciously assist in receiving the congressists in a worthy way.

To sum up the Congress will embrace the following subjects:

1. Physiology of speech and voice (experimental phonetics in its strict meaning)
2. Study of the development of speech and voice in the individual; their evolution in the history of mankind; the influence of heredity.
3. Anthropology of speech and voice (racial differences in the articulation basis and the pitch of the voice in different peoples).
4. Phonology.
5. Linguistic Psychology.
6. Pathology of speech and voice (clinical experimental phonetics).
7. Comparative physiology of the sound of animals.
8. Musicology.

All who are interested in these fields will be welcome at the Congress.

JAC. VAN GINNEKEN, *President.*
L. KAISER, *Secretary.*
A. ROOZENDAAL, *Treasurer.*

Amsterdam C., Rapenburgerstraat 136.

PROVISIONAL PROGRAM

SUNDAY, 3RD JULY, 1932

Reception of the members of the Congress in a hall of the Society "Natura Artis Magistra" called Koningszaal.

MONDAY 4TH JULY, 10 O'clock

Opening of the Congress and official addresses (Colonial Institute)

MONDAY, 4TH JULY, 14 O'clock

Motor-coach drive through the town, tea in the Vondelpark Pavilion provided by the Municipality of Amsterdam.

TUESDAY, 5TH JULY, 9—12:30
Addresses in the Physiological Laboratory.

TUESDAY, 5TH JULY, 14—17 O'clock
Demonstration in the Physiological Laboratory.

WEDNESDAY, 6TH JULY, 9—12:30
Addresses in the Physiological Laboratory.

WEDNESDAY, 6TH JULY, 14—15 O'clock
Meeting of the Council of the International Society of Experimental Phonetics.

THURSDAY, 7TH JULY
Visit to the laboratory of the Philips works, Eindhoven
Visit to the Zuiderzee.

AN AUTHOR REPLIES

Editor of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH:

I feel obliged to write you a gentle word of remonstrance concerning Professor Crocker's review of my "Analytical Contrast of Oral with Written English." This is not because of his unfavorable conclusions regarding it. I am fully aware of its shortcomings, but because he gives what I consider a wholly inadequate and misleading account of the problem, procedures, and findings of an investigation, the first of a scientific sort, in a field closely related to the professional interests of a majority of JOURNAL readers. Those to whom a pioneer attempt at systematic, objective study of several types of differences between tenth grade oral and written language might appeal are not only not informed, in the review, that this study represents such an attempt, but are even led to understand that the sole finding consists in a certain untenable, far-fetched conclusion applying to speech on the adult level. The reviewer evidently overlooked numerous warnings in the text against implying that tenth grade data are at all relevant to adults, but assuming that I had fallen into this error, he has devoted the entire critical portion of the review to inveighing against my "pedantic" conclusion.

As a matter of fact, the significance of the study does not lie nearly as much in its general conclusions as in its ground-breaking, fact-finding nature. To make this clear it is necessary to add to the reviewer's outline the following information: first, each pair of the oral and written compositions deals with identical material, i.e., inci-

dents and experiences; second, the talks were recorded by a court stenographer; third, the compositions, in addition to being rated, were analyzed and compared with regard to errors, vocabularies, and language usages. Factors of sex, fluency, and relation to school marks were studied. A critical estimate of the value of these findings is given by Professor Howard Seely in the School Review of last September, page 552.

The question raised by Professor Crocker, "Why should oral language be made to conform to the standards of written English?" is applied by him to the adult level and so is irrelevant to the issue raised in the investigation: should not speech have more of the correctness, logic, order, and coherence—such as they are—of written English, in the tenth grade? The reviewer has not touched upon this problem so I shall not discuss it here, except to warn against the temptation to which teachers of speech are especially subject of making a virtue of necessity by claiming that oral awkwardness really represents a subtle and unique form of effectiveness and merit perceptible to the ear alone.

One minor point I think should be mentioned, though it may make me appear more vindictive than I really am: the book is attributed to the wrong publisher. The Teachers College Bureau of Publications, which publishes it, is quite distinct from the Columbia University Press.

PAUL P. BUSHNELL,
The College of Wooster.

SUSTAINING MEMBERSHIP

The 1930 Chicago Convention amended the Constitution of our NATIONAL ASSOCIATION to provide for a new type of membership with annual dues of ten dollars a year instead of the regular two dollars and a half. Those who become sustaining members under the terms of this amendment will be entitled to all the rights and privileges of regular members and in addition will receive the issues of the *Speech Bulletin* and of the *Research Monographs* which appear within the term of their membership.

In adopting this plan, our Association has followed the practice of many other academic societies. Our officers always face a press-

ing need for funds, and it is hoped that the additional income from sustaining memberships will make possible a larger activity on the part of our Committee on Research, or some of our recent scholarly work. Those who are in a position to underwrite their share of such projects should feel their obligation to do so, and should immediately communicate with Executive Secretary G. E. Densmore at the University of Michigan, and become sustaining members of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION.

Amy V. Allen
Lyndon Institute
Lyndon Center, Vermont

Margaret Althouse
Ackley High School
Ackley, Iowa

Sara Barber
Richmond High Schoæol
New York City

L. E. Bassett
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California

J. Richard Bietry
Los Angeles Junior College
Los Angeles, California

Dr. C. S. Bluemel
Physician
Denver, Colorado

Gladys Borchers
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

W. N. Brigance
Wabash College
Crawfordsville, Indiana

Earl C. Bryan
Texas State College for Women
Denton, Texas

Therese Cavanaugh
124 Pair St.
Paterson, New Jersey

Cornelia Cooper
1811 Jefferson
Madison, Wisconsin

Rupert Cortright
Detroit City College
Detroit, Michigan

C. C. Cunningham
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

Annette Lucille Cusack
John Adams High School
New York City

Mary Cryan
Detroit Public Schools
Detroit, Michigan

Ralph Dennis
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

G. E. Densmore
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

John Dolman, Jr.
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

A. M. Drummond
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Louis M. Eich
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

H. L. Ewbank
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

Annie Kate Ferguson
Sul Ross State Teachers College
Alpine, Texas

John Frizzell
Pennsylvania State College
State College, Pennsyivania

Dorothea Fry
John Muir Technical High School
Pasadena, California

Joseph M. Galvin
1015 Masonic Ave.
San Francisco, California

W. C. Garwick
Fairchild Aerial Camera Corp.
New York City

Wilbur E. Gilman
University of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri

Guy S. Green
Iowa State College
Ames, Iowa

Alta Hall
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

B. T. Hanley
New Orleans School of Speech
New Orleans, Louisiana

C. H. Harshbarger
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

Violet Hassler
The Stout Institute
Menomonie, Wisconsin

Howard Higgins
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio

Hoyt Hudson
Princeton University
Princeton, N. J.

Lee Hultzen
Dartmouth College
Hanover, N. H.

R. K. Immel
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

Huron D. Johnson
Pekin High School
Pekin, Illinois

S. L. Kennedy
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York

Carroll P. Lahman
Western State Teachers College
Kalamazoo, Michigan

James Lardner
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

Anne Larkin
Columbia College of Expression
Chicago, Illinois

Azubah Latham
Columbia University
New York City

Charles Layton
Muskingum College
New Concord, Ohio

Edward Mabie
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

Mrs. Bertha Jackson MacKay
California Christian College
Los Angeles, California

J. H. McBurney
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Elizabeth D. McDowell
Columbia University
New York City

Eleanor McLellan
33 West 67th St.
New York City

Frederick McKay
Ypsilanti State Teachers College
Ypsilanti, Michigan

Roberta McWade
170 Plymouth Ave.
Schenectady, N. Y.

Elizabeth Morse
Morse School of Expression
St. Louis, Missouri

Henry M. Moser
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Dorothy I. Mulgrave
New York University
New York City

Richard Murphy
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Professor Dr. Med Max Nadoleczny
München 2, NW1
Maximilianplatz, Germany

The Pacific University Library
Forest Grove, Oregon

Edwin Paget
North Carolina State College
Raleigh, North Carolina

T. Earl Pardoe
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah

G. R. R. Pflaum
Emporia State Teachers College
Emporia, Kansas

Henrietta Prentiss
Hunter College
New York City

F. M. Rarig
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota

J. Walter Reeves
The Peddie School
Hightstown, New Jersey

Lillian J. Reifsteck
School of Self Epression Speech and Acting
Joplin, Missouri

Floyd K. Riley
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Paul J. Ritter
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

Vladimir Rottenbor
Tucker School of Expression
Cleveland, Ohio

J. P. Ryan
Grinnell College
Grinnell, Iowa

Preston H. Scott
College of the City of Detroit
Detroit, Michigan

Rolland Shackson
Junior College
Grand Rapids, Michigan

Clarence T. Simon
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

Irene Skinner
Columbia College of Expression
Chicago, Illinois

Ray Skinner
College of the City of Detroit
Detroit, Michigan

E. J. Spadino
1272 Amsterdam Ave.
New York City

Speech Arts Association
Los Angeles, California

Jane Bliss Taylor
Hunter College
New York City

S. Elizabeth Tyson
State Teachers College
West Chester, Pennsylvania

R. B. Wagner
St. Louis University
St. Louis, Missouri

Russell A. Wagner
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Jean Walker
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

A. T. Weaver
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

J. Dale Welsch
Elkader Junior College
Elkader, Iowa

H. A. Wilchelns
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Marjorie Will
Private Studio
San Antonio, Texas

Arleigh B. Williamson
New York University
New York City

J. A. Winans
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire

H. S. Woodward
Western Reserve University
Cleveland, Ohio

Gertrude Van Adestine
150 Atkinson St.
Detroit, Michigan

Helen Vergason
Franklin K. Lane High School
Brooklyn, New York

OLD BOOKS

Recollections of Middle Life. By FRANCISQUE SARCEY. Translated by Elisabeth Luther Cary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893.

This book, though out of the usual run of volumes dealing with our subject, will be a delight to any teacher of the craft and mystery of speech. It is all about lecturing—and by lecturing the writer means the kind of speaking that most of us have to do, and nothing very different from that which we try to teach others to do. M. Sarcey was a professor who got into journalism, and then a journalist who got into lecturing. This book deals entirely with the last phase. In the 1860's he helped to found, or to revive, the public lecture in Paris, and he lived to see its decline. He faced all sorts of audiences, not only in Paris but in Belgium, Holland, and the provinces, making as he went along every mistake a speaker can make. He discovered for himself the rules of oratory, and he recounts his discovery of them in a narrative which is always witty and full of zest. The chapters on "How to Lecture," "How a Lecture Is Prepared," and "Giving Lectures Upon Books," might well be put on the list of required reading; but they are best understood by being read in their biographical setting.

Near the close of his book M. Sarcey writes:

> You can see that I have loved lecturing much, with a love that has not been over-happy. . . . The lecture has not only cost me time and strength. I have lost a considerable sum in it; for I should have been able to carry into other tasks the prodigous effort of mind, and the incredible number of hours, that I have thrown into that bottomless and echoless pit. Ah, well! I regret neither my time nor my trouble nor my money. And do you know why? Because I have felt in lecturing the kind of pleasure the equivalent of which I have found only in play—the pleasure of struggling against chance, the terrible and charming sensation of casting the die. . . . I could never be certain in advance that I should not break my neck, and

> that was delicious. However much assurance the habit of speaking may give a lecturer, he never knows how things will turn for him, and his heart leaps in his breast like that of a player who has put his last five louis on the red. He hopes and he fears! Do you know any greater happiness for a man?

At the very end, the author has anticipated just such a reading as I hope many of us will give him, and has himself written the final comment for the reviewer. He says:

> And as for me, my recompense is that the lecturer of the future will hardly be able to do other than open this little volume, were it only for the sake of its information, and that he will say, after having run it through: "He was a good fellow and a hard worker; he knew what he was talking about, and he was not altogether so stupid as the *beaux esprits* of his time would like to make out."

Unlike some other books discussed in this department, *Recollections of Middle Life* should not be hard to come by. My copy cost fifty cents. But I firmly believe you will find it worth whatever money or effort you expend in getting hold of it.

HOYT H. HUDSON, *Princeton University*

Elocution. By Professor C. P. BRONSON, A.M., M.D. John P. Morton & Co., Louisville, Ky., 1845.

This is an amazing old book and one well worth the attention of teachers of Speech. The full title is, in itself, a rather complete description of the book. The title: "Elocution; or, Mental and Vocal Philosophy: involving the principles of Reading and Speaking; and designed for the development and cultivation of Both Body and Mind, in accordance with the Nature, Uses, and Destiny of Man: illustrated by two or three hundred choice anecdotes (excellent); three thousand oratorical and poetical readings; five thousand proverbs, maxims and laconics, and several hundred elegant engravings."

The first few pages deal with the anatomy and physiology of the human body. There are diagrams of the Nerves of Respiration, Body Muscles, Skeleton, Thorax, Lungs and Heart, Larynx, and Horizontal view of the Glottis.

The many pictures indicating Jealousy, Malice, Mirth, etc., should be compared with the Psychological series of Ruckmick.

Each of the 384 pages is printed in double column fine print.

L. S. JUDSON, *University of Wisconsin*

Advanced Elocution. By MRS. J. W. SHOEMAKER, Principal of the National School of Elocution and Oratory. The Penn Publishing Company, Philadelphia, 1896.

This book is called to the attention of Speech teachers because it gives an interesting glimpse of the recent background of "Elocution" upon which we have built, through changes in terminology, "Oratory," "Public Speaking" and, finally, "Speech."

In the preface, Elocution is defined as "the art of speaking *naturally* and *artistically*" (author's italics.)

There are three main subdivisions in the book: (1) Vocal Expression (all that pertains to voice); (2) Verbal Expression (use of words); (3) Visible Expression (that which relates to attitudes, bearings, motions of the human form, together with expressions of the countenance).

Voice is "the result of a psychic condition which manifests itself in the physical (phase of muscular activity which results in sound) nature, causing the air to be expelled from the lungs through the larynx, tensioning and controlling the vocal bands, and thus setting in motion a volume of air which is modified by the resonance chambers, and which, vibrating on the tympanum of the ear, is called sound."

"Gesturing" is defined as "that which is done through the motions of the arm and positions of the hand." There are four types of gestures: Descriptive, imitative, emphatic, and passional.

Approximately the last one-third of the book is given over to selections for Reading and Recitation.

L. S. JUDSON, *University of Wisconsin*

NEW BOOKS

Persuasive Speech, An Art of Rhetoric for College. By FRANCIS P. DONNELLY. New York: P. J. Kennedy and Sons, 1931; pp. x, 258. $2.25.

When Donnelly's *Art of Interesting* appeared, some eight years ago, a reviewer in *The Nation* wrote:

> . . . Father Donnelly is a sound classical scholar. He has done us the service of showing conclusively that the underlying principles of classical rhetoric are fundamentally valid today—that Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian knew not only how to make speeches, but how to preach sermons, write editorial articles, and sell groceries.

Now the same author has embodied those principles in a text-book for college use, with more than the usual amount of illustrative material and suggested assignments. Were it not for a reservation, to be stated forthwith, one could say that those who have been wondering whether classical rhetoric could be taught to undergraduates and, if so, what text-book might be used, have here their answer to both questions.

The reservation is this: it seems to the present reviewer that what we have in *Persuasive Speech* is not classical rhetoric at its purest and best, but that rhetoric as it was codified and formalized in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, when chance remarks and observations of Aristotle or Cicero were erected into rules and definitions, and when the rough-and-ready oratory of popular assemblies was lost sight of. For teaching purposes, all this may be something of a gain; though one cannot help being a little dismayed at the number of definitions and clasifications which Father Donnelly expects his students to master. Yet it is a real question whether Nikolaus Schleiniger's *Principles of Eloquence,* as translated into English by Joseph Skellon (1909) and until recently kept in print, does not give a better interpretation of the rhetoric, and yet one which is as teachable as that of the present volume.

Schleiniger is not now generally available to us; and in comparing Donnelly's work with him, I intended a compliment. *Persuasive Speech,* as already suggested, is very full on the side of illustration, and the illustrations are not all drawn from Cicero; English and American orators, down to the most recent, are quoted. The sentence from St. Augustine on the title-page implies that Father Donnelly places more stress upon acquaintance with models than upon learning theoretical principles. But again we must note that no class could proceed far into the text without facing the necessity of memorizing a great many definitions and rules.

Another loss which classical rhetoric, as represented by Aristotle, suffered at the hands of its later teachers was the dropping out of audience analysis; this loss *Persuasive Speech* does nothing to restore. And many modern readers will think that there has been insufficient assimilation of modern psychological studies, since Father Donnelly sticks to the facultative analysis of the mind. Here he may possibly be pardoned, until psychologists speak with more certainty and unanimity than they are now speaking. In the meantime, while I am not ready to adopt this book as a text for my own teaching, I should very much like to observe students who are using it, to see whether they can get the undoubtedly sound discipline and philosophical view of the subject which are implicit in the book.

HOYT H. HUDSON, *Princeton University*

The Rhetoric of Aristotle: An Expanded Translation with Supplementary Examples for Students of Composition and Public Speaking. By LANE COOPER. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1932; pp. xlviii, 259; $3.

In translating Aristotle, Professor Cooper has followed the precepts of his master; he has formed a clear conception of his audience:

> I have not kept much in mind the opinion finished scholars may entertain of my undertaking, though of course I desire their good will. . . . But the persons I have kept in mind are the undergraduate and graduate students of public speaking in America, and the large body of teachers who have not studied Rhetoric in its sources, and otherwise lack a classical background.

The method followed here is similar to that of the admirable version of the *Poetics* which Professor Cooper published some years ago. Explanations, illustrations and comments, instead of being relegated to footnotes, are placed in brackets and incorporated in the text. This might easily prove a dangerous procedure, but Professor Cooper's explanations have the virtue of being devoted to matters that need explanation, and of really explaining. His interpretations of enthymemes and of topics will probably be enlarged upon by teachers, but they are of fundamental importance, and offer safe guidance in questions that students find confusing. Professor Cooper's anticipations of apparent inconsistencies in the text (as in the condemnation of the emotional as irrelevant in the first book, and the extensive treatment of means of stirring the feelings of an audience, in the second book) are helpful in the difficult task of enabling the student to see the work as a whole. In the translation of certain important terms, as the ends of the various types of rhetoric, the distinction between artistic and inartistic proofs, probably no one English word is adequate. The different words employed by various tranlators should be compared and discussed for an adequate conception of the meaning. The translation as a whole is clear and simple in style, and in no sense forbidding to the rather large number of students who are fearful of the classics, even in translation. The chapter headings, the marginal topics and paging, the book list and index make the book easily usable as a reference work, even though the format of the book is hardly equal to that of the Roberts, Welldon, or Jebb translations.

Professor Cooper's introduction and his collection of "witnesses to the value of the *Rhetoric*" suggest that he regards the *Rhetoric* as a neglected work, that he regrets his early ignorance of the worth of the *Rhetoric* to students of poetry, that lawyers, legislators, statesmen, clergymen, editors, teachers, and everyone whose business it is to persuade others should study the *Rhetoric* with care, and that the recent growth in the number of graduate and undergraduate students in public speaking offers a hope that this neglect shall not continue. If everyone whose business is the persuasion of others should come to regard Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a *vade mecum*, Messrs. Appleton and Co. would find that they have just published their most profitable book. It may be necessary to seek consolation in the remark of Emerson's that although there were never enough

readers of Plato in any one generation to pay for a new edition of his works, his readers were the most influential figures of their time; but it might be better to ask whether departments of speech can profitably attempt to create a widespread interest in the book. Philosophers, in whose hands the works of Aristotle have traditionally rested, are prone to join in Gomperz's characterization of the *Rhetoric* as "an agglomeration of inwardly unconnected parts rather than an organic structure—a great deal of dialectic, some politics, a little grammar and jurisprudence, a section on style, and considerable borrowings from descriptive ethics and psychology." A "popular" work of practical intent in the chaotic field of everyday happenings is unlikely to appeal to a professor of philosophy. The social psychologists are eagerly investigating all the phenomena that Aristotle treated in the *Rhetoric*, but they are now more interested in developing experimental techniques for the investigation of small parts of their field than in relating or synthesizing their results. But whatever the point of view of the teacher of speech, whether he be modernist or classicist, scientific or literary, he should be able to see that if "speech" is to develop as an academic subject, some such unity as Aristotle imposed upon the diverse elements of the *Rhetoric* must be created and recognized. In the creation of such a unity contemporary work in psychology, physiology, sociology, physics, literary criticism, etc., may be the chief instruments, but Aristotle's *Rhetoric* should provide the pattern and should acquaint students with the observations of a mind of the first order.

In what kind of courses and at what level should the *Rhetoric* be used? Professor Cooper suggests its usefulness for both graduate and undergraduate students. In his list of witnesses he includes Thomas Arnold's statement of his use of it with the boys in the Sixth Form at Rugby. I have myself used the *Rhetoric* in graduate courses entirely divorced from practical attention to the ends of skill, and have used it in the elementary course in public speaking for freshmen and sophomores. For several years past freshmen at Swarthmore have used the *Rhetoric* as a basis for criticism in writing papers upon modern speeches. There are those, of course, who fail to become interested or to see its value. The same may be said of any subject matter in any course. But the substance of the book is no more difficult than much of the material through which college students are introduced to economics, philosophy, politics or history.

and every year some excellent papers on the *Rhetoric* are written by freshmen. Professor Cooper's emphasis in his *Introduction* is on the practical value of the work in speech-making, although his chief illustration is to show the applicability of the *Rhetoric* in analyzing the Gettysburg Address. I prefer to emphasize the value of the *Rhetoric* as providing canons of criticism and as a stimulus to speculation about rhetoric and its function in society. Many students in economics, my colleagues tell me, seem to take courses in order to become good book-keepers, and it takes considerable time, energy, and irritation to bring them to a realization that the study of economics in a liberal college is an attempt to understand the economic order of society. Today we are justified, I think, in talking seriously about the rhetorical order of society. Such a point of view is established most clearly by the *Rhetoric*. Much can be said, of course, of the immediately practical value of the *Rhetoric*, but that is not likely to be neglected. A modern attempt to view rhetoric in its relations to ethics, poetics, politics and psychology would relieve the study of rhetoric of its connotations of immaturity and triviality. Professor Cooper deserves our gratitude for his scholarly labors in making the *Rhetoric* so easily available.

EVERETT HUNT, *Swarthmore College*

Pantomimes for Stage and Study. By T. EARL PARDOE. New York: Appleton, 1931; $3.00, pp. 393.

Here is a book that will be seized upon avidly by the teacher of the class in acting. Such a teacher is forever between the Scylla of dealing solely in theory, and the Charybdis of trying to conduct the class by means of the rehearsal process. The former method is unsatisfactory for obvious reasons, and the latter nearly always has to contend with waning class interest resulting from monotony and uneven distribution of activity. This book provides something brief yet complete for the whole class to do. Here are hundreds of pantomimes, ranging from mere exercises to complete performing units out of Shakespeare and the moderns; and from practice bits for hand or torso to all-inclusive Commedia dell' arte productions. This book is a gold-mine of immediately usable material.

Supporting the 400-odd actual pantomimes are expository chapters:

Art and the Human Body
A Brief History of Pantomime
The Emotional Basis of Acting
The Body as an Expressive Agent
Technic of Pantomime Writing

Though at times a little difficult in style, these chapters are distinctly contributive. Mr. Pardoe has long studied, practiced and taught his material, and is by way of becoming the best American authority on the subject. His chapter on The Body as an Expressive Unit probably evaluates the philosophy of Delsarte more sanely and adapts it more practicably than any other similar work.

Pantomimes for Stage and Study is adequately and admirably documented. Its scholarship will commend it, and its outstanding usableness will insure it a long life as a text and reference.

C. M. Wise, *Louisiana State University*

Speech Sounds of Young Children. By Beth L. Wellman, Ida Mae Case, Ida Gaarder Mengert, Dorothy E. Bradbury. Iowa City: State University of Iowa, 1931; pp. 82.

As the title suggests this brochure is a survey of the repertoire of vocables of some of the youngest of our speech students—the preschool children. "The method used in this study was the testing of the child's ability to produce the sounds of the English language by securing verbal responses through questions and the presentation of pictures and toys. The questions were organized in such a way that the answers would contain certain words not used by the examiner. The sounds used by the child in these words were recorded in phonetic symbols. . . . . In the preliminary study, the materials used were toys which ordinarily bring an active response from young children. The examiner handed one toy at a time to the child, recorded his comments, and asked questions about each toy."

This study is perhaps one of the most thorough-going analyses of the speech of young children ever made. Checks were employed to render it thoroughly scientific. It seems likely to the reviewer that the results are trustworthy. Some of the most interesting of the results are as follows:

1. "The sounds that were given correctly by 90 to 100 per cent of the children who were completely tested on 123 sounds included sixteen consonant elements—initial t, p, b, m, n, f, d, h, w; medial b, m, n, p, g, k; final m: no consonant blends; four vowels, i, a, ə, and u; and one diphthong ei. The sounds that were given correctly by less than 50 per cent of the children included two consonant elements—final θ and ð; four consonant blends—θr, nd, skr-, and lk; no vowels, and no diphthongs.

2. "Final sounds were more difficult than initial or medial sounds. Nasals were easier than stops and fricatives. Stops were easier than fricatives. No differences were found between voiced and voiceless consonants.

3. "The girls tended to be superior to the boys on consonant elements. On vowels no definite conclusions as to the sex differences could be made from the data.

4. "A high relationship between age and the ability to give the sounds correctly is indicated by the correlation .80±.03. Between mental age (Stanford-Binet) and speech sounds the correlation was .71±.04.

5. "No relationship was found between speech sounds and introversion-extroversion ratings, size of vocabulary, or number of older children in the family.

6. "Between weight-height index and consonant elements and consonant blends there were substantial correlations (.49±.05 and .37±.08).

7. "A substantial relationship was found between the tracing-path test of motor control and the total number of speech sounds correct and consonant blends correct (.67±.06 and .65±.06) when the age range was two to six years."

The rather interesting speculative inference to be drawn from this last finding is that speech is partly a motor skill in which a premium is placed upon the correct balancing of muscle controls. Speech is like the tracing-path test in that it does not involve the ability to produce a given muscle movement so much as it involves the ability to check that movement at just the right point by opposing it with a movement of an antagonistic sort. In other words, speech is a process of delicately poised reciprocal innervation. One might connect this inference also with findings 4 and 6, in which the relationship between speech processes and general maturation has

been pointed out. Speech is a motor skill like tennis playing, and depends for its efficiency upon the integrity of the neuromuscular system.

On page 29 of this study the authors say: "As the child spoke, his phrases or words were transcribed into sounds of the phonetic alphabet. The symbols of the International Phonetic Association were used. Each sound was represented by a separate symbol. The advantage of this system over the diacritical systems is that only one interpretation of the symbol is possible." That paragraph might arouse in many of the readers of this study slight intellectual antagonisms. It seems to the reviewer as though the authors of this study were claiming a bit too much for the International Phonetic Alphabet and making an unwarranted charge against the diacritical markings of the dictionaries. I doubt if there is so great difference between the fallibility of the dictionary and the infallibility of the International Phonetic system as our authors would suggest by this paragraph. A careful perusal of the introduction to Webster's New International Dictionary, for example, will reveal to the reader that the diacritical markings are employed as phonetic symbols and are really scientifically constructed to convey much the same thing as is conveyed by our International Phonetic symbols. It seems to the reviewer that the difference between International Phonetic symbols and the diacritical marking of the English dictionary is not that one is a more faithful representation of sounds than the other; but rather that one is inter-linguistic, whereas the other is limited in its usefulness to a sort of standard English. (By all means speech scholars should prefer the International Phonetic Alphabet for scientific purposes; but for the time being the lay person may prefer, and properly, to have his words re-spelled for pronunciation in English diacritical markings.)

Another critical comment upon this work is that it includes no mention of the many experimental sounds that a child makes for which there are no phonetic signs. The examiner merely states that the child's words were transcribed into sounds of the alphabet. What happened to sounds for which there are no signs? The guess of the reviewer is that the nearest phoneme to the child's experimental sound was selected—either consciously and arbitrarily, or unconsciously and intuitively—as the sound the child actually produced. Probably no other course could have been taken, but the

significance of this study is slightly impaired by the vagueness on the part of the authors in their explanation of just what they did in this part of the investigation.

ROBERT WEST, *University of Wisconsin*

Broadcast English. By A. LLOYD JAMES (Second Edition) 1931; British Broadcasting Corporation, Savoy Hill, London, W. C. 2.

When the Advisory Committee on Spoken English for the British Broadcasting Corporation made its first recommendations some five or six years ago (1926), many of its suggestions were received, both in that country and in America, with a diversity of attitudes, ranging from general acquiescence to loud protest and biting ridicule. Even the authority of such notables as Robert Bridges, George Bernard Shaw, Forbes-Robertson and Daniel Jones was not sufficient to gain for many of the recommended pronunciations recognition among radio announcers in England, or among speakers in general.

The present booklet, prepared to accompany two ten-inch records on which the actual pronunciations of some 503 words are recorded,[1] presents the latest revisions of the work of the Committee; and in an excellently written and thoroughly sane discussion of Broadcast English, sets forth the problems that arose. It is "the first official publication embodying the findings of the Committee."

If one has no more than the list of words and the gramophone records, and but a general idea of what this group was trying to do, without the discussion in this little booklet of only 38 pages, an entirely erroneous impression is inevitable. It is easy, lacking the available information, to get the idea that here is an attempt to standardize pronunciation in general, to do for English what certain groups have attempted to do for other European tongues—and what certain other groups have been trying to do to American speech. Such, however, is far from the purpose underlying the endeavors of the Advisory Committee.

For even here in England, the seat of this reputed "international, world-wide form of cultured usage," where, it is presumed by many who should know better, the "styles" of English pronunciation are set, the admission is freely made, is even argued, that there is no such thing as a "standard dialect" of English!

[1] The Linguaphone Institute, 24-27 High Holborn, London, W. C. 1.

Pronunciation varies, it is noted, from district to district, from (social) class to class, from individual to individual. With a general rise in cultural level provided by universal education, and with the increasing mobility of the population, these district, class and individual variants become more and more alike, so that "out of the broad band that comprises all district and class variants, there is emerging a considerably narrower band of variants that have a great measure of similarity. . . . Those who speak any one variety of the narrow band are recognized as educated speakers throughout the country. . . . ."

"It is quite evident," concludes the Committee, "that we are not entitled to conclude that there is *one* standard pronunciation, *one* and *only one* right way of speaking English. There are varieties that are acceptable throughout the country, and some that are not." The word *"dance"* is given by way of illustration. Is it to have the sound of the *a* in *Dan*, or that of the *a* in *darn?* "Both pronunciations must stand; both are common among educated speakers."

Nowhere in the booklet is there the slightest intimation that the members of this British Committee would admit the existence, or even the desirability, of a uniformly standard pronunciation, even for England. When Englishmen themselves cannot agree, and see no particular necessity for complete agreement over the finer details of English pronunciation, it would seem that any demand for uniformity in American speech is quite superfluous.

After making due allowance for the fact that many British vowels are qualitatively somewhat different from American, we should all agree with most of the pronunciations given in *Broadcast English*. Some of them, however, are quite different from those common in this countfy, or those supposed to be correct. It is unfortunate that the method of indicating pronunciations is so inadequate in many instances; one must hear the word in order to get a fair idea of its proper sounds.

In *adults*, for example, the accent is shifted to the first syllable. *Ate* is to be pronounced to rhyme with *bet* rather than with *bait*. *Geyser* is *geezer* (*g* as in *go*); *ass* has the *a* as in *hat*, as has *glacier*. *Medicine* and *ordeal* are disyllabic, as is *omelette*. *Sheik* is exactly like *shake*.

So far as these particular 503 words are concerned, "It is not suggested that these pronunciations are the only 'right' ones, and

it is not suggested that any special degree of authority attaches to these recommendations. They are recommendations made primarily for the benefit of announcers, to secure some measure of uniformity in the pronunciation of broadcast English, and to provide announcers with some degree of protection against the criticism to which they are, from the nature of their work, peculiarly liable."

The booklet and the records are interesting and worth having. They should not be considered in any sense as offering a standard of pronunciation for American speakers, either over the radio or otherwise. But the discussion of Broadcast English may contribute somewhat to the establishing of a saner point of view and greater tolerance toward the few minor regional variations which exist in American speech.

GILES W. GRAY, *University of Iowa*

Parliamentary Procedure. By J. WALTER REEVES. New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1931: pp. vii, 102.

In his preface, Mr. Reeves says that there are few subjects so universally used as parliamentary procedure about which there is "more profound ignorance." Experience with the working of almost any club will demonstrate the truth of this remark. Men even get elected to the United States Senate, where a knowledge of the rules is as important as political acumen, when, like the eminent Huey P. Long of Louisiana, they "can't understand what it is all about."

This book is intended as an introduction to the study of parliamentary procedure. In addition to the principal rules, it includes exercises and drills on the various motions discussed in the text. Most of the exercises are based upon preparatory-school organizations, and probably the book would fit a high-school or preparatory-school course better than a college course. The discussion of all the motions is clear and concise; whenever a motion is explained, a list of all the rules that apply to it is given. One careful reading does not reveal a single error or misprint.

The author follows Robert in the order of precedence of motions, but he does not give all the motions that are included in the famous *Rules of Order*. Among those omitted are motions related to the committee of the whole. His tables seem, however, simpler than Robert's, and more teachable.

Beside tables of motions, the appendix includes a model constitution and by-laws, a set of test questions, and supplementary drill. There is a good index.

This text should prove very useful to teachers of parliamentary procedure, combining as it does, rules, drills, and exercises in one book. The larger works may be used to settle moot questions or to cover unusual motions not included in this book. We may hope that this book will do something to dispel the profound ignorance that exists about the subject of parliamentary procedure.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN, *Princeton University*

Elements of Public Speaking. By RUTH BRYAN OWEN. New York: Horace Liveright, Inc., 1931: pp. 200.

"We have with us today the Honorable Ruth Bryan Owen, member of Congress from Florida. She needs no introduction to this audience or to any audience. . . ." Thus begins William Lyon Phelps in a prefatory remark to this book, wherein the distinguished daughter of the Great Commoner joins the swelling ranks of writers upon the art of public speaking.

This reviewer opened the book expecting to find it a libretto upon the finer nuances of speaking, seasoned perhaps by the experiences both of the writer and of her father. It was a disappointment, therefore, to find it merely another textbook instead—and not a comprehensive one at that.

Nevertheless the book begins well. Its opening chapter, "Why Speak in Public?" contains the best exposition this reviewer has read upon the growth and changing aspect of public speaking in recent years. "Public speaking has become Everyman's occupation," sagely observes Mrs. Owen. "The orator no longer finds an inarticulate multitude ready to accept him as an exceptional figure. The public has climbed onto the platform with him."

The second chapter, upon "This Acquired Art," carries on equally well. Mrs. Owen takes one through the "earlier journeys from town to town" of many so-called "natural" speakers wherein they struggled severely to acquire this "natural" gift. One reads therein the story of her own severe efforts.

The last two chapters, upon "Important Trifles," and "Dealing With the Unexpected," likewise are the fruit of the author's experience. They will interest any reader, student or teacher.

But the chapters in between—intended to be the heart of the book—seriously fail in their purpose. The material is too scanty, many of the important factors in speech-making are left out altogether; and rather too much space (over one-third of the entire book) is given over to quoting reminiscences upon past great speakers which, though interesting, offer little aid to beginners attempting to emulate these speakers.

The chapter upon "Voice" may be taken as an example. "The audience must hear without effort," we are told. And again, "It is a useful and reassuring practice to address the first words of a speech to the most distant hearers. . . ." Certainly this is sane advice, and if all that any beginning speaker needed was to lift his voice and address to the most distant hearers, it would also be sufficient. But unfortunately we who labor with the rank and file well know that there are many who cannot lift their voices until first they have developed proper habits of breathing. We know that there are many others who, even though they lift their voices, cannot be well understood because they never have learned to shape speech sounds distinctly in the mouth. We know that this rank and file must be drilled in rhythm and resonance, pronunciation and enunciation. But Mrs. Owen gives her readers nothing of the phonetics of sound formation, nothing of the physiological nature of resonance, nothing of the physical qualities of sound, and very little of the psychology concerning this complex instrument used by human beings for conveying thoughts and emotions—in short little to aid them in overcoming these everyday difficulties of speaking. She treats them instead to half a dozen pages of testimony upon the sonorous voices of Pitt, Bryan, Clay, Chatham, Webster, Choate, Ingersoll, and Bright. In brief the reader is told *what kind* of a voice he ought to have, but he is not told *how* to develop it.

No discussion whatever is given to bodily action, to the mechanics of organizing a speech, or to speech motivation.

In short, here is a book written by an eloquent daughter of an eloquent father which, had it been written from a more suitable viewpoint, might have been as striking as the personality of its author. But the moment Mrs. Owen projected herself into the field of textbook writing she was forced to exclude from her treatment the more fascinating things she could have told about speaking.

Likewise she was forced to discuss mechanical details of psychology, phonetics, acoustics, and composition—with which she was less acquainted than the average teacher.

Nevertheless we enjoyed the personal touches that here and there crept into this book and hope that some day Mrs. Owen will write a book more out of her own experience and skill.

WILLIAM NORWOOD BRIGANCE, *Wabash College*

Speech. By J. R. FIRTH. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1930.

The contributions of University College phoneticians to the cause of good speech call for no explanation. Daniel Jones and Stephen Jones are names which suggest much that is fundamental from the point of view of instruction and guidance in English phonetics. Through the medium of Benn's Sixpenny Library the judgments of another University College teacher are brought to the attention of an expanding circle of students and instructors who manifest a deep interest in matters pertaining to the spoken word. The little book under consideration was prepared by J. R. Firth, Senior Lecturer in University College.

Mr. Firth has assembled the findings and points of view of many scholars in the fields of psychology, physiology, physics, linguistics, and speech. He has articulated these results with the now current conception of speech as a social phenomenon. Such familiar names as Fletcher, De Laguna, Markey, Negus, Paget, and Watson are so frequently encountered that the reader is disposed to wonder at every turn whether speech is not the most dependent of all the branches of learning in the field of knowledge. Mr. Firth's book tends to verify a remark of the late Professor Woolbert who observed that the speech teacher, perhaps more than any other person giving instruction, should keep his intellectual windows open to the other arts and sciences.

The point of view in this book is that speech "is a bodily habit having a physical basis," and that its function is "the social control and co-ordination of behaviour." In the presentation and development of his thesis Mr. Firth briefly reviews the theories accounting for the origin of speech, the differences between written and spoken words, the physical and mental phenomena involved in speaking, the problem of meaning so far as it centers about perceived situation and "common contexts of experience," and the

acoustic phenomena involved in hearing and recognition. In the latter consideration he summarizes much of the experimental data which have been assembled by Fletcher.

The last half of the book is devoted largely to a discussion of phonetic habits and standard English speech. A phonetic habit, according to Mr. Firth, is "an attunement, a setting of the central nervous system, which will be touched off by the appropriate phonetic stimulus. This 'setting' is probably a disposition to function in a fairly wide range of varied but in some respects similar contexts." Function and experiential context enable individuals to perceive the difference between words which are phonetically homophonous. Throughout this discussion the author keeps within easy reach of his original thesis, namely, that speech is a social adjustment—that it functions "in a continuum of social experience. . . ."

A genuine tolerance of various "norms" of good speech is evident in Mr. Firth's section dealing with Standard English. He writes: "All phonetic behaviour is determined by individual and social needs. Education is such a need, and a reasonable conformity to a serviceable norm will operate as a sort of standard in all speech communities. Educated speakers of English all over the world form such a speech community. They all speak educated English. But they can never all speak public school English, nor, we hope, cultivate a shameful negative English which effectually masks social and local origin and is a suppression of all that is vital in speech." The "educated English" to which the author refers admits of "a wide range of permissible variation in pronunciation and usage." The educated English is not to be interpreted as standard English. The former admits of certain signs of social and geographical origin. It is, according to the author's testimony, "the only kind of English that has the remotest chance of universality even in Great Britain itself."

Mr. Firth has given the profession an interesting review of the chief problems involved in speech, and more particularly, in English phonetics. He has presented his material in the light of recent researches in the many sciences to which speech pays heavy tribute. And, fortunately, he has recorded his written judgment in a volume so inexpensive that even the terrors of financial depression cannot prevent interested parties from making the purchase.

LESTER W. THONSSEN, *College of the City of New York*

Edmund Burke: A Biography. By Rev. Robert H. Murray, Litt.D. Oxford University Press, 1931. Pp. v., 423.

Dr. Murray, Vicar of Penshore in Worcestershire, and Supervisor of Historical Studies at Oxford University, has written several volumes on Irish History and on Nineteenth Century Political Science. The present volume is the result, if footnotes are any indication, of tireless research and omnivorous reading, stimulated, doubtless, by the author's serving as lecturer in history at Trinity College, Dublin (Burke's College) in 1921-22. Murray has, apparently, read everything extant in print or in manuscript that Burke ever wrote or may have written, and everything that might have any reference to Burke or any bearing upon his career. Unfortunately, however, the book is not the complete picture and revaluation for which students of Burke had hoped. Murray seems to have so steeped himself in his information upon a baffling subject that the result remains an impressive but disappointing confusion.

The confusion is greatest in the organization and style of the book. Murray's account follows generally an uncritical, chronological sequence; but from sentence to paragraph, to chapter, to the whole, it is marred by gratuitous digression, excessive sentiment, and doubtful English. In Chapter I, for instance, entitled characteristically, "Childhood Days," for which Murray might well have followed Samuels' excellent and exhaustive study, Burke is not allowed to grow up consecutively, but must reminisce about his childhood from the edge of the grave, and from the heat of the platform defend his youth. The chapter does not even end on Burke, but on Warren Hastings, dreaming dreams at Westminster, though, as Murray says: "There is no obvious connection between such an unknown school as Ballitore and such a well-known one as Westminster." Has the author to quote from a letter Burke wrote upon entering Trinity College, his comment is boundless sentiment: "The first day as Auditor of the Club at college, the first day as a member of the Government—these, too, were for Burke proud and happy days, but the *couleur de rose* had paled by that time. There is no colouring so bright as the long-faded colours of those early days! Who does not look back on them, only realizing when they are long past how happy they were! One is very much wiser now, and richer, and, maybe, has reached the highest round of the ladder; but who does not remember the daisies that grew

around the foot when one was climbing that lowest round? Ah, but the old days were the best!"

Nevertheless, Murray has added much to the so far inadequate mass of fact concerning Burke and has opened many previously uninspected sources of information. He has settled an occasional moot point; for instance, he has shown that Burke's wife was not a Roman Catholic. And he has rectified a blunder of interpretation made by Morley (p. 33). On the other hand, he has sometimes inferred beyond the strength of his evidence on such questions as the extent of Burke's connection with the *Annual Register,* and the date of the composition of the *Sublime and Beautiful.* We know, for instance, that Burke was largely instrumental in originating Dodsley's annual, and that he contributed rather heavily to the first few numbers. The problem of the degree of his responsibility for the *Annual Register* after he began his parliamentary career is, however, not to be solved, as Murray seems to solve it, by gently assuming that Burke may be held accountable for all the literary and political opinion it contained while he lived. Further, Murray's assertion that Burke visited his constituents at Bristol once a year from 1774 to 1783 (p. 239) is entirely unsupported by the reference to the Fitzwilliam Correspondence. Its truth is, again, questionable, for Burke's failure to visit his constituents was one important reason for his unpopularity at Bristol.

The treatment of Burke's oratory is unanalytical and in any large sense uncritical. It consists mostly of the conventional remarks which have always been made about Burke, largely supported by quotation from his contemporaries and his biographers. On pages 156-7, Murray collects several of these remarks into what is his most extended (though still desultory) critique: Burke has character, wisdom, statesmanship; he is essentially a Romantic; he was an orator rather than a debater; he had perfection of form and phrase; his speeches were better read than heard; he was too violent, and he lacked taste; he spoke too often and too long; he never learned moderation; and so on through the usual armory of criticism. Murray's own additions seem to be that Burke forgot that the essence of art is to conceal art, and that his asperity and single-mindedness kept him out of office. On other pages, however, his failure is attributed variously to his views on Catholicism and on Non-conformity, and to his strained finances. Nowhere in the book, we regret

to say, does Burke, the man, or the orator, emerge from the confusion of fact and digression, except in the print of Reynolds' noble portrait on the frontispiece. Burke is tremendous, and the task of his biographer is difficult. Perhaps we have been expecting too much of Dr. Murray in an undertaking which made even Hazlitt throw up his hands in despair.

DONALD C. BRYANT, *New York State College for Teachers*

James A. Garfield. By ROBERT GRANVILLE CALDWELL. Dodd, Mead, and Company, New York, 1931; pp. ix, 383. $5.00.

Garfield is not remembered today as one of the great speakers of his generation, and his speeches are little read and seldom quoted. But his own generation regarded him highly, a generation which had speakers such as Blaine, Ingersoll, Beecher, and Phillips. Garfield owed most of his success in politics to his ability to speak, he was not a great thinker or a peerless leader. He began his speaking in his academy days when he defended the thesis, "That Christians have no right to participate in human governments." At Williams, according to Dean Caldwell, he gained a commanding position among the students by his ability as a debater. That was in the days when the literary society was the only "activity." As president of Hiram College he gained a local reputation in 1858 by a debate on the principle of evolution with John Denton, an Englishman. Garfield defended orthodoxy, but, unlike many debaters, he learned from his adversary and was never afterward as dogmatic as he had been. He was a popular preacher and lecturer in Ohio for some years before the Civil War. It is not commonly known that his published sermons fill two volumes. His speaking got him elected to the state legislature, and in 1860 he stumped Ohio and parts of Kentucky for Lincoln. In 1864, while he was still in the army, he was elected to Congress, and he remained in Congress until he was elected President eighteen years later.

Dean Caldwell's able biography gives full credit to his speaking ability, analyzes his important speeches, and estimates their effect upon contemporaries. The main purpose of the book, of course, is to estimate Garfield's place in American history, but the author does so with recognition of Garfield's speaking.

The book is number three of the American Political Leaders Series, edited by Allan Nevins. There is a complete bibliography.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN, *Princeton University*

Wabash College Orations, 1879-1932: A Centennial Volume with a foreword by W. NORWOOD BRIGANCE. The Wabash College Alumni Office, Crawfordsville, Indiana, 1932; pp. 128; $1.00.

A liberal arts college commemorating its Centennial Year here offers to its alumni and to those interested in speech a volume containing some of the successful speaking efforts of its students during the fifty-two years since it entered intercollegiate forensic competition. The fact that fourteen of the speeches included are products of the last twelve years does not mar the historical value of the four orations from the last quarter of the century past. Though victories in contests may not enhance the value of speeches they may bear testimony as to their excellence. Nineteen state and five interstate contest victories seem to furnish that evidence, which becomes totally unnecessary after reading the speeches.

Subjects? Ah—— ". . . Rhetoric . . . . has the function of discovering the means of persuasion for every case . . . . and hence we say that the art has no special application to any distinct class of subjects." A half-dozen highways to peace (a certainty in 1911 —a hope in 1921), eulogies (few in number but on noble subjects —Savonarola and Ibsen), the constitution (thanks to the pruner who cropped the eagle's wings), social criticism (a spirited plea for eugenics, an exposition of the nature and cause of the moral laxity of American youth, and a protest against capitalism), and political criticism (here the quality rises high) are subjects capably handled by young men, principally college seniors. Timely notes are struck as the American citizen, on different occasions, is urged to take up arms against the usurpation of power by political grafters, unscrupulous judges, and bribing gangsters. Broadside attacks upon the American press and lofty cheers for the power of public opinion are freshly phrased common denominators running through virile attacks.

As the back-stage speaking laboratory shifts from the literary society room of 1879 to the public speaking class room of 1931, platitudes and generalities ("The heresy of today becomes the orthodoxy of tomorrow." "In the depths of every human soul, in the dreams of sleep, in every flower that lifts its head to heaven, in every senseless, useless clod is lodged a mystery far transcending scientific skill to comprehend") seem to fall apart into details ("According to the census reports of 1920 . . . ." "According to

the army mental tests . . . ." "The homicide rate of the United States is eight times . . . ." "Last year, one of these advertisers . . . spent . . . ." "Yet today Americans own 200,000 acres of Haitian land . . . .").

If one's faith in the quality of contest speaking is wavering he should feel more optimistic after reading this compilation. Significant and timely subjects are developed by students who seem to know how to phrase effectively pertinent facts and judicious appeals.

The historical statement explaining the general growth of the Oratorical Contest movement and the Foreword evaluating the work of the orators, both written by Professor Brigance, form a fitting introduction for the book.

JOHN W. BLACK, *Adrian College*

IN THE PERIODICALS

WEAVER, ANDREW THOMAS: *The Place of Speech Training in the Curriculum.* Educational Administration and Supervision, Vol. XVII, No. 7. October 1931, pp. 522-529.

It is essential to realize that in education we are, first, teaching *pupils* rather than *subject-matter*; second, stimulating pupils into useful, adaptive activities; and third, trying to bring out all the significant and worthwhile responses of which the essentially unified personality is capable. The curriculum is, in a way, a training ground on which the pupil's powers must be built up.

Man's supreme problem is always "fitting himself satisfactorily and efficiently into his social environment." For that reason, elementary training in the social sciences, among which speech is pre-eminent, "transcends in value elementary discipline in the natural sciences."

Any subject, in order to justify its presence in the curriculum must satisfy two requirements: first, it must contribute to the general ends of education; and second, it must make a contribution which is not made by any other discipline. Speech training meets these tests because:

> "First, more directly than any other discipline, speech training is training in thinking, and better still, training in thinking in a social situation.
>
> "Second, more directly than any other discipline, speech training is training in certain essential techniques of social adjustment.
>
> "Third, speech training, more than any other discipline, is directly transferable from the classroom to other life situations without loss."

It is quite immaterial whether separate departments be maintained in secondary schools—every teacher should be trained in speech, with experts available for supervision and direction.

G. W. G.

JUDSON, LYMAN SPICER: *Combining the Breathing Undae of Speaker and Listener with the Dictaphone Record of the Speech.* American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XLIV, January 1932, 183-4.

A spring pneumograph "impinges a column of air directly to a knife edge water tambour. The tambour lever operates, over a pulley system, the moving coil of the electrodynamic recorder. The latter unit consists of a light movable coil cutting lines of force in the field of an energized primary helix. The induced current set up is amplified and controlled through a D. C. amplifier for convenient operation of a zero-center, dead-beat recording voltmeter. The voltmeter lever writes directly on the kymograph paper. Two of these combined air-recorder units may be used in obtaining thoracic and abdominal records. Any convenient number of these combinations may be used to record the breathing undae of the speaker and one or more listening Ss. . . . The use of this apparatus makes it possible to apply objective measurements to changes in breathing on the part of the speaker, due to (a) internal conditions and (b) external conditions (ed g. applause, hissing, which can be directed by accomplices of the experimenter), and to changes in breathing on the part of one or more listeners, due to the influence of the speaker or of the crowd. . . . . With the close co-operation of the speaker, and by having the listeners under observation scattered in the audience, it is possible very nearly to duplicate the normal audience-situation."

G. W. G.

BROWN, FREDERICK W.: *Viewpoints on Stuttering.* American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. II, January 1932, No. 2, pp. 1-24.

The paper presents "briefly certain of the theories and practises which are widely employed in attempting to understand, to treat and to prevent stuttering." On the basis of certain facts and principles which appear to be common to most of these theories and practises, an attempt is made to formulate a reasonable hypothesis upon which both therapeutic and prophylactic work may be based.

Quotations from a number of the leading authorities in the field are given, as to cause and treatment. "Procedures are sug-

gested as the basis of a rational method of attempting to solve the problem of stuttering which, to be more exact, is the personality problem of the stutterer."

G. W. G.

ROUNDS, G. H. and POFFENBERGER, A. T.: *The Measurement of Implicit Speech Reactions.* American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XLIII, 1931, 606-612.

Description of a method for getting kymographic records of sub-vocal speech by means of breathing curves. Sample curves are given to indicate the type of results obtained. (Quoted from *Psychological Abstracts, 6,* 1932, p. 181, No. 181.)

G. W. G.

SHEPARD, GRACE F.: *Symposium Rather than Debate.* Education, Vol. 52, December 1931, pp. 211-213.

Debate, which is derived from *de* and *batuere* (ML *battere*) to fight, "presupposes hostility, at its worst physically abusive hostility, at its most contemptible mere wrangling." *Symposium,* on the other hand, which is derived from the Greek, means literally, a drinking together. It suggests friendliness, good fellowship.

The debate often disregards truth, at least the debaters do. They become clever sophists. They may even be required to support the side of the question in which they do not believe, an evil against which, we are reminded, Mr. Roosevelt was wont to inveigh. "To espouse the side against which you have moral (*sic*) convictions is a devastating experience." Debating is pernicious because it requires the debater to "close his lips against the admission of any damaging fact; he must twist, or change, or otherwise manipulate evidence so that it may batter down his enemy."

To correct these inherent (?) evils, the symposium is suggested. "Regard for truth may now transcend all other considerations; there is no opposing side to beat." The audience participates, so that game, trickery, and mere entertainment are out. Co-operation rather than competition is the ideal.

G. W. G.

CONFREY, BURTON: *Making a Text for Oral English.* Education, Vol. III, October 1931, pp. 69-73.

A very excellent and workable outline is given of the class procedure and instruction in a class in Oral English. Each student

was asked to keep a note-book, and as the course developed, he arranged these and applied them to his needs. At the end of the semester he had his own text. The articles present what one student considered of greatest importance.

G. W. G.

DICKSON, BELLE: *The Vocabulary and Good Speech Habits.* The Elementary English Review, Vol. IX, January 1932, pp. 20-21, 24.

Oral English and the speaking vocabulary should be emphasized in all school work. The problem is, first, to provide training in connected speaking, and, second, to enlarge the children's reading, speaking and writing vocabularies. "Good speech habits and a large vocabulary go hand in hand," because of the necessity for clearness. If freedom and naturalness in expression are emphasized through the grades, everyone graduating from the elementary school should be able to talk for a few minutes on a familiar and interesting subject, using clear and concise language.

G. W. G.

NEWS AND NOTES

(Please send all items for this section direct to Miss Lousene Rousseau, 49 East 33rd Street, New York City.)

Approximately five hundred teachers and students, representing fifty-five schools from Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming, attended the Rocky Mountain Speech Conference for secondary schools and colleges, which met at the University of Denver on January ninth. The conference was so successful that it will be an annual affair in the future. Sponsored by the Department of Speech at the University of Denver, under the direction of Elwood Murray, the session included discussions and practical demonstrations in debate, dramatic arts, literary interpretation, word usages, speech and voice correction, and teachers' problems. Among the speakers were Wilber E. Moore, Colorado Agricultural College; Paul E. Soper, Western State Teachers College, Gunnison; Margaret Blackburn and R. E. Allen, Colorado State Teachers College, Greeley; Edith L. Ridings, Laramie, Wyoming, High School; Leon J. Whitney, Denver South High School; M. M. Blakeskee, Fort Collins High School; W. E. Oecker, Englewood High School; Walter Sinclair, Director of the University of Denver Civic Theatre; and Marion Robinson, Erna Triplett, and Elwood Murray, University of Denver.

Features of the conference were a debate between freshmen of the University of Denver and the State Teachers College of Greeley, on the subject of unemployment insurance, and a play, *When the Red Army Marches*, by Harry L. Baum, presented by the University of Denver Civic Theatre, under the direction of Walter Sinclair.

* * * *

The Oklahoma Senior College Speech Association and the High School Sections of the Oklahoma Educational Association arranged identical programs for their meetings at Oklahoma City, February 4, and at Tulsa, February 5. The main speaker at these meetings was Frank M. Rarig, of the University of Minnesota, formerly president of the National Association of Teachers of Speech. W. V. O'Connell was chairman of the College Association and Harold Netherton, of Central High School, Oklahoma City, of the High School Speech Section. The latter section also arranged a special meeting, at which papers were presented by Mrs. Zazelle Gifford of Oklahoma City, and Miss Perrill Munch, of the University of Oklahoma. D. T. Martin, of the Stillwater A. & M. College, discussed the state One-act Play Tournament, and a one-act play was presented by the Classen Little Theatre group.

* * * *

The Poetry Playhouse of the University of Southern California, under the direction of Miss Cloyde Dalzell, which was reported here in the last

issue, is presenting three programs for the spring season: "A Poem Program of the Dance," a "Poem Program of Prayer and Protest," and a closing bill of "Poem Portraits." Both sayers and players are men and women students of the School of Speech. In the first program, consisting of twenty-two numbers, some of the notable numbers were: a Chinese student conductor in native cosume, who "played" Don Blanding's "Chinese Music"; an interpretation of Carl Sandburg's "Jazz Fantasia"; oriental poem measures, presented by students in Javanese costumes; Negro poem novelties; a "grand little opera ballet" by A. P. Herbert; two chorus numbers by Vachel Lindsay, "The Fireman's Ball," and "The Potatoes Dance"; an animated interpretation of Sarojini Naidu's "Bells" and "Indian Dancers"; and a Greek dance-poem.

* * * *

South Dakota is organizing a new State Course of Study, in which a semester of training in public speaking will be required of every high school graduate.

* * * *

The curriculum at Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania, is in process of being completely revised. One of the most notable changes being instituted is a compulsory course in speech for all freshmen.

* * * *

Many teachers of speech will be interested in the poems selected by the committee in charge of the second annual Poetry Speaking Festival to be held at Northwestern University, March 24 and 25. They are as follows:

Preliminaries for Men:

Class I. "Feud"—Lew Sarett.
Class II. "Losers"—Carl Sandburg.
Class III. "A Hillside Thaw"—Robert Frost.

Semi-finals for Men:

Class I. "Indian Summer"—William Ellery Leonard.
Class II. "The Virginians Are Coming"—Vachel Lindsay.
Class III. "Demos"—Edward Arlington Robinson.

Finals for Men:

"The Falconer of God"—William Rose Benet.

Preliminaries for Women:

Class I. "The Garden by Moonlight"—Amy Lowell.
Class II. "The Ballad of the Doorstone"—Louise Ayres Garnett.
Class III. "Ellis Park"—Helen Hoyt.

Semi-finals for Women:

Class I. "Their God"—Harriet Monroe.
Class II. "Incident"—Nancy Byrd Turner.
Class III. "Anne Rutledge"—Edgar Lee Masters.

Finals for Women:

"The Bean Stalk"—Edna St. Vincent Millay.

The Drama League Travel Bureau announces that it has a number of scholarships to be awarded for study at the Central School of Speech Training and Dramatic Art in London (six weeks) and at the summer session of the University of Munich (four weeks). Applications for scholarships should be made to the League at once, together with a statement of the dramatic work the applicant has done and the instiutions with which he has been connected. The headquarters of the League are at 15 West 44th Street, New York City.

The Bureau is arranging three official drama tours this summer: a Russian Theatre Tour, under the direction of H. W. L. Dana; a Summer Theatre Tour, to be led by Carl Glick; and an English Study Tour, directed by Olivia Hobgood.

* * * *

The second congress of the International Society for Experimental Phonetics and Phonology will meet at Amsterdam, Holland, from the 3rd to the 7th of July, 1932. The psychology of speech, and physiology of speech and song will be discussed, problems in articulation, individual speech, organic speech defects, effect of climate upon speech and voice, will be included on the programs. Those who wish to attend or to receive report of the proceedings will please communicate with the secretary, Mr. L. Kaiser, Rapenburgerstraat 136, Amsterdam, Holland.

The Fifth Congress of the International Society for Logopedy and Phoniatry (remedial training of speech and voice) will take place in Budapest from the 7th to the 9th of July, 1932. Persons interested in attending or in receiving the literature are asked to communicate with the president of the society, Dr. Emil Fröschels, Vienna IX, Ferstelgasse 6.

Allegheny College, of Meadville, Pennsylvania, has arranged debates on the proposition, "Resolved: that capitalism as a system of economic organization is unsound in principle," with Geneva College, Thiel College, Westminster College, Grove City College, and the University of Pittsburgh, all in Pennsylvania; Ohio Wesleyan University, Oberlin College, Western Reserve University, College of Wooster, in Ohio; the University of West Virginia; and Brothers College, in New Jersey. All of the debates will be of the informal, no-decision type. Many other debates have been and will be held before luncheon clubs and high schools.

* * * *

The Reserve Rostrum is a group of speakers trained for public appearance by the Speech Department of Western Reserve University. These speakers are available to business, professional, or labor organizations, churches, luncheon assemblies, clubs or fraternal orders, high schools and other educational groups. The form of the speaking may be debates, informal discussions, group discussion leadership, or addresses. Last year seventy debates were held by members of the Reserve Forum, and twenty-eight debates by the intercollegiate teams.

* * * *

Twenty-five students trained in the Department of Speech at the University of Denver delivered some forty-five short addresses before various Denver audiences in favor of the Community Chest and Unemployment Relief Campaign last November.

DRAMATIC NEWS

The eighth annual One Act Play Festival presented by the dramatic classes of the Pontiac High School, Michigan, was held on December 3, 4, and 5, under the direction of W. N. Viola. The plays presented during this time were as follows: *Submerged,* by Stuart Cottman and LeVergne Shaw; *Red Carnations,* by Glenn Hughes; *Joint Owners in Spain,* by Alice Brown; *Why the Chimes Rang,* by Elizabeth McFadden; *The Great Dark,* by Dan Totheroh; *Medicine Show,* by Stuart Walker; *Travelers,* by Booth Tarkington; and *Silver Slippers,* a comic adaptation of Cinderella, written by the director, Mr. Viola. The program for the third night was four plays selected by a committee of judges for repetition after the performance of the first two nights.

* * * *

The play broadcasts of the NBC Radio Guild for the spring season, extending from January 1 to April 29, were and will be as follows: *The Importance of Being Earnest,* by Oscar Wilde; Ibsen's *Peer Gynt;* Synge's *Playboy of the Western World;* Barrie's *Dear Brutus; Prunella,* by Housman and Barker; *Milestones,* by Knoblauch and Bennett; Philips' *Paola and Francesca;* Pinero's *The Second Mrs. Tanqueray;* Dunsany's *King Argimenes* and *the Unknown Warrior, The Queen's Enemies,* and *The Lost Silk Hat;* Rostand's *Cyrano de Bergerac;* Milne's *The Dover Road;* Moody's *The Great Divide; The Terrible Meek,* by Charles Rann Kennedy; *The Truth,* by Clyde Fitch; Iben's *The Doll's House;* Zangwill's *The Melting Pot;* Benelli's *The Jest;* and *Beggar on Horseback,* by Kaufman and Connolly. The plays are broadcast on Friday afternoons from 4:15 to 5:15, Eastern Standard Time, over WJZ and nation-wide network.

* * * *

The Civic Theatre of the University of Denver, under the direction of Walter Sinclair, has produced for the current academic year, *The Road to Rome,* by Robert Sherwood, and *When the Red Army Marches,* by Harry S. Baum, a Denver writer. The remaining productions scheduled for the season are *The Emperor Jones,* by Eugene O'Neill, *Alison's House,* Susan Glaspell's Pulitzer Prize-winning play, and *Once in a Lifetime,* by Moss Hart and George Kaufman.

* * * *

The Qui Vive Club of the Eveleth, Minnesota, Junior College, recently presented *Wedding Bells,* by Salisbury Fields, under the direction of Earl W. Blank.

* * * *

A program has been received from Constantinople College, in Turkey, of a production there by the Dramatic Association of *The Yellow Jacket,* by Hazelton and Benrimo. Mabelle Platz was the director.

* * * *

The eleventh season of the Little Theatre of the University of California has included *March Hares,* by Harry Wagstaff Gribble; *Beyond the Horizon,* by Eugene O'Neill; *The Commodore Marries,* by Kate Parsons; *Hedda Gabler,* by Ibsen; *Hotel Universe,* by Phillip Barry; and *Tartuffe,* by Moliere. Edwin Duerr is director of the Little Theatre. The Department of Public